DENNIS v. SUPERINTENDENT et al
Filing
78
Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The defendants' 41 motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The plaintiff's 67 motion to correct err ors is denied as moot. The defendant's 71 motion to strike the response in opposition to summary judgment is denied. The plaintiff's 76 motion for discovery is denied as moot. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 11/24/2015. Copy sent to Plaintiff via US Mail. (GSO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
MICHAEL J. DENNIS,
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) Case No. 2:14-cv-00230-WTL-WGH
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Plaintiff,
vs.
SGT. LOVETT, B. PAIR,
Defendants.
Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
I.
Michael Dennis filed an amended complaint in this action on November 17, 2014,
contending that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants when they allegedly
committed excessive force upon him on October 19, 2014, while they were in the process of
handcuffing him. [dkt. 13, p. 2]. The defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Mr.
Dennis failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before filing this lawsuit.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” designated evidence which
“demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant may not rest upon mere
allegations. Instead, “[t]o successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Trask–Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008). “The non-movant
will successfully oppose summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to
rebut the motion.” Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
Discussion
A. Undisputed Facts
At all times relevant to his complaint, Mr. Dennis was confined by the Indiana Department
of Correction (“IDOC”) at the Putnamville Correctional Facility (“Putnamville”). The IDOC has
an Offender Grievance Process which is intended to permit inmates to resolve concerns and
complaints relating to their conditions of confinement prior to filing suit in court. As an inmate at
Putnamville, Mr. Dennis had access to the Offender Grievance Process. Copies of the Offender
Grievance Process are posted throughout Putnamville, including the law library.
The Grievance Process consists of three steps. It begins with the offender contacting staff
to discuss the matter or incident subject to the grievance and seeking informal resolution. If the
offender is unable to obtain a resolution of the grievance informally, he may submit a formal
grievance to the Grievance Officer of the facility where the incident occurred. If the formal written
grievance is not resolved in a manner that satisfies the offender, he may submit an appeal.
Exhaustion of the grievance procedure requires pursuing a grievance to the final step. A grievance
must be filed within twenty (20) working days from the date of the alleged incident. Grieveable
issues includes actions of individual staff. [dkt. 41-1].
The IDOC’s grievance records for Mr. Dennis reflect that he filed two formal grievances
while he was incarcerated at the Pendleton Correctional Facility in 2008. Neither of the formal
grievances Mr. Dennis filed involve a complaint regarding facility staff using excessive force upon
him. [dkt. 41-3]. None of those grievances related to the allegations raised in the Complaint.
B. Exhaustion
The defendants argue that Mr. Dennis failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies as required by the PLRA with respect to his claims against them.
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before
bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
524-25 (2002). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other
critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing
some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91
(2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In order
to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in the place, and at the
time, the prison’s administrative rules require.’”)(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Strict compliance is required with respect to exhaustion, and a prisoner must
properly follow the prescribed administrative procedures in order to exhaust his remedies. Dole v.
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not subject
to either waiver by a court or futility or inadequacy exceptions. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
741, n.6 (2001); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (“Where Congress specifically
mandates, exhaustion is required.”).
C. Discussion
The defendants have shown that Mr. Dennis failed to avail himself of all administrative
remedies before filing this civil action. Mr. Dennis does not dispute this. Instead, Mr. Dennis filed
a document titled “Plaintiff’s Disagreement with Court’s Reasoning” on April 3, 2014. [dkt. 44].
Mr. Dennis’ filing fails to include the section labeled “Statement of Material Facts in Dispute” as
required by Local Rule 56-1. Nonetheless, in the April 3, 2014, filing, Mr. Dennis contends that
the IDOC Offender Grievance Process does not have a mechanism for an inmate to file battery
charges against IDOC staff. To the extent his statement regarding filing battery charges against
IDOC staff can be understood as an argument that the completion of the grievance process should
be excused, this argument is unavailing. A battery by IDOC staff is contemplated by the Offender
Grievance Process when it includes “conduct by individual staff” as a grievable offense. Whether
or not Mr. Dennis is able to pursue a criminal complaint against the defendants is irrelevant in this
civil action. The “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002). Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is mandatory and not subject to futility or inadequacy exceptions. See Booth, 532 U.S. at
741.
Mr. Dennis also argues that grievance specialist Chris Williams failed to adequately
respond to his grievance. [dkt. 44, at p. 13]. He attached to the April 3, 2015, filing, a copy of an
offender complaint dated February 18, 2015. The offender complaint is step one of the grievance
process. The attached offender complaint discusses the alleged excessive force inflicted on Mr.
Dennis by the defendants. The filing of the this offender complaint is dated after the date Mr.
Dennis filed his amended complaint on November 17, 2014, and nearly five months after the date
of the alleged use of excessive force by the defendants on October 19, 2014. A grievance must be
filed within twenty (20) working days from the date of the alleged incident.
Post-filing exhaustion of administrative remedies does not establish compliance with the
requirements of the statute. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Ford’s real
problem . . . is timing. Section 1997e(a) says that exhaustion must precede litigation. ‘No action
shall be brought’ until exhaustion has been completed. . . . And these rules routinely are enforced
. . . by dismissing a suit that begins too soon, even if the plaintiff exhausts his administrative
remedies while the litigation is pending . . . . To prevent this subversion of efforts to resolve matters
out of court, it is essential to keep the courthouse doors closed until those efforts have run their
course.”)(internal citations omitted).
On September 28, 2015, Mr. Dennis filed a response in opposition to motion for summary
judgment. In his response, Mr. Dennis states that he exhausted his administrative remedies by
filing a formal grievance with the Final Reviewing Authority Charles Penfold, but does not
indicate when he filed this formal grievance. Mr. Dennis states that the issue of review in the
formal grievance is the inadequate record keeping of medical records by staff at Putnamville,
which is unrelated to the claim of excessive force in this action.
Mr. Dennis does not identify any evidence that would preclude the conclusion that he failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies in his claim of excessive force against Sgt. Lovett and B.
Pair.
It is therefore undisputed that Mr. Dennis failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies as required by the PLRA before filing this lawsuit. The consequence of these
circumstances, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is that Mr. Dennis’ action should not have been
brought and must now be dismissed without prejudice. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that “all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.”).
Conclusion
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [dkt. 41] is granted. Judgment consistent
with this Entry shall now issue.
The plaintiff’s motion to correct errors [dkt. 67] is denied as moot.
The defendant’s motion to strike the response in opposition to summary judgment [dkt. 71]
is denied.
The plaintiff’s motion for discovery [dkt. 76] is denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
Date: 11/24/15
Electronically registered counsel
Michael Dennis
626 North Alabama Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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