ROSE v. MARION COUNTY H.D.C. COMMISSIONER

Filing 35

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - Mr. Rose has filed a second amended complaint, which the Court must screen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A. This action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If Mr. Rose is able to identify an individual or a corporate or municipal policy or practice he believes is responsible for his inadequate medical care, he may be able to pursue his claims in a new lawsuit. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 8/30/2024. (See Order.) Copy mailed to Plaintiff. (BAA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LASHAWN M. ROSE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARION COUNTY H.D.C. COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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No. 1:23-cv-01841-SEB-MG

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
The Court dismissed two complaints in which LaShawn Rose alleged inadequate care for
a knee injury at the Marion County Adult Detention Center (MCADC) and New Castle
Correctional Facility (NCCF). Dkts. 22, 30. In both cases, Mr. Rose failed to allege a plausible
claim for relief against any defendant.
Mr. Rose has filed a second amended complaint, which the Court must screen pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because it too fails to state a plausible claim for relief against any defendant,
this action is dismissed pursuant to § 1915A, and the clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To determine whether the complaint states a
claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). Under
that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Second Amended Complaint
Mr. Rose asserts claims for damages and injunctive relief against three defendants, which
he identifies as the MCADC medical staff, the GEO Group, Inc., and Centurion Health of Indiana,
LLC. His claims are based on the following allegations, which the Court accepts as true at the
pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023).
Mr. Rose injured his knee playing soccer at the MCADC in April 2022. He believes he tore
a muscle or tendon. He does not specifically describe his symptoms at that point.
Mr. Rose submitted requests to see the medical staff and was told to purchase over-thecounter pain medication from the commissary. At some point he was given an opportunity to see
a nurse or doctor but refused to do so because he was told he would be charged money, which he
did not have. He states that the medical staff "let [him] suffer in pain" until he moved to New Castle
Correctional Facility (NCCF) in September 2022.
At some point while he was still at the MCADC, Mr. Rose began to "self-medicate."
Dkt. 32 at 3. This was effective until he arrived at NCCF, and "the pain came back harder [than]
ever." Id. at 3–4.
Mr. Rose aggravated the injury playing basketball in approximately late October 2022. He
submitted healthcare requests but did not see a doctor until December 2022. She ordered an x-ray,
which revealed no broken bones.

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Mr. Rose continues to submit health care requests but continues to get "the run around."
Id. at 4. One nurse has helpfully provided a knee brace, a bottom bunk pass, and over-the-counter
pain medication, which has not been effective. She arranged for Mr. Rose to receive an ultrasound,
but he has not seen a doctor yet. His knee is swollen and in constant pain.
III. Discussion of Claims
Although private entities, Centurion and GEO act under color of state law by contracting
to manage NCCF and to provide medical care to inmates, so they are treated as government entities
for purposes of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d
824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010); Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002).
To state a claim against Centurion or GEO, Mr. Rose must allege that he suffered a constitutional
deprivation as the result of a corporate policy, practice, or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, 940 F.3d 954, 966 (7th
Cir. 2019) ("Prevailing on [a Monell] claim requires evidence that a Wexford policy, practice, or
custom caused" the constitutional violation alleged.").
The amended complaint alleges that Mr. Rose has not received adequate medical attention
for his knee injury. No allegation in the amended complaint, however, supports a reasonable
inference that his requests for treatment have been ignored, or that his treatment has been delayed,
because of a policy, practice, or custom of Centurion or GEO. Accordingly, constitutional claims
against these defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Mr. Rose also asserts claims against the MCADC medical staff. Any claim against the Jail
fails because the Jail is not a person who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Smith v. Knox
County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he district court was correct that, in listing

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the Knox County Jail as the sole defendant, Smith named a non-suable entity."). Any claim against
a different municipal entity fails for the same reasons his claims against Centurion and GEO fail:
He has not identified a municipal policy, practice, or custom that has caused him to receive
inadequate medical care or otherwise supported a reasonable inference that he has been wronged
due to a municipal policy, custom, or practice. And, he has not identified any MCADC employee
who could be sued as an individual under § 1983, even though the Court issued process to the
Marion County Sheriff and allowed Mr. Rose to pursue discovery for the purpose of identifying
such individuals. See dkt. 22 at 3–4. 1 "It is pointless to include an anonymous defendant in federal
court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor
can it otherwise help the plaintiff." Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (cleaned
up); see also Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2021) (Plaintiff used "John Doe"
placeholders in original complaint, then amended after learning defendants' names, but
amendments did not relate back because "suing a John Doe defendant is a conscious choice, not
an inadvertent error.").
IV. Conclusion
This action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If Mr. Rose is able to identify an individual or a
corporate or municipal policy or practice he believes is responsible for his inadequate medical

The Court notes Mr. Rose's request that the Court appoint an attorney to assist him. Dkt. 32 at 2. The Court
need not rule on this request because he did not present it as a standalone motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)
("A request for a court order must be made by motion."). Had he done so, the Court would deny his motion
because he has not satisfied the threshold requirement of demonstrating that he made reasonable efforts to
recruit an attorney on his own. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021).

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care, he may be able to pursue his claims in a new lawsuit. The clerk is directed to enter final
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

_______________________________

8/30/2024

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

LASHAWN M. ROSE, JR.
290837
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
P.O. Box E
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
Barry F. McGinley
Frost Brown Todd LLP
[e-mail]
Anthony W. Overholt
Frost Brown Todd LLP
[e-mail]

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