ODOM v. PRISON HEALTH SERVICES et al

Filing 110

Entry Discussing Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus - In a twist on his earlier request for an order directing his custodian to transport him to a doctor's office, the plaintiff, a Kentucky prisoner, now seeks an order directing the United States Marshal to transport him to an orthopedic hand specialist for examination. The motion for writ of habeas corpus [dkt. 73] is denied. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 9/13/2013. (RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

GLENN D. ODOM, II,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. TALENS doctor,
NURSE FLINER Nurse,
KIM GREY,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:12-cv-00251-JMS-MJD

Entry Discussing Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
In a twist on his earlier request for an order directing his custodian to transport him to a
doctor’s office, the plaintiff, a Kentucky prisoner, now seeks an order directing the United States
Marshal to transport him to an orthopedic hand specialist for examination. The plaintiff hopes to
use the testimony of the specialist as evidence in support of his Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim. The plaintiff argues that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), gives this
court the authority to order his release to the Marshal’s Service for any reason.
Section 1651(a), the All Writs Act, which states that through such jurisdiction the court
“may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law.” This does not mean, as the plaintiff suggests that this Court
can order his release to the Marshal’s Service for any reason. As the plaintiff points out his
request is for a writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus must be “directed to the person in
whose custody the party is detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Thus, this statute deprives the Court of
any power to require the Marshals Service to perform that task. See Ivey v. Harney, 47 F.3d 181,

184 (7th Cir. 1995). For example, in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals
Service, 474 U.S. 34 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the All Writs Act does not authorize a
district court to order United States marshals to transport state prisoners from state prisons to
federal court houses in the ordinary course of litigation in federal courts. Instead, the court held
that such a writ must be directed to the plaintiff’s custodian. The Supreme Court explained,
Section 1651, the All Writs Act:
is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by
statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that
authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. Although that Act
empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises,
it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with
statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate.
474 U.S. at 43. In other words, a court may not employ § 1651(a) to evade the limitations
imposed by the habeas statutes such as § 2243. See Jones v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 964 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition, the plaintiff’s request is not agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
This Court could not find any authority (at common law or otherwise) to support the plaintiff’s
position that this Court can order the State of Kentucky to release the plaintiff to the U.S.
Marshal, and then order the U.S. Marshal to transport the plaintiff to a doctor’s office for
examination for the purpose of collecting evidence for use in civil litigation. Accordingly, the
motion for writ of habeas corpus [dkt. 73] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________

09/13/2013
Date: __________________

Distribution:
All Electronically Registered Counsel

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana