SHINNEMAN v. INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITY-COUNTY COUNCIL et al

Filing 107

Order on City Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - The City Defendants' second motion for judgment on the pleadings, dkt. 72 , is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent that Mr. Shinneman� 39;s state law claims against the Council and his official capacity and state law claims against Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith are dismissed. His Fourth Amendment claims against Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith for not interve ning when he was transported without a seatbelt are dismissed because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. His failure to train claim against the Council is dismissed. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time. The City Defend ants' motion is denied to the extent that the following claims against them remain: Fourth Amendment excessive force and failure to protect claims against Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith based on Mr. Shinneman's allegation that two of the officers present threw him headfirst into the van while he was handcuffed; and a Monell policy claim against the Council. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/1/2022. (JSR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TRAVIS SHINNEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITYCOUNTY COUNCIL, et al.
Defendants.

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No. 1:21-cv-02203-JMS-TAB

Order on City Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The plaintiff Travis Shinneman alleges that Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(IMPD) Officers Theodore Brink, Joshua Brown, Brian Linares, and Terry Smith violated his
constitutional rights when they either failed to intervene or participated in throwing him headfirst
into a Marion County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) van while he was handcuffed and allowed him to
be transported without a seatbelt or other safety restraints resulting in severe injuries. He also
alleges that the Indianapolis-Marion County City-County Council's (Council) policy requiring
IMPD to use MCSO to transport detainees despite the lack of seatbelts in the transport vehicles
was the moving force behind his injuries. The Council and the four IMPD officers (City
Defendants) have moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons below, the motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In deciding the motion, the Court accepts as true Mr. Shinneman's account of how he was
treated while in the custody of IMPD and MCSO. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616
(7th Cir. 2011). He alleges that on September 8, 2019, defendants Officers Brink, Brown, Linares,
and Smith arrested him for disorderly conduct and public intoxication because he had been walking

in the street and yelling. Pursuant to policy, the officers requested MCSO to transport
Mr. Shinneman to the Marion County Jail. MCSO Deputy Monday arrived on the scene and
became frustrated with Mr. Shinneman's difficulty entering the back of the van. Deputy Monday
and another unknown officer, presumably one of the four IMPD defendants, tossed a hand-cuffed
Mr. Shinneman headfirst into the back of the van. Deputy Monday transported him without a
seatbelt or other safety restraint. When Mr. Shinneman arrived at the Marion County Jail, he was
assaulted by several deputies and transported by ambulance to Eskenazi Hospital where was
diagnosed as a quadriplegic. Dkt. 63.
II.

Legal Standard

The City Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated under the
same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 646
(7th Cir. 2016), so the Court reviews the pending motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A facially plausible claim is one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
will "accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true" but will not defer to "legal conclusions
and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.
III.

Discussion

Mr. Shinneman does not object to the dismissal of the following claims: official-capacity
claims against Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith (dkt. 76 at 13); state law claims against

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the Council (id. at 20-21); and state law claims against the four Officers (id. at 20). Mr. Shinneman
asks that the state law claims against the officers be dismissed without prejudice so that he may
move to amend his complaint if he discovers that their actions were outside the scope of their
employment. Id. Because Mr. Shinneman does not object to the dismissal of these claims, the City
Defendants' motion to dismiss them is granted.
This leaves two sets of claims against the City Defendants: Fourth Amendment claims
against the four officers and a Monell policy claim against the Council. Mr. Shinneman's basis for
these claims is that the Council maintained a policy of delegating the transport of detainees to
MCSO despite knowing that MCSO transport vehicles lacked seatbelts or other safety restraints.
He asserts that the Council's policy, and the four officers' adherence to that policy, resulted in him
being transported without a seatbelt and being rendered a quadriplegic.
A. Fourth Amendment Claims Against IMPD Officers
1. Plausible Claim for Relief
Mr. Shinneman claims that defendant Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith violated
his rights when they failed to arrange other transport for him when they realized he was intoxicated
and was going to be transported without a seatbelt in the MCSO van. Dkt. 63 at 22, ¶ 114. He also
alleges that two individuals grabbed him on either side and tossed him headfirst into the van while
he was handcuffed. Id. at 6, ¶ 31. Although he does not know who tossed him into the van, Deputy
Monday was the only non-IMPD officer present, so presumably one of the IMPD officers assisted
him. At the least, the Court can infer from the amended complaint that Mr. Shinneman alleges that
the other officers failed to stop the two individuals from tossing him into the van.
Because Mr. Shinneman was a pretrial detainee who had not yet had a probable cause
hearing, the Court applies the Fourth Amendments' objective unreasonableness standard. Estate of

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Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 452 (7th Cir. 2017). An officer who is present and fails to intervene
to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is
liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know that other officers were committing a
constitutional violation and he had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm. Yang v. Hardin, 37
F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994).
Mr. Shinneman's allegations that one of the four IMPD officers participated in tossing him
headfirst into the MCSO van while he was handcuffed, and that the remaining officers failed to
intervene, state a viable Fourth Amendment claim. A reasonable jury could conclude that it was
objectively unreasonable to either participate or fail to intervene in this conduct.
It is less clear whether Mr. Shinneman's allegations that the IMPD officers failed to protect
him from being transported without a seatbelt state a viable Fourth Amendment claim. In Dale v.
Agresta, in the context of a qualified immunity defense to an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim regarding failure to seatbelt a convicted prisoner, the Seventh Circuit held that
a convicted inmate did not have a clearly established right to a seatbelt during transport under the
Eighth Amendment. 771 F. App'x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019). Because Mr. Shinneman's claims are
governed by the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, Dale does not foreclose
a Fourth Amendment violation when an officer fails to seatbelt an arrestee. The Court need not
decide whether to extend Dale's reasoning to the Fourth Amendment context, because the
individual officers are protected by qualified immunity as to these claims.
2. Qualified Immunity
"A state official is protected by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows: (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at
the time of the challenged conduct." Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal

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quotations and citations omitted). "'If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant
official' is protected by qualified immunity." Id. (quoting Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.
2017)). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). "Because a qualified immunity
defense so closely depends 'on the facts of the case,' a 'complaint is generally not dismissed under
[Rule 12] on qualified immunity grounds.'" Id. at 548 (quoting Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648,
651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Mr. Shinneman had a clearly established Fourth Amendment right not to be tossed into a
van headfirst while handcuffed. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1990) ("If the
officers intentionally restrained, jolted, and roughed up Titran without physical provocation from
her, their behavior was unreasonable."); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Facts
may be developed during discovery that alter this determination, but at this stage, the IMPD
officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Shinneman's excessive force or failure-toprotect claims. See Reed, 906 F.3d at 553 ("[A]lthough qualified immunity defenses should be
decided at 'the earliest possible stage in litigation,' Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991), the
determination whether qualified immunity exists for Palmer depends on 'particular facts' that are
not yet in the record.").
On the other hand, an arrestee's right to a seatbelt was not clearly established in September
2019. In Dale, the Seventh Circuit observed: "Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled
that transporting an inmate without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm." 771 F. App'x
at 661. Dale was decided a mere three months before Mr. Shinneman's arrest. Dale involved a
convicted inmate and the more rigorous Eighth Amendment standard. But absent a Fourth
Amendment case to the contrary, a reasonable officer could conclude from Dale that the transport

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of an inmate without a seatbelt was not objectively unreasonable. Officers Brink, Brown, Linares,
and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Shinneman's seatbelt claim.
B. Monell Policy Claim Against the Council
Mr. Shinneman raises a claim against the Council under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their
implementation of a policy requiring arrestees to be transported by MCSO, knowing MCSO
transport vehicles lacked seatbelts, and also based on the Council's alleged failure to train officers
in how to handle intoxicated arrestees. While municipalities and entities that contract with
municipalities can be held liable under section 1983, they cannot be held liable under a respondeat
superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). Rather, to be liable under section 1983, the entity must have caused the deprivation of the
plaintiff's federally secured rights "through its written policies, widespread practices or customs,
and the acts of a final decisionmaker." Levy v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir.
2019) (citing Bd. of the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).
As discussed above, while Dale held that it was not clearly established that convicted
inmates had a right to a seatbelt during transport, the court left the door open to the possibility of
such a right existing and supporting a Monell claim:
The department may be liable under § 1983 if its official policy or custom violates
a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Even if we assumed that the lack of seatbelt
violated Dale's Eighth Amendment rights, Dale has not produced evidence that the
sheriff's department did not provide seatbelts as a matter of policy.
771 F. App'x. at 661 (cleaned up).
Here, Mr. Shinneman claims that the Council maintained a policy of using MCSO for the
transport of arrestees (IMPD General Order 8.1(I)(F), that the Order did not give IMPD officers
discretion to consider transport alternatives, that the Council knew MCSO transport vehicles
lacked seatbelts or other restraints, and that this policy directly led to his injuries. Dkt. 63 at 5, ¶ 26;
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14, ¶ 81; 16, ¶91; 18, ¶ 96. These allegations give the Council fair notice and state a plausible
Monell claim.
In contrast, Mr. Shinneman's failure to train claim lacks sufficient factual allegations to
state a plausible claim. "A municipality can be held liable under a theory of failure to train if it has
actual knowledge of a pattern of criminally reckless conduct and there is an obvious need to
provide training to avert harm, even if the prior acts have yet to result in tragedy." Flores v. City
of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Mr. Shinneman alleges only that
the Council failed to train officers on the transport and emergency transport of individuals. Dkt. 63
at 18, ¶¶ 96-97. His response in opposition to the City Defendants' motion suggests that the failure
of the IMPD officers to prevent Mr. Shinneman from being transported without a seatbelt "is a
clear indication that there was a failure to train the officers on the proper recognition and handling
of intoxicated arrestees." Dkt. 76 at 19. Mr. Shinneman does not allege that the Council had actual
knowledge of a pattern of deliberate indifference or criminally reckless conduct related to the
transport of arrestees. And given the discussion in Dale regarding the lack of obvious risk
associated with transporting individuals without a seatbelt, it cannot be inferred from Mr.
Shinneman's allegations that there was an "obvious need to provide training" on transporting
arrestees "to avert harm". Flores, 997 F.3d at 733. Therefore, Mr. Shinneman's failure to train
claim against the Council is dismissed.
IV.

Conclusion

In summary, the City Defendants' second motion for judgment on the pleadings, dkt. [72],
is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent that Mr. Shinneman's
state law claims against the Council and his official capacity and state law claims against Officers
Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith are dismissed. His Fourth Amendment claims against Officers

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Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith for not intervening when he was transported without a seatbelt
are dismissed because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, his failure to train
claim against the Council is dismissed. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time.
The City Defendants' motion is denied to the extent that the following claims against them
remain:
•

Fourth Amendment excessive force and failure to protect claims against Officers
Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith based on Mr. Shinneman's allegation that two of
the officers present threw him headfirst into the van while he was handcuffed; and

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A Monell policy claim against the Council.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/1/2022

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Distribution:
Jennifer H. Culotta
CULOTTA & CULOTTA LLP
[e-mail]
J. Clayton Culotta
CULOTTA & CULOTTA LLP
[e-mail]
Carol A. Dillon
BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL, P.C.
[e-mail]
Andrew R. Duncan
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP
[e-mail]
Christopher Andrew Farrington
BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL ATTORNEYS
[e-mail]
Amy Stewart Johnson
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]
John F. Kautzman
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP
[e-mail]
Edward J. Merchant
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP
[e-mail]
Anthony W. Overholt
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]
Mathew Rayman
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Adam Scott Willfond
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]

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