BEST v. ARAMARK

Filing 8

ORDER denying defendant's 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausib le on its face.'" Best has done so here. Accordingly, Aramark's motion to dismiss is denied. Aramark shall have twenty-one days from the date this Entry is issued to file an Answer to the complaint. Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 10/6/2014. (AH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
ALVIN MARK BEST,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES,LLC, 1
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:14-cv-243-JMS-DKL

Entry Denying Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Alvin Mark Best brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Aramark
Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”) alleging that Aramark has violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide him
nutritionally adequate food. 2 As a result, Best alleges that he has hunger pains at night, loses sleep,
and cannot maintain his desired weight. Aramark moves to dismiss. Best has moved to amend his
complaint to acknowledge the correct name for the defendant, but has not otherwise responded to
the motion to dismiss.
Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a

1
The clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the defendant’s correct name, Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, as
explained by the defendant in the Notice of Removal. The plaintiff’s motion to amend [dkt 7] is granted consistent
with this ruling.
2
Best initially filed this complaint in the Putnam Superior Court against Aramark, Stanley Knight, and Bruce
Lemmon. After the claims against Stanley Knight and Bruce Lemmon were dismissed, Aramark removed the action
to this Court.

plaintiff to clear two hurdles. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
2007). First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give a defendant fair
notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests. Id. Although specific facts are not necessary,
“at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not
provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled.” Airborne Beepers &
Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). Second, the complaint
must set forth a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007).
The “allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility
above a ‘speculative level’; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” EEOC, 496 F.3d
at 776 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555–56, 569 n. 14). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and drawing all
possible inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
2008). However, legal conclusions are not accepted as true. A pleading containing only
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” will not do. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).

Discussion
Aramark, a private corporation, moves to dismiss Best’s claims against it arguing that Best
has not stated a claim for deliberate indifference, that it cannot be held liable for Best’s alleged
injuries, and that it is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.
A. Deliberate Indifference
Aramark first argues that Best’s claims against it must be dismissed because Best has not
sufficiently alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. A prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). A prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). While Best complains about receiving sack lunches, which on its own might not state a
constitutional claim, he also alleges that he receives inadequate nutrition. He asserts that as a result,
he has had hunger pains at night, lost sleep, and cannot maintain his desired weight. At the pleading
stage, this is sufficient to state a claim for relief. See French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 570-71 (10th Cir. 1980)) (inmates must be provided
with “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present
an immediate danger to the health and well-being of the inmates who consume it”).
B. Aramark’s Liability
Aramark next argues that even if Best has been provided constitutionally inadequate food,
Aramark is not liable for that deprivation. First, Aramark asserts that Best’s allegation that
“Aramark was notified about the problems through letters and prison grievances, but it fails to do
anything about it,” is insufficient to state a claim against Aramark. Aramark argues that “[e]ven if

Best sent letters or grievances to Aramark, that does not prove that Aramark was indifferent to his
needs.” But Best’s allegation that Aramark was made aware of his complaints that the food he was
being served was not meeting his nutritional needs and ignored those complaints alleges just that.
This is sufficient to state a claim against Aramark. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (proof is not
required at the pleading stage).
Aramark also argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts Best alleges.
“[J]ust as a municipal corporation is not vicariously liable upon a theory of respondent superior
for the constitutional torts of its employees, a private corporation is not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.” Iskander v. Village of Forest Park,
690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). To state a claim for liability against a private corporation under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the corporation had an unconstitutional policy or
custom that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id. The Supreme Court has
explained that plaintiff must establish that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality [or
corporation] was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that
the [] action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal
link between the [] action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan
County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). A causal link between the corporation’s action
and the constitutional violation can be shown by: “(1) an express policy causing the loss when
enforced; (2) a widespread practice constituting a ‘custom or usage’ causing the loss; or (3) a
person with final policymaking authority causing the loss.” Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Here, Best’s assertion that “Aramark is not providing nutritionally adequate food on a
regular basis . . . .” is sufficient at the pleading stage to allege a “custom or usage” on the part of

Aramark to provide constitutionally inadequate meals. See Jubeh v. Dart, 11 C 3873, 2011 WL
6010267 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011) (allegation that the unprotected covering of food and delays in
delivering meals was and is a continuing condition that has existed since 2009 stated an officialcapacity claim).
C. State Actor
Finally, Aramark argues that it cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because
it is a private corporation and does not act under “color of state law” as required for liability under
that statute. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (explaining that the “color of state
law” requirement excludes “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”)
(internal quotation omitted). This doctrine “requires that a court find such a ‘close nexus between
the State and the challenged action’ that the challenged action ‘may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.’” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). Aramark
argues that it has merely contracted with the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) to provide
meals to the inmates under the direction of the DOC and that the traditional state function of
providing meals to the inmates remains with the DOC. But this argument is based on a number of
facts that are not alleged in the complaint or otherwise supported by the record. Because it is not
appropriate as a general rule to look outside the pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss, see
Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2002), the Court will not consider
Aramark’s bald assertions regarding its contract with the DOC. Further, “[a]ddressing this same
argument, several courts have held that Aramark may be considered a state actor under § 1983.”
Jubeh v. Dart, 11 C 3873, 2011 WL 6010267 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011) (citing cases). Best claims
that Aramark has failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate meals. At this stage of the

proceedings, the Court cannot hold that Aramark is not a state actor in these circumstances subject
to liability under § 1983.
Conclusion
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007). Best has done so here. Accordingly, Aramark’s motion
to dismiss [dkt 4] is denied.
Aramark shall have twenty-one days from the date this Entry is issued to file an
Answer to the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 6, 2014
Date: _________________
Distribution:
Alvin Mark Best
850121
Putnamville Correctional Facility
1946 West US Hwy 40
Greencastle, IN 46135

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

All electronically registered counsel

Note to Clerk: Processing this document requires actions in addition to docketing and distribution.