TRAPP v. OLIVER et al

Filing 21

Entry Discussing Motion for Summary Judgment - Howard Ray Trapp, Jr. brings this action pursuant to the theory recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 38 (1971) alleging that the defendants exhibited deliberate indiff erence to his serious medical needs. Arguing that Trapp failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies, the defendants move for summary judgment. The defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt. 18] is granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to plaintiff via US MailTrapp has not responded.. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/15/2013. (RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
HOWARD RAY TRAPP, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. WILLIAM WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:12-cv-90-JMS-DKL

Entry Discussing Motion for Summary Judgment
Howard Ray Trapp, Jr. brings this action pursuant to the theory recognized in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 38 (1971) alleging that the defendants
exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Arguing that Trapp failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies, the defendants move for summary judgment.
Trapp has not responded.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party. Id. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court
views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).

Trapp has not responded to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
consequence of these circumstances is that he has conceded the defendants’ version of the
events. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the
nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”).
II. Discussion
A. Undisputed Facts
Consistent with the foregoing, therefore, the following statement of facts is not
necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts
are presented in the light reasonably most favorable to Trapp as the non-moving party with
respect to the motion for summary judgment.
Trapp is a federal inmate formerly housed at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre
Haute, Indiana (“FCC Terre Haute”).1 He alleges in this case that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has
promulgated an administrative remedy system applicable to Trapp’s claims. The administrative
remedy procedures require grievances to be filed first to institution staff with an informal
resolution form (BP-8), then to the Warden at the institution (BP-9), then at the Regional Office
(BP-10). The final stage of the administrative remedy process would be an appeal to the General
Counsel’s Office (BP-11).
Trapp filed his BP-8 at FCC Terre Haute regarding the claims relevant to this law suit on
March 23, 2012. On April 5, 2012, Trapp filed a BP-9 dated March 26, 2012. That request was
assigned as Administrative Remedy # 682810-F1. Administrative Remedy # 682810-F1
complained about the Health Care Administrator and medical staff at FCC Terre Haute using

1 Trapp is now housed at the MCFP Springfield. The clerk shall amend the docket to reflect Trapp’s address as
identified in the distribution of this Entry.

Trapp’s past mental health issues in a discriminatory manner against Trapp which adversely
impacted his medical care at FCC Terre Haute. On April 20, 2012, the Warden denied the
remedy request with a detailed explanation. Trapp commenced this law suit on April 12, 2012.
On May 7, 2012, Trapp filed an appeal of the denial of Administrative Remedy # 682810-F1,
with the Regional Director (BP-10), it was assigned Remedy # 682810-R1, and denied by the
Regional Director on May 10, 2012. Trapp did not appeal the denial of his BP-10 to the General
Counsel’s Office.
Trapp asserts in his complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing
Administrative Remedy # 638430-A1. Administrative Remedy # 638430-A1 related to medical
care and providers at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield,
Missouri (hereafter “USMCFP Springfield”). The issues raised in Administrative Remedy #
638430-A1 were solely related to Trapp’s dissatisfaction with the medical staff and medical care
provided to him at that location. Administrative Remedy 638430-A1 was dated June 26, 2011,
approximately 10 months before Trapp was transferred to FCC Terre Haute. Administrative
Remedy 638430-A1 had nothing to do with medical care at FCC Terre Haute or the defendants
named in this case.
B. Analysis
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner exhaust his available
administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
applies to “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter, 534
U.S. at 532. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other

critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in the
place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.’”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Based on the undisputed facts, Trapp failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies. It is undisputed that with respect to his medical care at FCC Terre Haute, Trapp filed
Administrative Remedy # 682810-F1 on April 5, 2012. Trapp then filed this lawsuit on April 12,
2012. His Remedy request was denied by the Warden on April 20, 2012. He then filed an appeal
of the denial of Administrative Remedy # 682810-F1, and that appeal was received on May 7,
2012, by the Regional Director. The Regional Director denied the appeal on May 10, 2012.
Trapp did not file an appeal of the Regional Director’s denial. In other words, Trapp failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies in two ways: (1) by filing this lawsuit before the
administrative remedy process was completed, and (2) by failing to complete fully the
administrative remedy process by filing an appeal to the General Counsel’s Office.
The consequence of these circumstances, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is that Trapp’s
claims should not have been brought and must now be dismissed without prejudice. See Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “a prisoner who does not
properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies,
and thus is foreclosed by § 1997e(a) from litigating”); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th
Cir. 2004)(“We therefore hold that all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without
prejudice.”).

III. Conclusion
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [dkt. 18] is granted. Judgment consistent
with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________

07/15/2013
Date: __________________
Distribution:
HOWARD RAY TRAPP, JR.
15668-076
MCFP Springfield
Medical Center/Federal Prisoners
P.O. Box 4000
Springfield, MO 65801
Electronically Registered Counsel

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana