DAY v. KNIGHT
Filing
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Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - The petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/26/2013.(RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
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COREY DAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY KNIGHT,
Respondent.
Case No. 2:13-cv-00028-WTL-DKL
Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
The petition of Corey Day for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. JCU-12-10-0038. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Day’s
habeas petition must be denied.
Discussion
A. Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process
requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision maker, a written statement articulating the
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record”
to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.
2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
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B. The Disciplinary Proceeding
Day was charged with disorderly conduct. On October 18, 2012, Correctional Officer
Bridget Daeger wrote a report of conduct charging Day with Class B offense 236.1 The Conduct
Report states:
On October 18, 2012, I, Officer Daeger was downstairs in D dorm when I
heard a commotion upstairs. I held on to my keys and my chits and went up the
staircase slowly. As I reached the top of the stairs, I witnessed Offender Collins,
Eric DOC # 225980 and Offender Day, Corey DOC # 988795 grabbing each
other’s shirts and pushing each other saying “come on”. I immediately called a
10-10 over the radio to sergeant. As soon as the two noticed me, they split up and
stated they were just playing. I instructed them both to sit down in a chair until
sergeant made it over.
Conduct Report, Exhibit A.
On October 18, 2012, Day was notified of the charge of Disorderly Conduct, when he was
served with the Conduct Report and the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (Screening Report). Day
was notified of his rights and pled not guilty. He was appointed a lay advocate at his request. Day
did not request any physical evidence. Day requested witnesses Offenders Daryl Coleman, Donnie
Darcy, and Darnell Allen. Statements from these offenders were collected. Daryl Coleman
submitted the following written statement:
Me, myself & Eric Collins & Corey Day, we all work-out together. Eric goes home this
Wed. & I would hate to see both of those guys get punished for horseplaying. They made a
mistake by horseplaying – never had any serious write ups. Second chance is needed. Hope
that you give them a second chance.
Donnie Darcy submitted this written statement, “The two offender’s were not fighting,
they had just grabbed each other and kicked over a chair. That’s when the officer came up stairs
and seen them standing there.” Darnell Allen’s written statement provided the following, “I
witnessed Eric Collins & Cory Day horse playing they were just having a little fun with each other.
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Class B Offense 236 is defined as “Disorderly conduct: exhibiting disruptive and/or violent conduct which
disrupts the security of the facility or other area in which the offender is located.” See Department of
Correction’s Disciplinary Process For Adult Offenders (ADP), Dkt. No. 12-2.
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They are pretty cool with each other they work out together every day. I know they were not
fighting.”
The hearing officer conducted a disciplinary hearing in JCU-12-10-0038 on October 24,
2012. The hearing officer found Day guilty of the charge of Disorderly Conduct. In making this
determination, the hearing officer considered the Conduct Report, Day’s statement (“it was just
honest fun”), and witness statements. The hearing officer recommended and approved the sanction
of 30-days earned credit time deprivation.
Day appealed to the Facility Head on October 25, 2012. The Facility Head denied the
appeal on November 1, 2012. Day appealed to the Final Reviewing Authority, who denied his
appeal by letter dated November 30, 2012.
C. Analysis
The only argument Day presses in his reply to the return to order to show cause is his view
that he was charged with a more severe offense than necessary. He insists the evidence more
appropriately supports the less serious charges of Disruptive Behavior or Fighting. Day explains
that both offenders involved in the incident were not injured and did not require medical treatment.
“It just seems wrong that Petitioner Corey Day was charged with such a serious offense
considering the facts and actions of the offenders just having fun.” Dkt. 15 at p. 4.
This argument is not persuasive. The respondent correctly points out that the evidence
showed that Day caused a commotion, was pushing and shoving another offender, and a chair was
kicked over in the process. The conduct report documents that Officer Daeger heard a commotion
and saw Day and another offender grabbing and pushing each other. This conduct fits within the
definition of Disorderly Conduct: “exhibiting disruptive and/or violent conduct which disrupts the
security of the facility or other area in which the offender is located.” The officer could hear the
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offenders from downstairs, and they did not split up until they saw her. Regardless of what was in
the minds of the two offenders, their conduct disrupted the security of the facility. The commotion
diverted the attention of Officer Daeger, as well as the three other offenders who provided witness
statements. These facts are “some evidence” to support the charge of Disorderly Conduct. The
“some evidence” standard is lenient, “requiring only that the decision not be arbitrary or without
support in the record.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). A rational
adjudicator could readily conclude from the content and surrounding circumstances of the conduct
report that Day’s conduct was disorderly. Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d
1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal habeas court Awill overturn the . . . [conduct board=s] decision
only if no reasonable adjudicator could have found . . . [the petitioner] guilty of the offense on the
basis of the evidence presented”), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457
(“The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but
the one reached by the disciplinary board.”).
Day is not entitled to habeas relief because he was afforded due process. He received
24-hour notice of the charge against him and, at the time he received notice of the charge, he was
given the opportunity to request witnesses and evidence. He requested three witnesses, all of
whom provided written statements. He did not request any physical evidence. The Conduct
Report, offender’s statement, and witness statements were presented to and considered by the
hearing officer. In addition, Day received a copy of the Report of Disciplinary Hearing, which
documented the evidence on which the hearing officer relied and the basis for her decision. There
is no evidence that the hearing officer was biased. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir.
2003)(citations omitted) (Finding adjudicators in prison disciplinary cases “are entitled to a
presumption of honesty and integrity. . . .”). Finally, the Conduct Report and witness statements
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provide “some evidence” that Day engaged in Disorderly Conduct.
D. Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was
no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Day to the relief he seeks. Accordingly,
Day’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment
consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
06/26/2013
Date: __________________
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
COREY DAY
988795
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1946 West U.S. Hwy 40
Greencastle, IN 46135
Frances Hale Barrow
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Email: frances.barrow@atg.in.gov
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