EASLEY v. KNIGHT

Filing 26

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability - For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Kent Easley for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Easley's Show Cause and Motion for Summary Judgment Supported by Evidence and Sworn Oath [dkt. 17] is denied. The parties' strident arguments about procedural default are not jurisdictional in nature. The better course here is for the merits of Easley's claim to be add ressed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. In addition, the court finds that the certificate of appealability should not issue. (See Entry.) Copy to petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 11/14/2013. (RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

KENT A. EASLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY KNIGHT,
Respondent.

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2:13-cv-116-JMS-MJD

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Kent Easley for a writ of habeas
corpus must be denied. In addition, the court finds that the certificate of appealability should not
issue.
I.
Convicted offenders have no entitlement to early release from a prison sentence based on
the Due Process Clause alone. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Rather, when a
state creates a right to good time credit a prisoner's interest therein is embraced within the
Fourteenth Amendment's “liberty” concerns so as to entitle him to those minimum procedures
appropriate under the circumstances and required by the due process clause to insure that this
state created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Id. Any deprivation of this protected liberty
interest must comport with due process. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985).

An Indiana statute, IND. CODE § 35–50–6–3.3(b), provides in relevant part:
In addition to any credit time that a person earns under subsection (a) or section 3
of this chapter, a person may earn credit time if, while confined by the department
of correction, the person:
(1) is in credit Class I;
(2) demonstrates a pattern consistent with rehabilitation; and
(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain at least one (1) of the following:
...
(B) A certificate of completion of a substance abuse program approved by the
department of correction.
The Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) has the obligation to “establish admissions
criteria and other requirements for programs available for earning credit time under subsection
(b).” IND. CODE § 35–50–6–3.3(c).
In the present case, Easley contends that he has been improperly denied credit to which
he is entitled pursuant to IND. CODE § 35–50–6–3.3(b). His claim was rejected by both the trial
court and the Indiana Court of Appeals. Easley v. State, 980 N.E.2d 446 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012)
transfer denied, 983 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 2013). He seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The scope of federal habeas review is limited. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13,
16 (2010). “[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment
susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides
that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).” Id.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), codified 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), et seq., govern this case because
Ritchie filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996). “A state court's decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law
if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it
‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza,
540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06
(2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’
prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of petitioner's case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7;
Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). With respect to § 2254(d)(2), statecourt determinations of factual issues are “presumed correct” unless the petitioner can rebut the
presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79
F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1996).

The Court assumes for the purpose of resolving Easley’s habeas petition that IND. CODE §
35–50–6–3.3(b) supports a liberty interest in the award of good time credit if an inmate satisfies
the requirements of that statute. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). This
statute “allows a person to earn credit time if, ‘while confined by the department of correction,’
the person is in credit Class I, demonstrates a pattern consistent with rehabilitation, and
successfully completes the requirements to obtain a certificate of completion of a substance
abuse program approved by the department of correction.” Smith v. State, 982 N.E.2d 483, *2
(Ind.Ct.App. 2013)(unpublished).
The defendant in Smith did not prevail because he was on home detention when he
participated in the specified programs, not in the custody of the DOC. The same result is seen in
Gates v. State, 990 N.E.2d 71 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), wherein the defendant argued that the postconviction court erred by denying his request for credit time under IND. CODE § 35–50–6–3.3 for
certificates of completion he received while he was in the Marion County Jail awaiting trial. The
defendant in Gates failed to prevail because he was not in the custody of the DOC.
Easley’s circumstances when he participated in the substance abuse treatment program in
2000 included that he “was detained in the Shelby County Jail prior to the sentencing on his
original charges.” Easley, 980 N.E.2d at 980, *4. He was thus ineligible for the credit he sought.
The Indiana Court of Appeals also noted that “Easley presented no evidence before the postconviction court that the program he completed was ‘approved by the department,’ and indeed,
there was ample evidence presented that the program was not approved by the DOC.” Id. The
denial of Easley’s petition for post-conviction relief on this ground was thus affirmed. That
decision is consistent with the earlier decision in Smith and with the later decision in Gates.

"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the state
courts’ adjudication of Easley’s petition for credit time based on his completion of an
unapproved substance abuse treatment program while he was confined in the Shelby County Jail
awaiting the disposition of criminal charges. Easley was not eligible under these circumstances
to the award of credit pursuant to IND. CODE § 35–50–6–3.3(b).
The AEDPA standard Atightly constrains the availability of the writ.@ Stock v. Rednour,
621 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2010). "A defendant whose position depends on anything other than
a straightforward application of established rules cannot obtain a writ of habeas corpus."
Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381, 1388 (7th Cir. 1997). No such established rules entitle Easley
to relief in this case. Easley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied. Easley’s
Show Cause and Motion for Summary Judgment Supported by Evidence and Sworn Oath [dkt.
17] is denied. The parties’ strident arguments about procedural default are not jurisdictional in
nature. The better course here is for the merits of Easley’s claim to be addressed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
II.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules
Governing § 2254 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court finds that Easley has failed to
show that reasonable jurists would find “it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The court
therefore denies a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________

11/14/2013
Date: __________________

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Electronically Registered Counsel
Kent Easley
DOC # 103481
Putnamville Correctional Facility
1946 West U.S. 40
Greencastle, IN 46135-9275