MCANALLEY v. KNIGHT

Filing 12

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - The petition of Robert McAnalley for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding in ISF 14-07-0114 in which he was found guilty of conspiracy to engage in an unauthorized f inancial transaction. For the reasons explained in this entry, Mr. McAnalley's habeas petition must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 12/30/2015.(RSF) Modified on 12/30/2015 - added W/O (RSF).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
ROBERT MCANALLEY.
Petitioner,
v.
STANLEY KNIGHT,
Respondent.

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) Case No. 2:14-cv-0336-JMS-WGH
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Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
The petition of Robert McAnalley for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison
disciplinary proceeding in ISF 14-07-0114 in which he was found guilty of conspiracy to engage
in an unauthorized financial transaction. For the reasons explained in this entry, Mr. McAnalley’s
habeas petition must be denied.
I. Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of credit time, Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d
637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 64445 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement is satisfied with the issuance
of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial
decision maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for the disciplinary action and the
evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support the finding of guilt.
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224
F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

II. The Disciplinary Proceeding
On July 4, 2014, Correctional Officer Weeks filed a Report of Conduct that charged Mr.
McAnalley with a class B offense conspiracy to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction.
The Report of Conduct states:
On July 4, 2014 two phone call[s] were monitored from 17 North A-side. The calls
were made by offender Robert McAnalley DOC 150042. The first call was at 13:16
at 2 min and 41 sec into the call offender McAnalley ask[s] “When you get home
why don’t you get on the computer and order a rush card and when you get it we
will start using it.[”] The second call was at 13:45 from 17 North A side at 2 min
and 40 sec into the call offender McAnalley ask[s], “stop and get me 130 and I will
tell you the rest in a little bit you can get that at the same place[”] and she replied
yes.
Mr. McAnalley was notified of the class B charge when he was served with the Report of
Conduct and the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (Screening Report). He was notified of his rights,
pled not guilty, and indicated his desire to have a lay advocate. He did not want to call any
witnesses but he requested the recording of the phone call as evidence.
The hearing officer conducted a disciplinary hearing on July 14, 2014, finding Mr.
McAnalley guilty of the class B offense conspiracy to engage in an unauthorized financial
transaction. The hearing officer considered the staff reports, the offender’s statement, and the
phone call as evidence in finding him guilty. The recommended sanctions imposed included a
written reprimand, a 30-day phone restriction, and the deprivation of 30 days of earned credit time.
The hearing officer imposed the sanctions because of the seriousness of the offense and the degree
to which the violation disrupted or endangered the security of the facility.
Mr. McAnalley appealed to the Facility Head on July 23, 2014. He argued that the
conversations did not support the offense and that there was no physical evidence listed on the
conduct report. The Facility Head denied the appeal on August 8, 2014. Mr. McAnalley appealed

to the Final Reviewing Authority, who denied his appeal on August 29, 2014. He filed his habeas
petition on October 30, 2014.
III. Analysis
Mr. McAnalley’s claims for habeas relief are that his due process rights were violated
when: 1) the sanctions were not approved by a higher authority; 2) he was not notified of evidence;
and 3) lack of evidence.
Mr. McAnalley did not raise on appeal the claim concerning the approval of the sanctions
by a higher authority. This claim, therefore, has been waived and procedurally defaulted. See
Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the principles of exhaustion of
available state remedies apply to prison disciplinary proceedings). Moreover, this is an issue based
on Indiana Department of Correction rules and regulations, which is not subject to federal habeas
review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 at n.2 (1991) (“state-law violations provide no basis
for federal habeas review.”); Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(violations of the Indiana Adult Disciplinary Policy Procedures do not state a claim for federal
habeas relief). This claim fails.
Mr. McAnalley’s second claim is that on the conduct report, there was nothing listed in the
“disposition of physical evidence” box. He contends that he could not be found guilty of the
offense if the physical evidence box was left blank. This claim is frivolous because the conduct
report described two phone calls which were the basis of the charge. There was no confiscated
evidence and there was no evidence of which Mr. McAnalley was not notified. This claim fails.
The third claim relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the evidence does
not support an unauthorized financial transaction. The hearing officer reviewed the phone call and
reasoned that the “phone call does state that you need to get a Rush card and then we can start

using it. Then he tells her about the one dude and other guy get that will be $75 total should be
$250. Get out $130 when go out and will tell you later the rest of it.” Dkt. 8-4. The hearing officer
noted that the total would be $250 and more than one man was involved in the transaction. Mr.
McAnalley was charged with Offense 220 which is defined as “[e]ngaging in or possessing
materials used for unauthorized financial transactions. This includes, but is not limited to, the use
or possession of identifying information of credit cards, debit cards, or any other card used to
complete a financial transaction.” Conspiracy is defined as “[a]ttempting to commit any Class B
offense; aiding, commanding, inducing, counseling, procuring or conspiring with another person
to commit any Class B offense.”
The “some evidence” evidentiary standard in this type of case is much more lenient than
“beyond a reasonable doubt” or even “by a preponderance.” See Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978,
981 (7th Cir. 2002) (hearing officer in prison disciplinary case “need not show culpability beyond
a reasonable doubt or credit exculpatory evidence.”). The “some evidence” standard requires “only
that the decision not be arbitrary or without support in the record.” McPherson v. McBride, 188
F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). The recorded directives by Mr. McAnalley to another person support
a finding that Mr. McAnalley was engaging in an unauthorized financial transaction. There was
sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding of guilty.
Mr. McAnalley was given notice and had an opportunity to defend the charge. The hearing
officer provided a written statement of the reasons for the finding of guilt and described the
evidence that was considered. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision.
Under these circumstances, there were no violations of Mr. McAnalley’s due process rights.

IV. Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceedings. Accordingly, Mr. McAnalley’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this
Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 30, 2015

Distribution:
Robert McAnalley, # 150042
Correctional Industrial Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
5124 W. Reformatory Rd.
Pendleton, IN 46064
Electronically registered counsel

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana