BROOKS v. CARAWAY

Filing 16

ENTRY - Brooks has sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 under circumstances which do not permit or justify the use of that remedy. The savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) is thus not available to him for that purpose. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 12/30/2013.(RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
MARTES NIYUM BROOKS,
Petitioner,
vs.
J.F. CARAWAY,1
Respondent.

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Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Martes Niyum Brooks is confined in this District and seeks a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On March 1, 2005, Brooks pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He was sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924, because he had three prior violent felonies. Brooks did not appeal his conviction or
sentence or file a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Now, Brooks
challenges his sentencing as as armed career criminal via 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
A § 2241 petition by a federal prisoner is generally limited to challenges to the execution,
not the validity, of the sentence. Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998);
Atehortua v. Kindt, 951 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1991). A “federal prisoner should be permitted to
seek habeas corpus only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction
of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255
motion.” Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). “The
essential point is that a prisoner is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to receive a
decision on the merits.” Potts v. United States, 210 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2000).
1

The petitioner’s current custodian is substituted as the proper respondent.

Brooks contends that he is no longer properly categorized as an armed career criminal
due to recent changes in the law, announced by the Supreme Court in Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137 (2008), and Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). The question here
thus becomes whether § 2255 gives Brooks a meaningful opportunity to challenge his § 924(c)
conviction.
Brooks has not argued that his habeas claim would not be cognizable under § 2255 or
that such an action is not available to him. Even had he done so, it is the inefficacy of the
remedy, not the personal inability of the petitioner to utilize it, that is determinative. Garris v.
Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C.Cir. 1986). Thus, for example, a petitioner cannot show that a
motion under § 2255 is “ineffective” simply because that remedy is no longer available because
the deadline for filing such a motion has passed. Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.
2001)(“The mere fact that Garza's petition would be barred as a successive petition under § 2255,
however, is not enough to bring the petition under § 2255's savings clause; otherwise, the careful
structure Congress has created to avoid repetitive filings would mean little or nothing.”).
Brooks has sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 under circumstances which do not
permit or justify the use of that remedy. The savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) is thus not
available to him for that purpose. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

12/30/2013
Date: __________________

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Martes Niyum Brooks
Reg. No. 07688-041
Terre Haute Penitentiary
P.O. Box 33
Terre Haute, IN 47808
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