PHILLIPS v. CENTURION HEALTH et al
Filing
48
Entry Granting Unopposed Motions for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - Plaintiff Brian Phillips filed this action contending that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility ("NCCF"). Specifically, Mr. Phillips alleges that the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs when he suffered a stroke. Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Phillips failed to exhau st his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before filing this lawsuit. Defendants' unopposed motions for summary judgment, dkt. 31 , dkt. 34 , dkt. 36 , are GRANTED. Defenda nt Rampallo's renewed motion for summary judgment, dkt. 47 , is denied as unnecessary. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice shall now issue. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 5/10/2024. Copy to Plaintiff via US mail. (JSR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
BRIAN ALLEN PHILLIPS,
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Plaintiff,
v.
CARTER, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 1:23-cv-00882-SEB-CSW
Entry Granting Unopposed Motions for Summary Judgment
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
Plaintiff Brian Phillips filed this action contending that his constitutional rights were
violated while he was incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility ("NCCF"). Specifically,
Mr. Phillips alleges that the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs when
he suffered a stroke. Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Phillips failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") before filing this lawsuit. For the reasons explained below, the motions for summary
judgment are GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way to resolve a
case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A
"genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts" are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws
all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v.
Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or
make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the
materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need not "scour every inch of the
record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th
Cir. 2017).
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. Indeed, "[t]he court has no duty to search or consider any
part of the record not specifically cited" in accordance with the local rules. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56 1(h);
see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56 1(e) ("A party must support each fact the party asserts in a brief with a citation
to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible evidence. . . . The citation
must refer to a page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant
information can be found in the supporting evidence.").
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Mr. Phillips failed to respond to the summary judgment motions. Accordingly, facts alleged
in the motion are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the record.
See S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response brief and identify disputed
facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the movant
still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the undisputed facts." Robinson v.
Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
II.
Factual Background
At the time Mr. Phillips alleges that he was denied care for a stroke, he was confined at
NCCF, but shortly after the incident, he was transferred to Miami Correctional Facility ("MCF").
Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 11 (Rutledge Aff.).
A. Offender Grievance Process
The IDOC has a standardized offender grievance process which was in place at NCCF and
MCF during the time Mr. Phillips alleges his rights were violated. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 6; dkt. 31-5 ¶ 6
(Gapski Aff.).
IDOC Policy and Administrative Procedures 00-02-301, Offender Grievance Process
("Offender Grievance Process") is the IDOC policy governing the grievance procedure and details
how a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies using that procedure. Dkt. 31-1 (Offender
Grievance Process). During the relevant period, the grievance process consisted of three steps:
(1) submitting a formal grievance following unsuccessful attempts at informal resolutions;
(2) submitting a written appeal to the facility Warden/designee; and (3) submitting a written appeal
to the IDOC Grievance Manager. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 6. Successful exhaustion of the grievance process
requires timely pursuing each step or level of the process. Id. ¶ 7.
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If the inmate receives no grievance response within twenty business days of the grievance
specialist's receipt of the grievance, the inmate may appeal as though the grievance had been
denied. Dkt. 31-5 ¶ 15. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the grievance response, he may appeal the
response by completing the grievance appeal form. Id. The grievance appeal must be submitted to
the grievance specialist within five business days after the date of the grievance response. Id.
During the orientation process and after arriving at NCCF and MCF, inmates receive
information on the Offender Grievance Process. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 8; dkt. 31-5 ¶ 8. Inmates also have
access to a current copy of the policy in the facility law library and can request a copy at any time.
Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 8; dkt. 31-5 ¶ 8.
B. Mr. Phillips's Participation in the Grievance Process
On February 17, 2023, while at NCCF, Mr. Phillips submitted a grievance complaining
that on February 8, 2023, he suffered what he believed was a stroke. Dkt. 34-3 at 3. Mr. Phillips
wrote that he was taken to medical, but that Dr. Carter sent him back to his cell and told him he
was faking the stroke. Id. He was sent to the hospital the next day. Id. For relief, Mr. Phillips asked
for the medical staff to be held accountable and for compensation for his pain and suffering from
his injury. Id.
Mr. Phillips was transferred to MCF on March 1, 2023, before he received a response to
his grievance. See dkt. 31-4 ¶ 11. When an inmate is transferred to MCF, Michael Gapski, the
grievance specialist at MCF, coordinates with the transferring facility's grievance specialist to
facilitate a response to any previously-filed grievances. Dkt. 34-5 ¶ 13. About a week after
Mr. Phillips's transfer to MCF, Shane Nelson, NCCF's grievance specialist, notified Mr. Gapski
that his office had received a grievance from Mr. Phillips. Id. at ¶ 16. Mr. Nelson sent Mr. Gapski
the NCCF response denying the grievance on March 26 and Mr. Gapski forwarded the response
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to Mr. Phillips the next day. Id. ¶ 18-19. In the grievance response, a staff member recounted the
treatment that Mr. Phillips received, and Mr. Nelson stated, "Grievance addressed." Dkt. 34-3 at
1. There is no record that Mr. Phillips appealed this grievance. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 11.
III. Discussion
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies before suing
over prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to
all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation omitted). "To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must
comply strictly with the prison's administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the rules
dictate." Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
90-91 (2006)). A "prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals 'in the place, and at the
time, the prison's administrative rules require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
"Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense," Defendants face the burden of establishing
that "an administrative remedy was available and that [Mr. Phillips] failed to pursue it." Thomas
v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015). "[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is
'capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be
obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). "[A]n inmate is
required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain
some relief for the action complained of." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Defendants have met their burden of proving that Mr. Phillips "had available
[administrative] remedies that he did not utilize." Dale, 376 F.3d at 656. The undisputed record
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reflects that Mr. Phillips was made aware of the grievance process. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 8; dkt. 31-5 ¶ 8. It
is also undisputed that, when Mr. Phillips filed a grievance regarding his medical care, this
grievance was denied, and the denial was provided to him after his transfer to MCF. Dkt. 34-5
¶ 18-19. There is no record that Mr. Phillips appealed this denial. Dkt. 31-4 ¶ 11. By failing to
respond to the motions for summary judgment, Mr. Phillips has failed to identify a genuine issue
of material fact supported by admissible evidence that counters the facts established by
Defendants.
In short, Mr. Phillips did not complete the available administrative process as required
before filing this lawsuit. Reid, 962 F.3d at 329. The consequence of his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is that his claims against Defendants
must be dismissed without prejudice. Id; see also Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (holding
that "all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.").
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, Defendants' unopposed motions for summary judgment, dkt. [31],
dkt. [34], dkt. [36], are GRANTED. Defendant Rampallo's renewed motion for summary
judgment, dkt. [47], is denied as unnecessary. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice
shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: ________________
5/10/2024
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Distribution:
BRIAN ALLEN PHILLIPS
226590
WESTVILLE - CF
WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
5501 South 1100 West
WESTVILLE, IN 46391
All Electronically Registered Counsel
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