GIBSON v. RANKIN et al

Filing 111

Entry Discussing Defendant Hinton's Motion to Dismiss - Defendant Esther Hinton seeks dismissal of all the claims alleged against her pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Hinton argues that dismissal is appr opriate because the amended complaint makes no factual allegations that would put Ms. Hinton on notice that she violated state or federal law. Ms. Hinton's motion to dismiss [dkt. 62] is denied. The Eighth Amendment and state law negligence claim against Ms. Hinton shall proceed. Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 11/4/2015. (RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

LIONEL GIBSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOLIT JOSEPH, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2:14-cv-00280-JMS-WGH

Entry Discussing Defendant Hinton’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Esther Hinton seeks dismissal of all the claims alleged against her pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Hinton argues that dismissal is
appropriate because the amended complaint makes no factual allegations that would put Ms.
Hinton on notice that she violated state or federal law.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss the court “takes all well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Santiago v. Walls,
599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To satisfy the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the defendant with
“fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, (2007) (per curiam)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The only “factual” allegation against Ms. Hinton is the statement that: “The grievance
appeal was denied as a result of Ms. Hinton and Ms. Va[i]svilas’ statements.” Dkt. 29. In addition,
in the section titled, “Claims for Relief,” Mr. Gibson states that the actions of defendant Esther

Hinton, “in i[n]tentionally providing factually inaccurate information during plaintiff[’]s attempt
to receive adequate medical care[,] showed deliberate indifference to plaintiff[’]s right to
ad[e]quate medical care,” and deprived Mr. Gibson of rights secured by the Eighth Amendment
and also constituted negligence under state law.
Pro se complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff, are construed liberally and held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94;
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008). Liberally construed, the amended
complaint is understood to allege that Ms. Hinton intentionally fabricated information during the
grievance process which interfered with Gibson’s ability to obtain medical care.
Eighth Amendment Claim
The intentional fabrication of evidence during the grievance process which results in the
on-going denial of constitutionally adequate medical care states a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. This is not a case where the plaintiff simply alleges that his grievance regarding
medical care was rejected by the defendant. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.
2007)(“Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible”; an official “who
rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not [cause or
contribute to the violation]”). Instead, the claim in this case is that Ms. Hinton performed her
appointed task of responding to Gibson’s grievance with deliberate indifference because she
intentionally provided false information which had the effect of preventing the medical unit from
delivering needed care to Gibson. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (“One
can imagine a complaint examiner doing her appointed tasks with deliberate indifference to the
risks imposed on prisoners. . . . [A] complaint examiner who intervened to prevent the medical
unit from delivering needed care might be thought liable.”).

State Law Negligence Claim
Ms. Hinton argues that the state law negligence claim against Ms. Hinton should be
dismissed because Ms. Hinton enjoys immunity under the Indiana Tort Claim Act (the “Act”). But
this defense could be better evaluated in the course of summary judgment. Ms. Hinton explains:
The Act controls all claims against government employees, and provides
that “a lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act or
omission of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the
scope of the employee’s employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5)
calculated to benefit the employee personally.” Ind. Code 34-13-3-5. Further, and
importantly here, a plaintiff’s complaint cannot merely allege wrongdoing, but
must assert a reasonable factual basis supporting any allegations. Perrey v.
Donahue, 703 F. Supp. 2d 839, 856-57 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (citing Ind. Code 34-133-5 and Higgason v. State, 789 N.E.2d 22, 30 (Ind. Ct. App.2003)).
The amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Ms. Hinton acted maliciously or willfully and
wantonly when she intentionally provided false information in response to Mr. Gibson’s grievance.
Read broadly these facts are sufficient to state a negligence claim under state law. In addition, the
scope and nature of Mr. Gibson’s state law claim can be further explored by the defendant during
the course of discovery.
For these reasons, Ms. Hinton’s motion to dismiss [dkt. 62] is denied. The Eighth
Amendment and state law negligence claim against Ms. Hinton shall proceed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 4, 2015
Date: __________________

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All Electronically Registered Counsel
LIONEL GIBSON
104608
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362