WILSON v. WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 4

ENTRY Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability - Wilsons petition for a writ of habeas corpus shows on its face that it was filed beyond the statute of limitations and that for this reason he is not entit led to the relief he seeks. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore dismissed as untimely. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The court also DENIES a certificate of appealability. See Entry for details. (Copy to plf by U.S. Mail). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 4/9/2012.(LBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

GEORGE W. WILSON,

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Petitioner,
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vs.
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WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, )
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Respondent.
)

2:12-cv-53-JMS-DKL

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Denying Certificate of Appealability
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of George Wilson (“Wilson”) must be
summarily dismissed because his petition shows on its face that he is not entitled
to the relief he seeks. In addition, the court finds that a certificate of appealability
should not issue.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that
appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856
(1994). This authority is conferred by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in United States District Courts. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th
Cir. 1993).
“[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear
before his claim is properly presented to the district court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In this
case, Wilson encounters the hurdle produced by the one-year statute of limitations.

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), federal habeas petitions challenging a judgment of a state court are
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The effective date of
the AEDPA was April 24, 1996. The limitation period, with certain exceptions,
begins to run after the completion of direct review of the judgment by state courts.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A 1-year grace period applies to petitioners whose
convictions were final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA. Lindh v. Murphy, 96
F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), reversed on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320
(1997).
On August 24, 1991, Wilson was convicted of burglary, two counts of rape,
one count of criminal deviate conduct and five counts of confinement. His
convictions were affirmed in Wilson v. State, 603 N.E.2d 908 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992).
Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 3, 1997. That petition was
dismissed without prejudice on November 5, 1999. Wilson then filed another
petition for post-conviction relief on May 11, 2009. The trial court’s denial of postconviction relief was affirmed on appeal in Wilson v. State, 948 N.E.2d 868
Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
Wilson’s conviction became final before the effective date of the AEDPA. He
therefore had through April 24, 1997, in which to file his federal habeas petition.
See Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 978 (7th Cir. 2000). The running of the
statute of limitations was tolled, however, while "a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Gray v. Briley, 305 F.3d
777, 778 (7th Cir. 2002) (the one-year period “is tolled while a ‘properly filed’
application for post-conviction review is pending in state court.”).
Wilson’s first post-conviction relief action was filed on April 3, 1997, after 344
days of the grace period had been used. The running of the statute of limitations
was tolled for Wilson from April 3, 1997, until Wilson’s motion to withdraw his postconviction action was granted on November 5, 1999. At that point, Wilson had 21
days left in his 1-year grace period. This 21-day period expired on November 26,
1999, which is the last day on which he could have timely filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
Wilson filed a new petition for post-conviction relief on May 11, 2009. By that
time, the 1-year grace period had been expired by nearly 10½ years. The filing of
the new petition for post-conviction relief thus has no effect on the computation of
the statute of limitations. Teas v. Endicott, 494 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2007)(the fact
that the state courts entertained a collateral attack on prisoner's conviction more
than one year after the expiration of the one year time limit does not "re-start" the
statute of limitations under § 2244(d)); Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 978-79
(7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that it is illogical to toll a limitations period that has
already passed).

With the present habeas action having been filed on February 27, 2012 (the
date Wilson gave the habeas petition to prison authorities for filing), this action was
filed more than 12½ years late.
Wilson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus shows on its face that it was filed
beyond the statute of limitations and that for this reason he is not entitled to the
relief he seeks. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore dismissed as
untimely.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing ' 2254 Proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the court finds that
Wilson has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it Adebatable whether
[this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.@ Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). The court therefore denies a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

04/09/2012
Date: _____________________

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana