HOLLEMAN v. MARK et al
Entry Denying Motion to Reconsider - The request for reconsideration 13 is denied. (See Entry.) Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 11/27/2012. (RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
ROBERT L. HOLLEMAN,
T. MARK, et al.,
Entry Denying Motion to Reconsider
A motion to reconsider is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence. Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis
Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985). For example, a motion for
reconsideration is appropriate when: (1) a court has patently misunderstood a
party; (2) a court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented; (3) a
court has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension; or (4) a change in the
law or facts has occurred since the submission of the issue. On the other hand, a
motion for reconsideration is an “improper vehicle to introduce evidence previously
available or to tender new legal theories.” Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804
F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff Robert Holleman seeks reconsideration of the ruling on page 2 of the
Entry issued on October 16, 2012. Specifically, Holleman objects to the dismissal of
the claims against defendant Snyder. Holleman alleges that defendant Snyder
refused to allow Holleman to grieve the cold conditions on the Secured Control Unit
in violation of his First Amendment and Due Process Rights. The court stated:
Prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their
grievances from the government, but that right is the right of access to
the courts, and this right is not compromised by the failure of the
prison to address his grievances. Flick v. Alba, 932 F.3d 728, 729 (8th
Cir. 1991). As explained in Antonelli v. Sheahan, Aany right to a
grievance procedure is a procedural right, not a substantive one.
Accordingly, a state's inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.@ 81 F.3d 1422,
1430-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The foregoing has
recently been cited as Circuit law Aspecifically denouncing a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process right to an inmate
grievance procedure.@ Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th
Cir. 2008). Because Holleman had no expectation of a particular
outcome of his grievances, there is no viable claim which can be
vindicated through ' 1983.
Holleman argues that the court concluded that he has no right to seek
redress of his grievances from the government. This conclusion goes too far. The
court stated that prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their
grievances from the government, but that right is the right of access to the courts.
In support of such a right of access to the courts claim, Holleman alleges that
defendant Snyder prevented him from filing grievances to exhaust his
administrative remedies related to the cold conditions of the Secured Housing Unit
and that this (presumably) impeded his litigation of a non-frivolous legal claim.
Holleman’s, claim fails however, because he has not alleged that any case related to
the cold conditions (which he sought to grieve) was dismissed for failure to exhaust.
In other words, Holleman has not shown an actual injury. See Jacobs v. Gerber, 403
Fed. Appx. 67, 69, 2010 WL 4386856, 2 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding no actual injury
when grievance process was made unavailable). In any event, such an actual injury
should not result under the circumstances alleged because the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) requires exhaustion only of those administrative remedies “as
are available,” the PLRA does not require exhaustion when circumstances render
administrative remedies “effectively unavailable.” Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217,
1223-24 (9th Cir. 2010). “Prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the
exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees
do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct
to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th
Cir. 2006); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).
Finally, Holleman’s citation to Doobey v. Illinois Department of Correction,
574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009) is not relevant to the prior analysis. In Doobey, the
issue was whether the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for exercising his
First Amendment rights, by grieving and publicizing the alleged misconduct. The
court stated that “[t]his is not the case in which to try to straighten out the law of
petitioning for redress of grievances.” Id. at 447.
For the reasons stated above, the request for reconsideration  is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
ROBERT L. HOLLEMAN
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
6908 S. Old U.S. Highway 41
P.O. BOX 500
CARLISLE, IN 47838
All Electronically Registered Counsel
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