DOE I et al v. SOUTH MADISON COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al
Filing
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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS JANE DOE I'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM - Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Jane Doe I's Individual Claim [Dkt. 8 ]. Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Jane Doe I's Individual Claim [Dkt. 8 ] is GRANTED without prejudice. The case shall proceed accordingly. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 10/25/2024. (See Order.) (BAA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JANE DOE I, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
SOUTH MADISON COMMUNITY
SCHOOL CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 1:24-cv-00476-SEB-KMB
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS JANE DOE I'S
INDIVIDUAL CLAIM
Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Jane Doe I's Individual
Claim [Dkt. 8]. Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Individually and as Next Friend and Legal
Guardian, and Jane Doe II, an unmarried minor, 1 have brought this action against
Defendants South Madison Community School Corporation and Boone Madison Special
Services Cooperative, alleging a claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 as well as state law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff Jane Doe I's individual claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons detailed below, that motion is
GRANTED without prejudice.
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On October 11, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Proceed Under
Pseudonyms, holding that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are entitled to continue to
proceed anonymously in this case under the standard recently set forth by the Seventh Circuit in
Doe v. Trustees of Indiana University, 101 F.4th 485 (7th Cir. 2024) and Doe v. Loyola
University Chicago, 100 F.4th 910 (7th Cir. 2024).
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Factual Background
In January 2023, Jane Doe II, a minor, was a ninth grader at Pendleton Heights
High School ("Pendleton Heights"), within the South Madison Community School
Corporation ("South Madison"). Jane Doe II has been diagnosed with a verbal
processing disability and has an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"). During the time
period relevant to this litigation, Hamilton Boone Madison Special Services Cooperative
("Special Services") provided specialized services, certified staff, mental health
therapists, and psychologists for students with disabilities like Jane Doe II within South
Madison, including at Pendleton Heights. At all relevant times, Jane Doe II was also
involved with the Best Buddies Program, an international program sponsored by South
Madison and Special Services, to promote inclusion of students with intellectual and
developmental disabilities.
On January 26, 2023, during an event sponsored by the Best Buddies Program at
Pendleton Heights, Jane Doe II was sexually assaulted by a fellow student, J.S., who is
believed to be mentally or emotionally disabled. The event was sponsored by Katie
Neely, a special education teacher employed by Special Services and contracted by South
Madison. Jane Doe II immediately reported the sexual assault to two friends, one of
whom knew of prior incidents involving inappropriate touching by J.S. and right away
reported the assault to Ms. Neely. After learning of the assault, Ms. Neely contacted
J.S.'s parents, but did not contact Jane Doe II's mother, Jane Doe I, nor did she report the
assault to school administration officials; instead, Jane Doe I did not learn of the incident
until after Jane Doe II was picked up from the event and taken home. Since the assault
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occurred, despite repeated requests from Jane Doe I, South Madison has failed to make or
maintain reasonable accommodations to minimize contact between Jane Doe II and J.S.
Based on these facts, Plaintiffs have brought a Title IX claim as well as state law
claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants.
Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Jane Doe I's individual claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. That motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
Legal Analysis
I.
Applicable Law
Defendants have filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). In this procedural context, the Court must accept as true all wellpled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all ensuing inferences in favor of the
non-movant. Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the
complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests,” and its “[f]actual allegations must . . . raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). The complaint must therefore include “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Stated otherwise, a facially plausible complaint is one
which permits “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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II.
Discussion
Jane Doe I is pursuing this litigation both individually and in her capacity as Jane
Doe II's representative. Defendants seek dismissal of only Jane Doe I's individual claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, not any of the claims brought in her
representative capacity. The complaint alleges that Jane Doe I is Jane Doe II's parent and
legal guardian; that Ms. Neely did not inform Jane Doe I or school administrators of Jane
Doe II's assault; that Jane Doe I only learned about the incident after Jane Doe II came
home from the event; that despite her repeated requests, the school corporation has failed
to make reasonable accommodations to minimize contact between Jane Doe II and J.S.;
and that Defendants, through their negligence, caused an infliction of emotional distress
upon Jane Doe I when she learned that Jane Doe II had endured a sexual assault on
school grounds. Based on these allegations, Jane Doe I seeks damages from Defendants
for "emotional distress, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, counseling expenses,
and other past, present, and future damages." Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 24, 33, 38. Defendants contend
that Jane Doe I's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must be dismissed
because the above-recited facts do not support an entitlement to relief under such a legal
theory.
Under Indiana law, a plaintiff can generally pursue a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress only under the following circumstances: (1) where the plaintiff
suffered a direct physical impact and the defendant's negligence resulted in the injury or
death of a third party (the "modified-impact rule"); or (2) where the plaintiff has
witnessed or come to the scene soon thereafter the death or severe injury of certain
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classes of relatives (the "bystander rule"). Hyzy v. Anonymous Provider 1, 234 N.E.3d
248, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Ind.
2011)). In a divided opinion in K.G. by Next Friend Ruch v. Smith, 178 N.E.3d 300 (Ind.
2021), the Indiana Supreme Court recently created a "carve-out exception to the
bystander rule's proximity requirement," (id. at 308), holding as follows: "To reiterate our
new rule, when a caretaker assumes responsibility for a child, and when that caretaker
owes a duty of care to the child's parent or guardian, a claim against the caretaker for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress may proceed when the parent or guardian later
discovers, with irrefutable certainty, that the caretaker sexually abused that child and
when that abuse severely impacted the parent or guardian's emotional health." Id. at 311.
Jane Doe I argues that the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to plausibly
state a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim under the exception to the
bystander rule set forth in K.G. However, that exception, described by the K.G. Court as
a "narrow rule," provides for a parent or guardian's claim against their child's caretaker
for sexual abuse perpetrated by the caretaker. Id. at 304. Here, the complaint specifically
alleges that another student, not Jane Doe II's caretaker, was responsible for the sexual
abuse. Nor does the complaint contain any facts to support a plausible inference that at
the time the abuse occurred, Defendants had assigned the alleged perpetrator caretaking
responsibilities over Jane Doe II. Rather, the complaint alleges that Jane Doe II was
"under the supervision of Katie Neely, an employee and agent of Hamilton Boone
Madison Special Services Cooperative and contracted by South Madision Community
School Corporation." Compl. ¶ 22. Accordingly, the facts as alleged, when taken as true
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as we are required to do at this stage of the litigation, do not come within K.G.'s "narrow"
exception to the bystander rule. See K.G., 178 N.E.3d at 308.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Jane Doe I's
Individual Claim [Dkt. 8] is GRANTED without prejudice. The case shall proceed
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10/25/2024
Date: _______________________
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Distribution:
Shyann Ronea Boyer
CHURCH CHURCH HITTLE & ANTRIM
sboyer@cchalaw.com
Lynsey F. David
Church Church Hittle & Antrim
ldavid@cchalaw.com
Laurel Robin Klapper Gilchrist
GILCHRIST & BORINSTEIN LLP
lgilchrist@gilchristandborinstein.com
Gregory L. Laker
COHEN & MALAD LLP
glaker@cohenandmalad.com
Liberty L. Roberts
CHURCH CHURCH HITTLE & ANTRIM (Noblesville)
lroberts@cchalaw.com
Andrea Rose Simmons
S.K. HUFFER & ASSOCIATES, PC
asimmons@cohenandmalad.com
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