RENEHAN v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE et al

Filing 5

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - Renehan shall have though August 22, 2014, in which to show cause why judgment consistent with this Entry should not issue. Renehan shall not bring a claim on behalf of any corporation unless the corporation has retained counsel. **SEE ORDER** Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/23/2014. (ADH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
RODNEY ALLEN RENEHAN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
12TH CIRCUIT COURT VIGO COUNTY
INDIANA, STATE OF INDIANA,
Defendants.

Entry and Order to Show Cause
I.
The plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 2] is granted.
II.
This Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before
service on the defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard
as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal
pleadings standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by Renehan are
construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, “[p]ro se litigants are
masters of their own complaints and may choose who to sue-or not to sue,” Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), and the court may not rewrite a complaint to include
claims that were not presented. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999).
First, Renehan appears to bring this action in his own name and on behalf of RAK
Development Inc. “A corporation is not permitted to litigate in a federal court unless it is
represented by a lawyer licensed to practice in that court.” U.S. v. Hagerman, 545 F.3d 579, 581
(7th Cir. 2008). Because Renehan is not an attorney, he may not represent RAK Development
Inc. Any claim purportedly brought on behalf of RAK Development Inc. is dismissed.
Second, plaintiff Renehan has filed this civil action against the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), the 12th Circuit Court, Vigo County, Indiana, and the State of Indiana. However, his
claims against each entity are not clear from the complaint. A plaintiff can plead himself out of
court if he pleads facts that preclude relief. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir.
2007); McReady v. Ebay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006). His complaint alleges no set of
factual allegations that state a claim for relief that is plausible (or even discernable) on its face.
Third, Renehan’s complaint is a civil rights complaint (dkt. 1, p. 1) brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988).
The IRS is not a suable entity. Section 1983 does not support an action against the federal
government, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1973), and under even the
most liberal reading of the complaint, Renehan does not articulate a claim against the IRS

pursuant to Bivens. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits suits against the United
States except in specific instances where the government has consented to be sued. FDIC v.
Meyer, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives the
government’s immunity, but only under certain circumstances. The FTCA only permits claims
against the United States, but not agencies or individuals. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a); Hughes v. United
States, 701 F.2d 56, 57 (7th Cir. 1982). Therefore, the Internal Revenue Service is not an
appropriate defendant and the claim against it is dismissed.
Finally, neither the State of Indiana nor the Vigo County Court are persons subject to suit
pursuant to § 1983. Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989).1 Accordingly, both the
State of Indiana and the Vigo County Court are dismissed.
III.
Renehan shall have though August 22, 2014, in which to show cause why judgment
consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to
show cause, an IFP applicant’s case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any
timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.”).
Renehan shall not bring a claim on behalf of any corporation unless the corporation has retained
counsel.

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The “12th Circuit Court Vigo County Indiana” does not exist. If Renehan is attempting to sue
the Vigo County Court, it is not a suable entity. To the extent the Vigo County Court receives
state funding and is a state agency, the court is not a “person” and cannot be subject to liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

07/23/2014
Date:__________________

Distribution:
Rodney Allen Renehan
285 N. Gilbert Street
Apartment 8
Clinton, Indiana 47842

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana