MARSHALL v. GEO GROUP INC. et al

Filing 108

ORDER ADDRESSING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS - The IDOC Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. 66 , is GRANTED, and the GEO Group Defendants' motion, dkt. 73 , is GRANTED in part and DENIED in pa rt. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. This matter shall proceed on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims against Defendants Carter, Christian, and Sevier in their individual capacities and The GEO Group under the theory set forth in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See dkt. 45 at 9. The clerk is directed to terminate J. Smith as a defendant on the docket. No partial judgment shall issue. See Order for details. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 9/24/2024 (Copy mailed to Plaintiff). (LBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
AUGUSTUS MARSHALL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
GEO GROUP INC., et al.,
Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-02862-JPH-CSW

ORDER ADDRESSING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Augustus Marshall brings claims alleging that while he was
incarcerated at New Castle Correctional Facility ("NCCF"), Defendants violated
his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Defendants Robert E. Carter, Jr., and Derek Christian ("IDOC
Defendants") have filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to
his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before filing this lawsuit. Separately,
Defendants Mark Sevier and The GEO Group, Inc. ("GEO Group Defendants")
have filed a motion for summary judgment on both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. For the reasons below, the IDOC Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, dkt. [66], is GRANTED, and the GEO Group Defendants'
motion, dkt. [73], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a
way to resolve a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the
material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Cmty. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A
"genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). "Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need
only consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it
need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harney v. Speedway
SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008)).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the
basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

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U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. Indeed, "[t]he
court has no duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically
cited" in accordance with the local rules. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(h); see S.D. Ind.
L.R. 56-1(e) ("A party must support each fact the party asserts in a brief with a
citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible
evidence. . . . The citation must refer to a page or paragraph number or
otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the
supporting evidence.").
II.
Factual Background
A. Offender Grievance Process
At all times relevant to the claims in this suit, Plaintiff was incarcerated
at NCCF within the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"). The IDOC has
a standardized offender grievance process ("Offender Grievance Process") which
was in place during the time Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated. Dkt. 67-1
at 2 (Affidavit of Grievance Specialist Shannon Smith).
IDOC Policy and Administrative Procedures 00-02-301, Offender
Grievance Process ("Offender Grievance Process") is the IDOC policy governing
the grievance procedure and details how a prisoner must exhaust his
administrative remedies using that procedure. Id. During the relevant period,
the grievance process consisted of three steps: (1) submitting a formal
grievance following unsuccessful attempts at informal resolutions; (2)
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(2) submitting a written appeal to the facility Warden/designee; and (3)
submitting a written appeal to the IDOC Grievance Manager. Id.; see also dkt.
75-1 at 2–3 (Affidavit of NCCF Offender Grievance Coordinator Melissa
Rutledge). Successful exhaustion of the grievance process requires timely
pursuing each step or level of the process. Dkt. 67-1 at 2.
B. Plaintiff's Participation in the Offender Grievance Process
The conditions of Plaintiff's confinement are grievable issues covered by
the Offender Grievance Process. Id. at 5. Plaintiff's grievance history does not
reflect any fully exhausted grievances that could be associated with his
conditions-of-confinement claims against the Defendants, namely the condition
of his confinement during the STAND / non-transitional unit. Id.; see also dkt.
75-1 at 6; dkt. 67-4 (Plaintiff's Grievance History).
C. Plaintiff's Participation in the Classification Appeals Process
The Offender Grievance Process lists "[c]lassification actions or decisions"
under its examples of non-grievable issues. See dkt. 67-2 at 3 ("[A] separate
classification appeals process is in place for this purpose[.]"). In his response,
Plaintiff does not dispute that the conditions of his confinements were grievable
issues under the Offender Grievance Process nor that he failed to fully exhaust
any grievances with respect to these issues. See generally dkt. 79. Rather, he
responds only to the Defendants' claims that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his due-process claims. Id.
Specifically, he states that the Offender Grievance Process is "irrelevant" to his
due-process claims because classification decisions are "non-grievable," and he
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attaches several exhibits intending to demonstrate his participation in that
separate process. Id. at 7; see also dkts. 78-1 to 78-18. The IDOC Defendants
reiterated in their reply that they are not seeking summary judgment on
Plaintiff's due-process claims. Dkt. 80 at 1. The GEO Defendants did not file a
reply.
III.
Discussion
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative
remedies before suing over prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "[T]he
PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
"To exhaust available remedies, a prisoner must comply strictly with the
prison's administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the rules
dictate." Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006)). A "prisoner must submit inmate complaints
and appeals 'in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
"Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense," Defendants face the
burden of establishing that "an administrative remedy was available and that
[Mr. Marshall] failed to pursue it." Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th

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Cir. 2015). "[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable of use for
the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be
obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (internal quotation
omitted). "[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance
procedures that are capable of use to obtain some relief for the action
complained of." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit "has taken a strict approach to exhaustion." Wilborn
v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018). "An inmate must comply with
the administrative grievance process that the State establishes . . . ." Id.; see
also Ross, 578 U.S. at 639 (explaining that the mandatory language of the
PLRA "means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust").
A. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims
Defendants have met their burden of proving that Plaintiff "had available
[administrative] remedies that he did not utilize" with respect to this
conditions-of-confinement claims. Dale, 376 F.3d at 656. The record reflects
that Plaintiff was aware of the grievance process and that he failed to utilize
this process with respect to the conditions-of-confinement claims proceeding in
this action. Dkt. 20 at 2. Although Plaintiff has provided numerous exhibits
showing his participation in the classification appeals process, these exhibits
pertain only to his due-process claims, not his conditions-of-confinement
claims. Plaintiff therefore has not identified a genuine issue of material fact
supported by admissible evidence that counters the facts established by
Defendants.
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The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff did not complete the
available administrative process as required before filing this lawsuit. Reid,
962 F.3d at 329. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), his conditions-ofconfinements claims against Defendants must be dismissed without prejudice.
Id.; see also Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
"all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.").
B. Due Process Claims
While the IDOC Defendants do not seek summary judgment with respect
to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims, the GEO Group
Defendants do. See dkt. 74 at 1. The GEO Defendants have not shown,
however, that Plaintiff "had available [administrative] remedies that he did not
utilize" with respect to his due-process claims. Dale, 376 F.3d at 656. The
only grievance process in the record, the Offender Grievance Process, identifies
classification as a non-grievable issue, see dkt. 67-2 at 3. The GEO
Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff has exhausted a "separate
classification appeals process" applicable to Plaintiff's due-process claims.
Furthermore, the GEO Defendants have not addressed Plaintiff's argument that
the classifications process (and not the Offender Grievance Process) is
applicable to his claims or his designated exhibits demonstrating his
participation in that process.
The GEO Defendants have not carried their burden with respect to
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims so their motion for
summary judgment is denied with respect to those claims.
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IV.
Conclusion
The IDOC Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [66], is
GRANTED, and the GEO Group Defendants' motion, dkt. [73], is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions-ofconfinement claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. This matter shall
proceed on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims against
Defendants Carter, Christian, and Sevier in their individual capacities and The
GEO Group under the theory set forth in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). See dkt. 45 at 9. The clerk is directed to terminate J. Smith as a
defendant on the docket. No partial judgment shall issue.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/24/2024

Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
AUGUSTUS MARSHALL
6311 Southcrest Road
Fort Wayne, IN 46816

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