HINKLE v. WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 23

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability - petition of Roshene Hinkle for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the court finds that a certific ate of appealability should not issue. Also, because the record is sufficient to permit the proper disposition of the action, Hinkles motion to further expand the record 22 is denied. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The court finds that Hinkle has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find "it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right" and" debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling." The court denies a certificate of appealability. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/12/2011.(copy to petitoner via US mail) (see entry for details)(VS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
ROSHENE HINKLE,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BROWN,
Respondent.

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2:10-cv-317-JMS-DKL

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Roshene Hinkle for a writ of
habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the
court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue. Also, because the record is
sufficient to permit the proper disposition of the action, Hinkle’s motion to further expand
the record [22] is denied.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Hinkle was convicted in an Indiana state court of burglary, armed robbery, criminal
confinement, carjacking and theft. Hinkle’s convictions were affirmed on appeal in Hinkle
v. State, No. 27A05-0811-CR-641 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009).
Hinkle seeks habeas corpus relief based on his claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed fundamental error
in failing to give a limiting instruction.
“[T]he burden is on the petitioner to raise his federal claim in the state court at a
time when state procedural law permits its consideration on the merits. . . .” Bell v. Cone,
543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005). A state prisoner who seeks habeas corpus relief must fully
and fairly present his federal claims to the state courts before he files his federal habeas
petition. See Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2009). The failure to do so
constitutes either a failure to exhaust state court remedies—if remedies remained
available—or procedural default—if the opportunity to present the claim to the state
courts has passed. Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1472 (7th Cir. 1992). It is this latter
phenomenon which is conclusive as to the proper outcome in the present case.
Procedural default "occurs when a claim could have been but was not presented to
the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas petition,
be presented to the state court." Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962 (1993). When procedural default has occurred, it can be
overcome if a habeas petitioner “can demonstrate either (a) cause for the default and

prejudice (i.e., the errors worked to the petitioner's ‘actual and substantial
disadvantage,’); or (b) that failure to consider his claim would result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice (i.e., a claim of actual innocence).” Conner v. McBride, 375 F.3d at
649 (internal citations omitted). “Cause” for a procedural default exists if the petitioner can
demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s
efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986). Prejudice is demonstrated by showing that the errors worked to the petitioner’s
“actual and substantial disadvantage.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when a petitioner establishes that “a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Smith, 598 F.3d at 387–88.
Hinkle committed procedural default with respect to the claims in his habeas
petition. Specifically, these were claims asserted in Hinkle’s direct appeal, but he did not
seek transfer of that decision invoking the discretionary review of the Indiana Supreme
Court. His failure to do so constitutes his procedural default. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999) ("'[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's
established appellate review process,' including review by the state's court of last resort,
even if review in that court is discretionary.").
“[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear before
his claim is properly presented to the district court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1, 14 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). One of these is the
doctrine of procedural default. That is the barrier Hinkle faces here and he has failed to
overcome that barrier. His habeas petition must therefore be denied.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules
Governing § 2254 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the court finds that Hinkle has
failed to show that reasonable jurists would find “it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and “debatable whether [this court] was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The court
therefore denies a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

08/12/2011
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana