MCPHERSON v. KNIGHT

Filing 4

ENTRY Dismissing Complaint and ORDER to Show Cause - The plaintiff's 2 motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 2] is granted. An assessment of an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time. The complaint is dismissed for fail ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. McPherson shall have through February 20, 2015, in which to show cause why judgment consistent with this Entry should not issue. If he fails to do so, the action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth in this Entry. **SEE ENTRY** Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 1/23/2015. (AH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

NICHOLAS ANTHONY MCPHERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY KNIGHT,
Defendant.

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Cause No. 2:15-cv-00013-JMS-WGH

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status, Dismissing Complaint, and
Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause
I.

Background

The plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 2] is granted. An assessment of
an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
Plaintiff Nicholas Anthony McPherson is a prisoner confined at the Putnamville
Correctional Facility (“Putnamville”). Mr. McPherson filed this civil action against Putnamville
Superintendent Stanley Knight. Mr. McPherson brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. He seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages.
Mr. McPherson alleges that on November 15, 2014, he requested protective custody and
was placed in segregated confinement. He further alleges that he has remained in segregation
since that date and is in isolation for 23 hours per day. This isolation, alleges Mr. McPherson,
denies him access to educational programs, vocational training, and other programs that could aid
in his rehabilitation. He further alleges that the denial of access to these programs could have an
adverse impact on his mental health, physical health, and safety. According to Mr. McPherson,

placing him in isolation and denying him access to these programs simply because he requested
protective custody violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
II.

Screening

The complaint is now subject to screening as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This
statute directs that the Court dismiss a complaint or any claim within a complaint which “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
“[A]n inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding segregation is limited.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff,
734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013). “Whether a prisoner has a liberty interest implicated by special
confinement relies on whether the confinement imposed an ‘atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). “[D]isciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections depending
on the duration and conditions of segregation.” Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d
693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit has explained that “both the duration and the
conditions of the segregation must be considered in the due process analysis; if the conditions of
segregation were significantly harsher than those in the normal prison environment, then a year of
[segregation] might count as a deprivation of liberty where a few days or even weeks might not.”
Id. at 698 (internal quotation omitted). For example, “six months of segregation is not such an
extreme term and, standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted). In this case, Mr. McPherson alleges that he has been confined in segregation for two
months.

See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98, n.2 (collecting cases holding that placement in

segregation for 2 to 90 days does not implicate a liberty interest); see also Earl v. Racine County

Jail, 718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When an inmate is placed in conditions more restrictive
than those in the general prison population, whether through protective segregation like suicide
watch or discretionary administrative segregation, his liberty is affected only if the more restrictive
conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if he remains subject to those
conditions for a significantly long time.”). To the extent Mr. McPherson alleges a due process
violation based solely on his placement in segregation for two months, this claim is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Mr. McPherson alleges that his being confined in protective segregation has denied him
access to education and other programs which might help him achieve rehabilitation. “There is no
constitutional mandate to provide educational, rehabilitative, or vocational programs, in the
absence of conditions that give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Zimmerman v.
Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he denial of access to
educational programs does not infringe on a protected liberty interest.” Id. Because the successful
completion of an educational program is not inevitable, the denial of the opportunity to earn good
time credits through educational programs “does not inevitably affect the duration of the sentence,
and does not deprive him of constitutional guarantees.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 (due process is required only when state action “will inevitably affect the
duration of [a prisoner’s] sentence”).

To the extent Mr. McPherson alleges constitutional

violations because of an alleged deprivation of educational programs, this claim is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In addition, the conditions of an inmate’s confinement violate the Eighth Amendment only
if they deprive him of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “[L]ife’s necessities include shelter, heat, hygiene items and clothing.”

Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2014). The complaint fails to allege deprivations
of this type sufficient to support a claim under this theory as well.
III. Further Proceedings
The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Mr. McPherson shall have through February 20, 2015, in which to show cause why judgment
consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show
cause, an IFP applicant’s case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely
notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.”). If he
fails to do so, the action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth in this Entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 23, 2015
Date: __________________

Distribution:
NICHOLAS ANTHONY MCPHERSON
128372
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1946 West U.S. Hwy 40
Greencastle, IN 46135

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana