SOBIN v. BROWN
Filing
25
Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - The petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. All other motions are denied as moot. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 10/10/2013.(RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
GREGORY SOBIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
D. BROWN,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 2:12-cv-00243-WTL-MJD
Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Gregory Sobin seeks a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. WVS 12-02-0003. In that proceeding, Sobin was found guilty of
violating prison rules by conspiracy/attempting to commit any Class A offense/violation of
criminal law. The evidence supporting the hearing officer’s finding is that on February 3, 2012,
outgoing mail from Sobin at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility was found to contain a
letter from Sobin to retailer Nordstrom, wherein Sobin falsely claimed that he had mailed a
defective coat he had received for retirement to Nordstrom and was entitled to a replacement.
This letter was inside a larger envelope addressed to Sobin’s father and containing the letter and
an envelope addressed to Nordstrom intended to be mailed by Sobin’s father.
Contending that the proceeding is tainted by constitutional error, Sobin seeks a writ of
habeas corpus. The court finds, however, that there was no error of that nature and that Sobin’s
habeas petition must therefore be denied. This conclusion rests on the following facts and
circumstances:
1.
Sobin is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if he is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a). Prisoners in Indiana
custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.
2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45
(7th Cir. 2001), without due process. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
2.
In these circumstances, Sobin was entitled to the following process before being
deprived of his liberty interests: (1) advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of
the claimed violation; (2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) the
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent with
institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and
the reasons for the disciplinary action. Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.
1992). In addition, there is a substantive component to the issue, which requires that the decision
of a conduct board be supported by "some evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445
(1985).
3.
Under Wolff and Hill, Sobin received all the process to which he was entitled.
That is, the charge was clear, adequate notice was given, and the evidence was sufficient. In
addition, (1) Sobin was given the opportunity to appear before the hearing and make a statement
concerning the charge, (2) the hearing officer issued a sufficient statement of its findings, and (3)
the hearing officer issued a written reason for the decision and for the sanctions imposed. Sobin’s
arguments that he was denied due process are either refuted by the expanded record or based on
assertions which do not entitle him to relief.
a.
A “sufficiently impartial” decisionmaker is necessary in order to shield the prisoner
from the arbitrary deprivation of his liberties. Wolff, at 570–71; see also Gaither v. Anderson,
236 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1112,
1116 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). Sobin’s first claim is that he was
denied an impartial decisionmaker because the hearing officer said because his superior
officer wrote the conduct report there was no reason for a hearing because Sobin was guilty.
Federal courts employ an initial presumption that disciple hearing officers properly discharge
their duties. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997). This presumption can be
overcome with “clear evidence to the contrary.” See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996). Sobin provides no proof to support the story of the hearing officer’s alleged
statement. He has failed to rebut the presumption that the hearing officer in this case acted
appropriately. See, e.g., Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909 (finding the presumption “soundly rebutted”
where petitioner presented evidence to support his claim that the decision maker was biased
in his particular case). He is not entitled to relief as to this first claim.
b.
Sobin’s second claim is that he was denied due process because he was not provided
with requested exculpatory evidence. Specifically, Sobin claims he did not receive the large
envelope in which it was alleged he was attempting to mail the prohibited letters. However,
the evidence shows otherwise. Casework Manager Beverly Gilmore was notified by
personnel in the mail room of the irregularity. She inspected the materials, confiscated some
of them (issuing a confiscation report), issued the conduct report, and returned the large
envelope to Sobin. Staff thereafter did not have the large envelope addressed to Sobin’s
father. If that envelope was exculpatory, it was Sobin’s responsibility to bring the envelope to
the disciplinary hearing. This claim is meritless because it is based on an argument contrary
to the expanded record.
c.
As to Sobin’s third claim, the evidence favorable to the hearing officer’s decision has
already been described. The “some evidence” standard of Hill is satisfied if “there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
Id., at 455–56. Stated differently, “[t]his standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from
which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced.’” Id., at 455 (quoting
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)).
“Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire
record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”
Id. “[O]nly evidence that was presented to the [hearing officer] is relevant to this analysis.”
Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992). Sobin states there was no evidence
supporting his guilt, but the expanded record shows otherwise. The reporting officer saw the
large envelope and recited the person to whom it was addressed. The contents of the large
envelope support an inference that Sobin was attempting to defraud Nordstrom’s by
obtaining merchandise or funds to which he was not entitled. The evidence was sufficient.
Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal
habeas court “will overturn the [hearing officer's] decision only if no reasonable adjudicator
could have found [the petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence
presented.”); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (“The Federal Constitution does not require
evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary
board.”).
4.
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of
the charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action,
and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Pearson to the relief he
seeks. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed. All other motions are denied as moot.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10/10/2013
Date: __________________
Distribution:
Gregory D. Sobin 113650
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant -- Court Only
All electronically registered counsel
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?