WEIL et al v. METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

Filing 363

ORDER - For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 321 : The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion as to liability on Plaintiffs' wage deduction claim under th e IWPA, but only as to the period from January 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016.The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion as to liability for the remainder of the claim period.The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion as to liability on Plaintiffs' time-rounding claims under the FLSA and IWPA.The Court GRANTS Metal Technologies' Motion to Decertify 332 , and DENIES AS MOOT Metal Technologies' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 330 (SEE ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 5/26/2017. (DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
BRIAN A. WEIL,
MELISSA D. FULK,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-00016-JMS-MPB

ORDER
Plaintiffs Brian A. Weil and Melissa D. Fulk filed a Complaint asserting claims against
Defendant Metal Technologies, Inc. (“Metal Technologies”) for improper wage deductions and
failure to pay wages under the Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”) and the Indiana Wage Payment
Act (“IWPA”). [Filing No. 1.] The Court conditionally certified one subclass under the FLSA
and certified two subclasses under Rule 23 and the IWPA. [Filing No. 79.] Presently pending
before the Court are Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 321; Filing No.
330], and Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify several of the subclasses, [Filing No. 332].
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, GRANTS Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify, and
DENIES AS MOOT Metal Technologies’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Timekeeping Practices
Metal Technologies is a manufacturing facility located in Bloomfield, Indiana that
manufactures automobile parts for car manufacturers like General Motors, Chrysler, Hyundai, and

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Honda. [Filing No. 330-1 at 6.] Manufacturing employees work one of three shifts: first shift,
from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.; second shift, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.; or third shift, from 11:00
p.m. to 7:30 a.m. [Filing No. 330-1 at 9.] The shifts overlap by 30 minutes, and during that
overlapping time, employees are relieved of their duties by the next shift’s employees, and they
use the remaining time to clean up their work areas and exchange information about the previous
shift. [Filing No. 330-2 at 11.]
Metal Technologies uses an electronic time clock to record the time that each employee
clocks in and out. [Filing No. 321-11 at 7.] Employees are required to take a 30-minute unpaid
lunch break, which they are instructed to clock in and out for. [Filing No. 321-11 at 7.] Metal
Technologies does not calculate employees’ pay based on their time-clock punches, but instead
pays employees based on their scheduled shift times, minus an automatically deducted thirtyminute lunch break. [Filing No. 54-1 at 9.] So employees are typically paid for eight working
hours per day. [Filing No. 54-1 at 9.] If an employee works more than eight hours per day, she is
required to complete an Overtime Authorization Form in order to be paid for that additional time.
[Filing No. 330-1 at 10-11.]
Metal Technologies has an Employee Manual (the “Manual”), which is provided to and
discussed with all new employees. [Filing No. 330-7 at 2; Filing No. 321-1 at 108-09.] The first
page of the Manual states that “[t]he policies in this Manual are to be considered guidelines. Metal
Technologies, Inc. (MTI), at its option, may change, delete, suspend or discontinue any part or
parts of the policies in this Manual at any time without prior notice. … Employees may not accrue
eligibility for monetary benefits that they have not earned through actual time spent at work.”
[Filing No. 330-7 at 5.] The Manual also includes the following sections relevant to the instant
motions:

2

[Filing No. 330-7 at 6];

[Filing No. 330-7 at 7];

[Filing No. 330-7 at 8];

3

[Filing No. 330-7 at 8-9];

[Filing No. 321-11 at 7]. The Manual also outlines disciplinary policies through the use of a point
system for attendance, tardiness, and early departures. [Filing No. 321-11 at 4-6.]
B. Employee Declarations
Metal Technologies has submitted affidavits and deposition testimony from more than 20
plaintiffs attesting that although they sometimes clocked in and out before their scheduled shift
times, they did not perform work-related activities during those minutes. [Filing No. 332-9.]
4

James Lynch attested, for example, that if he arrived before his scheduled start time, he would
clock in and then eat breakfast in the break room. [Filing No. 332-9 at 13-14.] Alissa Murray
stated that when she clocked in before her scheduled shift, she would retrieve work items from her
locker and go to the break room to get a drink. [Filing No. 332-9 at 1.] Tobias Padgett attested
that he spent his pre-shift clocked in time socializing and getting snacks from the vending
machines. [Filing No. 332-9 at 30-31.] Jerry May stated that he clocked in immediately after
arriving, and then would typically wait in the “smoke shack” or the break room “until it is time to
start work.” [Filing No. 330-8 at 31.] These employees all attested that they did not perform work
prior to the start of their shifts, and that there was no work-related reason for them to clock in early.
[Filing No. 332-1 at 1-30.] Barbara Haithcock attested that, when she arrived, there were usually
at least 20 other employees waiting in the break room for their shift to start. [Filing No. 330-8 at
13.] Kirbie Conrad, Metal Technologies’ Human Resources Manager, testified that she often saw
numerous employees in the break room before their scheduled shifts. [Filing No. 330-7 at 1.]
Several plaintiffs also testified that they would clock out after the end of their scheduled
shifts, but would not perform work-related activities. For example, Brandon Alcorn stated that he
sometimes clocked out a few minutes after the end of his shift because he “lost track of time,” but
that he was not performing work duties. [Filing No. 332-9 at 5.] Many employees testified that if
they worked beyond the end of their scheduled shift times, they submitted Overtime Authorization
Forms and were compensated for that time. [Filing No. 332 at 5-28.]
C. Work Clothing Deductions
From January 20, 2013 (two years prior to the filing of this lawsuit—the lookback period
within the applicable statute of limitations) through the present, Metal Technologies took wage
deductions from employees for work clothing. [Filing No. 321-1 at 78-79.] These deductions are

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reflected on employees’ pay stubs. [Filing No. 321-1 at 78-79.] On April 11, 2016, Metal
Technologies distributed and employees signed an updated “Premiums and Deductions” form
which details the clothing deduction. [Filing No. 321-5.]
D. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Court on January 20, 2015. [Filing No. 1.] Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Certify a Combined Class Action and FLSA Collective Action on September 1,
2015, [Filing No. 53], which this Court granted in part and denied in part, [Filing No. 79].
Following the issuance of notice, some party plaintiffs have opted in to the collective action and
some potential class members have opted out of the class action. [See, e.g., Filing No. 104; Filing
No. 125.] The parties have also conducted discovery.
Presently pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment,
[Filing No. 321; Filing No. 330], and Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify Plaintiffs’
Combined FLSA Collective Action and Class Action with Respect to the Pre- and Post-Shift Time
Claim (“Motion to Decertify”), [Filing No. 332]. The Court addresses the pending motions in the
following order: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Metal Technologies’ Motion
to Decertify, and Metal Technologies’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for violations of
the IWPA and the FLSA, regarding both their wage deduction and timekeeping claims. [Filing
No. 321.]
A. Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment
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as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear,
whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the
asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or
affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant’s factual assertion
can result in the movant’s fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts
that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In
other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those
facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.
2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d
892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th
Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

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draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d
903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary
judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657
F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly assured the district courts that
they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to
the summary judgment motion before them,” Johnson, 325 F.3d at 898. Any doubt as to the
existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension
Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
“The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not, however, imply that there
are no genuine issues of material fact.” R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int’l Union of
Operating Engineers, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Specifically, “[p]arties have different
burdens of proof with respect to particular facts; different legal theories will have an effect on
which facts are material; and the process of taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, first for one side and then for the other, may highlight the point that neither side has
enough to prevail without a trial.” Id. at 648.
B. Work Clothing Deductions
Plaintiffs argue that Metal Technologies deducted money from employees’ paychecks to
cover the cost of work clothing in violation of the Indiana Wage Assignment Act, I.C. § 22-2-6-2,
and the Indiana Wage Payment Act, I.C. § 22-2-5. [Filing No. 322 at 12.] Plaintiffs contend that
under the pre-July 1, 2015 version of the Wage Assignment Act, a wage deduction for the purpose
of uniform rental or work clothing was not one of the permitted purposes for a wage assignment,
and therefore the wage deduction was improper. See I.C. § 22-2-6-2(b) (amended 2015); [Filing

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No. 322 at 14]. They argue that even after the statute was amended to add permissible deductions
for the “purchase” of uniforms, Metal Technologies did not secure a valid wage assignment from
its employees. [Filing No. 322 at 14.]
Metal Technologies does not dispute liability for deductions taken between January 20,
2013 and April 10, 2016. [Filing No. 331 at 19.] But it does dispute liability for deductions taken
after April 10, 2016, arguing that it secured valid wage assignments from employees after it
implemented an amended work clothing deduction form on April 11, 2016. [Filing No. 331 at 19.]
In reply, Plaintiffs argue that the newly distributed uniform deduction form is deficient, because it
does not indicate that it has been agreed to, in writing, by the employer. [Filing No. 341 at 14.]
Indiana Code Section 22-2-6-2 governs the requirements for the assignment of wages.
Section 22-2-6-2(a) requires that the assignment be (1) in writing; (2) signed by the employee
personally; (3) by its terms revocable at any time by the employee upon written notice to the
employer; and (4) agreed to in writing by the employer. I.C. § 22-2-6-2(a)(1). Subsection (a) also
requires that the assignment be made for a purpose enumerated in subsection (b). I.C. § 22-2-62(a)(3). Prior to July 1, 2015, subsection (b) listed 13 permissible deduction purposes, which did
not include the purchase of uniforms. The amended version of the statute, in effect from July 1,
2015, adds several permissible purposes, including “[t]he purchase of uniforms and equipment
necessary to fulfill the duties of employment….” I.C. § 22-2-6-2(b)(14). Indiana Code Section
22-2-5-1 requires that “every person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association,
their trustees, lessees, or receivers appointed by any court, doing business in Indiana, shall pay
each employee at least semimonthly or biweekly, if requested, the amount due the employee.”
I.C. § 22-2-5-1(a).

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Metal Technologies concedes that it improperly deducted funds for work clothing from
employees’ paychecks from January 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016, under both the prior and
amended versions of I.C. § 22-2-6-2. [Filing No. 331 at 19.] Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Metal Technologies is liable under I.C. § 22-2-6-2 for work clothing deductions taken between
January 20, 2013 and April 10, 2016.
Metal Technologies contests liability, however, for the period after April 10, 2016, when
it distributed a new uniform deduction form. Plaintiffs contend that because the form circulated
by Metal Technologies does not include an employer signature line or other written indication of
employer agreement, such as “a legend on the wage assignment form saying something such as
‘agreed to in writing by Metal Technologies, Inc.,’” [Filing No. 341 at 13], the new form does not
satisfy the statutory requirement that the wage assignment be “agreed to in writing by the
employer.” I.C. § 22-2-6-2(a)(1).
The Court concludes that the form at issue could be construed to satisfy the “agreement in
writing” requirement of I.C. § 22-2-6-2(a)(1)(D).

First, Metal Technologies generated and

distributed the writing—i.e., it created the form that describes and memorializes the wage
assignment between the employer and employee. Second, Metal Technologies received and
maintained the form in its files. Third, the form affirmatively describes the wage assignment’s
terms, which Metal Technologies proposed and carried out following the form’s execution by
deducting the wages at issue. Under these circumstances, the Court can, at a minimum, infer Metal
Technologies’ agreement in writing to the wage assignment from the written assignment form.
The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability for
uniform deductions occurring after April 10, 2016.

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For the reasons described above, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion as to liability on the
wage deduction claim, but only as to the period from January 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016.
The Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion as to liability for the remainder of the claim period.
C. Timekeeping Practices: Early and Late Time Punches
Plaintiffs allege that Metal Technologies has failed to pay them wages that they are due as
a result of an “illegal rounding scheme” in Metal Technologies’ timekeeping practices. Plaintiffs
contend that Metal Technologies failed to adequately compensate them, because they were paid
only for their scheduled shift hours, and not the hours actually indicated by their clock-in and
clock-out times. Plaintiffs argue that this rounding scheme constitutes a per se violation of the
FLSA, because it resulted in Plaintiffs’ hours being rounded down, always in favor of Metal
Technologies. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, they are entitled to summary judgment as to liability
under the FLSA and IWPA.
Plaintiffs argue that, for four reasons, Metal Technologies cannot escape a finding of
liability. First, Plaintiffs contend that, as a matter of law, time clock records constitute records of
work actually performed.

[Filing No. 341 at 18.]

Second, Plaintiffs contend that Metal

Technologies’ recordkeeping practices violate the FLSA, and therefore the Court should accept
the time clock records as reflecting hours actually worked. [Filing No. 322 at 21-23.] Third,
Plaintiffs argue that Metal Technologies has not presented evidence to rebut or contradict
Plaintiffs’ evidence of unpaid wages, and that Metal Technologies has made admissions that
establish beyond dispute all of the elements of liability. [Filing No. 322 at 28-35.] And fourth,
Plaintiffs contend that Metal Technologies has a private agreement with its employees that it would
pay them based on the times reflected by their clock-ins and clock-outs, and the Court should
enforce that agreement. [Filing No. 322 at 25-28.] The Court addresses each argument in turn.

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1. Whether Time Clock Records Necessarily Indicate Work Actually Performed
Plaintiffs argue that “[a]ny employer who creates a rounding scheme, policy or practice
that consistently results in the rounding down of hours and underpayment of wages commits a per
se violation of the FLSA.” [Filing No. 322 at 17.] Metal Technologies does not dispute that per
se violations can occur, but it argues that a rounding scheme is only improper if it rounds working
time, and if that rounding results in the failure to compensate employees for hours actually worked.
[Filing No. 331 at 22.] Metal Technologies argues that Plaintiffs have not established that they
were actually working during the beyond-shift times for which they were clocked in, and therefore
that they have not established any wage violation. [Filing No. 331 at 22-25.] Metal Technologies
contends that Plaintiffs may not simply rely on employees’ time sheets to establish hours worked.
[Filing No. 331 at 22.] Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that they are only due compensation for
time actually worked. [Filing No. 341 at 15 (“Plaintiffs are only seeking wages for hours that each
class member actually worked and reported in Metal Technologies’ own timekeeping system…”).]
But they also assert that time clock records necessarily reflect time spent actually working. [Filing
No. 341 at 18.]
Therefore, the threshold issue is Plaintiffs’ contention that “[t]ime clock records are records
of work. This is true under the law.” [Filing No. 341 at 18 (emphasis in original) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 516.2(a)(7)-(9); Solis v. A-1 Mortg. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 778, 806 (W.D. Pa. 2013)).] While
Plaintiffs never address the effect of 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(a), cited by Metal Technologies, it bears
directly on Plaintiffs’ contention that “time clock records are records of work.” [Filing No. 341
at 18.] The regulation provides that:
[t]ime clocks are not required. In those cases where time clocks are used,
employees who voluntarily come in before their regular starting time or remain
after their closing time, do not have to be paid for such periods provided, of course,
that they do not engage in any work. Their early or late clock punching may be
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disregarded. Minor differences between the clock records and actual hours worked
cannot ordinarily be avoided, but major discrepancies should be discouraged since
they raise a doubt as to the accuracy of the records of the hours actually worked.
29 C.F.R. § 785.48(a). This regulation specifically contemplates circumstances in which there
may be a difference between time clock records and actual hours worked, and it belies Plaintiffs’
contention that “time clock records are records of work.” Setting aside the fact that Plaintiffs cite
only to an out-of-circuit district court case in support of their proposition, the Court does not find
any statement in that case supporting Plaintiffs’ contention that time clock records necessarily
equate to hours actually worked. See also, Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 177 (7th
Cir. 2011) (employees who clock in early do not have to be paid so long as they are not working).
Moreover, adopting the rule suggested by Plaintiffs would effectively eliminate any
statutory constraint as to what constitutes compensable time under the FLSA. If an employee
could establish liability based solely on the hours noted on a time card, he would be under no
burden to prove that he performed compensable activities during the time at issue. The Court
cannot conclude that the FLSA contemplates such a result, particularly in light of 29 U.S.C. § 251
(the “Portal-to-Portal Act”), along with numerous Supreme Court cases determining which
preliminary and postliminary activities are compensable. See 29 U.S.C. § 251; see, e.g., IBP, Inc.
v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 30 (2005) (concluding that time spent walking between the locker room
and the production area after donning protective gear is compensable work under the FLSA).
The Court, therefore, cannot conclude that time clock records alone necessarily establish
the hours actually worked by employees. While Plaintiffs contend that the time and payroll records
alone establish their entitlement to summary judgment, the Court does not agree. And, as discussed
in more detail below, the Court concludes that the time records in this case are, in any event, not a
reliable measure of hours worked. Metal Technologies points to numerous employee declarations
attesting to the fact that employees clocked in prior to their shift start times and after their shift
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end times, but were not performing work. At the summary judgment stage, the Court is required
to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Metal Technologies, and it
credits the well-supported factual contentions made by them.
2. Recordkeeping Violation
Plaintiffs argue that the FLSA’s recordkeeping rules dictate that they must be granted
summary judgment on the issue of liability. [Filing No. 322 at 21.] Plaintiffs contend that because
they have relied on Metal Technologies’ own timekeeping and payroll records as evidence of the
alleged FLSA violation, “[t]his should be the end of the records review and the records permit
Plaintiffs to prove unpaid wages owed to the entire class.” [Filing No. 322 at 23.] To the extent
that Metal Technologies claims that its timekeeping records are inaccurate or incomplete, Plaintiffs
argue, the Court must accept Plaintiffs’ time sheet entries as the only possible evidence of hours
“worked,” because Metal Technologies has not designated any other records to rebut the
timesheets. [Filing No. 322 at 22.]
Metal Technologies responds that it disputes the contention that it did not maintain accurate
records. [Filing No. 331 at 32.] First, it contends that 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(a) establishes that
employers may properly disregard pre- and post-shift time punches if employees voluntarily come
in early or stay late and are not performing any work during those times. [Filing No. 331 at 32.]
Therefore, Metal Technologies argues, there was nothing “inaccurate” about it disregarding those
time punches and paying employees based on their scheduled shifts. [Filing No. 331 at 32.] But,
Metal Technologies argues, even if it had failed in its recordkeeping obligations, Plaintiffs are still
required to provide some evidence that they performed work for which they were not compensated,
which they have not done. [Filing No. 331 at 32-37.]

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The Court agrees with Metal Technologies that Plaintiffs have not established that Metal
Technologies committed a recordkeeping violation. For the reasons previously described, 29
C.F.R. § 785.48(a) establishes that employers may properly disregard pre- and post-shift time
punches when employees come in voluntarily before their regular start time, or remain voluntarily
after their end time. The Employee Manual explicitly permits employees to clock in up to fifteen
minutes before the start of their shift and clock out up to fifteen minutes after, [Filing No. 321-11
at 7], which could constitute the sort of “minor discrepancy” between time clock records and hours
worked contemplated by 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(a).
But, even if the Court were to conclude that Metal Technologies failed to keep adequate
records, it still could not reach the conclusion suggested by Plaintiffs. The Court begins with the
Supreme Court’s directive in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016):
[t]he Court in Mt. Clemens held that when employers violate their statutory duty to
keep proper records, and employees thereby have no way to establish the time spent
doing uncompensated work, the ‘remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public
policy which it embodies ... militate against making’ the burden of proving
uncompensated work ‘an impossible hurdle for the employee.’ Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Company, 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). Instead of punishing ‘the
employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the
precise extent of uncompensated work,’ the Court held ‘an employee has carried
out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount
and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.’ Id. at 687.
Under these circumstances, ‘[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to come
forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence
to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s
evidence.’ Id. at 687-688.
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs state that to satisfy this burden, they
“again simply present the Court with Metal Technologies’ own time records and corresponding
payroll records which, on their face, provide the best and only available evidence of each day that
the Plaintiff worked, and each work start time and work end time on each day.” [Filing No. 322
at 23.]
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But again, as the Court has already detailed, the mere clock-in and clock-out records are
insufficient to establish that Plaintiffs were actually working while clocked in early or late, and
therefore that there was any work time for which they were not compensated. Plaintiffs are correct
that, if they were actually working during the times represented by the time clock entries, those
records would be the best and most reliable evidence of that time. However, Plaintiffs have very
notably failed to point to any evidence that a single Plaintiff-employee was actually working
during beyond-shift time clock entries.
Contrary to the assertion Plaintiffs appear to make, they do not necessarily need
documentary evidence created or maintained by Metal Technologies in order to establish that
employees were working during beyond-shift clock-ins. Plaintiffs could, for example, provide
deposition testimony or affidavits from employees attesting to the fact that they worked during
even some of their early clock-ins or late clock-outs. 1 The Court is perplexed by Plaintiffs’
statement that testimony from class members would “have little, if any, probative value,” on this
issue. [Filing No. 341 at 21.] Plaintiffs seem to conflate two related but distinct elements: the first
is whether Plaintiffs can allege with evidentiary support that at any time they worked while clocked
in beyond their shift hours (excluding approved overtime). If they did, the second issue becomes
quantifying that work. While Plaintiffs may be correct that they would be unable to recall with
specificity the dates and times that they performed after-hours work, they have failed to provide
any evidence as to the first and critical element—that they ever performed work while clocked in
beyond their shifts.

1

The plaintiffs in Schneider v. Union Hospital, Inc., 2016 WL 6037085, *4 (S.D. Ind. 2016), for
example, testified that they punched in at the beginning of their shifts and immediately started
working, and the Court credited that testimony. That type of evidence is lacking here.
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Moreover, as described above, Metal Technologies has presented evidence in the form of
employee declarations that many employees did not perform work during pre-shift clock-ins.
Metal Technologies also argues that production line employees would not have been able to begin
performing work before their scheduled clock-in times, because they were relieving other
employees on the production line, who would not yet have vacated their stations. [Filing No. 3302 at 11.] Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence to dispute these factual assertions.
Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that they need not produce evidence that any Plaintiffs were
actually working before or after their scheduled shifts in order to be entitled to summary judgment
on the issue of liability. They contend that Ms. Conrad’s deposition testimony by itself establishes
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Metal Technologies engaged in
illegal rounding. The Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Conrad’s testimony proves, among other things,
that:
•

the payroll department reviewed each employee’s time record every week, and that Ms.
Conrad could see time punches and determine the actual hours of work reported, [Filing
No. 322 at 18 (citing Filing No. 321-1 at 30-31)];

•

the time records that showed each employee’s actual time in and actual time out were the
best evidence of time worked and the only evidence of time worked available in the case,
[Filing No. 322 at 18 (citing Filing No. 321-1 at 60-63)];

•

Metal Technologies had no other type of time records, [Filing No. 322 at 18 (citing Filing
No. 321-1 at 60-63)];
First, Metal Technologies disputes Plaintiffs’ characterizations of Ms. Conrad’s testimony,

and the Court agrees that this testimony does not establish Plaintiffs’ entitlement to summary
judgment. Ms. Conrad did testify that she reviewed each employee’s time card reports, but she
did not testify that she could determine the actual hours of work performed by each employee
based on the time cards. [See Filing No. 321-1 at 30.] Ms. Conrad testified that employees were
paid based on their shift times, and that employees “can clock in whenever they want, but based
17

off hours worked, we paid off of that.” [Filing No. 321-1 at 43.] Ms. Conrad also testified that
the Employee Manual states the employee shift times, and also specifies that employees can “clock
in 15 minutes early.” [Filing No. 321-1 at 65.] This testimony suggests that Ms. Conrad did not
consider the time cards to automatically reflect the actual hours worked by each employee.
Likewise, Ms. Conrad did not testify that “Metal Technologies had no other type of time
records,” as asserted by Plaintiffs. [Filing No. 322 at 18.] Ms. Conrad testified that employees
filled out overtime authorization forms in order to be paid for approved overtime and submitted
“missed punch forms” in the event that they did not clock in or out properly. [Filing No. 321-1 at
57.] Ms. Conrad testified that she received, on average, 50 to 75 of these forms per week, and she
would review them in conjunction with the time card reports in order to enter an employee’s hours
for payroll purposes. [Filing No. 321-1 at 59.] This testimony makes clear that multiple types of
timekeeping records exist and were utilized by Metal Technologies.
Again, Plaintiffs’ argument is in essence that the Court must consider the time and payroll
records as the only (and dispositive) evidence of a wage violation. But the Court cannot conclude
that Metal Technologies committed a recordkeeping violation. Nor can it conclude that the remedy
for that violation, if one occurred, is the conclusion that the time clock and payroll records alone
establish that Plaintiffs performed work for which they were not compensated.
3. Contrary Evidence and Admissions
Plaintiffs argue that Metal Technologies has not presented evidence to rebut or contradict
Plaintiffs’ evidence of unpaid wages, and also that Metal Technologies has made admissions that
establish beyond dispute all of the elements of liability. [Filing No. 322 at 28-35.]
As to the “unrebutted” evidence of unpaid wages, the Court addresses this contention
succinctly, because Plaintiffs’ argument again largely depends on their contention that the time

18

card and payroll records alone establish that Metal Technologies failed to pay Plaintiffs owed
wages. As described in detail above, those records do not establish the key element that Plaintiffs
actually worked during the hours represented on the time cards. And because Plaintiffs have failed
to submit any evidence on that point, there is nothing for Metal Technologies to rebut.
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Conrad testified that she had no evidence that any employee was
ever disciplined for clocking in but failing to start work, and from that, the Court should infer that
employees must have been working during those early and late clock-in times. [Filing No. 322 at
30-31.] The Court declines to do so, because Metal Technologies has presented evidence directly
rebutting this inference: namely, that Ms. Conrad also testified that the Manual indicated that
employees could clock in and out up to fifteen minutes early or late. Under those circumstances,
Ms. Conrad would have had no reason to discipline employees.
As to Metal Technologies’ “admissions,” the Court addressed many of these above. The
Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs consistently overstate the purported admissions made by
Metal Technologies and identify facts as undisputed when Metal Technologies clearly disputes
them. For example, under the heading “Areas of Agreement” in Plaintiffs’ reply brief, one
subheading is entitled, “No One Is Fighting Over Math – Metal Technologies Does Not Dispute
That a Comparison of Class Members’ Time Records To Corresponding Pay Roll Records Reveals
a Significant Underpayment of Wages on a Class-Wide Basis.” [Filing No. 341 at 16.] Metal
Technologies, however, disputes that statement in its entirety. As described at length above, Metal
Technologies argues that a comparison of the time and corresponding payroll records does not
reveal an underpayment of wages, because the time records do not reflect the hours actually
worked by employees.

19

For these reasons, the Court cannot conclude that Metal Technologies has failed to rebut
or has admitted Plaintiffs’ contentions.
4. Compensation Agreement
Plaintiffs argue that Metal Technologies established a compensation agreement via its
Employee Manual to pay employees based on their clock-in and clock-out times, and that this
agreement should be enforced by this Court pursuant to the FLSA. [Filing No. 322 at 25-28.]
Plaintiffs argue that the following statement from the Manual establishes an agreement to pay
employees for all hours clocked in, regardless of whether employees were working: “[y]our time
punch is the only way the payroll department knows how many hours you worked and how much
to pay you.” [Filing No. 322 at 25.] From this, Plaintiffs argue that “[i]n so doing, Metal
Technologies defined ‘hours worked’ for itself and its employees. Compensable work time began
with a time punch and ended with a time punch out.” [Filing No. 322 at 25.] Metal Technologies
responds that it did not ever make an agreement to pay employees for time not spent working, and
that the FLSA cannot be interpreted to require payment for such time. [Filing No. 331 at 37-43.]
Setting aside the issue of whether the Manual constitutes any type of employment
agreement, Plaintiffs fail to point out the other portions of the Manual that contradict their
interpretation of the one cited sentence. For example, the Manual specifies that employees may
clock in and out up to fifteen minutes before or after their shifts. Metal Technologies argues, and
the Court agrees, that Plaintiffs’ interpretation would create the highly unusual arrangement that
Metal Technologies offered to pay employees for up to 30 minutes per day of time not spent
working, but spent eating breakfast, drinking coffee, or chatting with coworkers. The Manual also
specifies that the normal workweek is 40 hours long, and that normal shifts are eight hours long.
It also states that all overtime pay must be approved in advance, and employees attested to being

20

aware that they must complete an overtime authorization form in order to be compensated for work
beyond 40 hours per week. [Filing No. 330-7 at 8-9; Filing No. 330-7 at 1; Filing No. 330-8 at 2.]
These overtime provisions are inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ interpretation: under their reading,
employees could amass 2.5 hours of time above 40 hours per week, again, engaging in non-work
activities, which the employer would be required to pay without prior approval or the use of an
overtime authorization form.
The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the cited portions of the Manual establish
an agreement for Metal Technologies to pay employees for all time spent clocked in, regardless of
whether they were working.
D. Timekeeping Practices: Lunch Breaks
The Court addresses separately Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding time-rounding practices
surrounding meal breaks. In their brief in support of their Motion to Certify, Plaintiffs sought to
certify a class/collective of those who were not paid for lunch breaks that lasted 20 minutes or less.
[Filing No. 54 at 20.] This Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion with regard to those unpaid breaks,
because it concluded that neither of the named Plaintiffs alleged that they ever took a lunch break
of 20 minutes or less, and therefore they did not demonstrate that they were harmed by the
allegedly offending policy. Weil v. Metal Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 286396 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
A group of plaintiffs represented by the same counsel then filed a separate lawsuit, Fannie M.
Kolish v. Metal Technologies, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-00145-JMS-MJD, involving meal breaks
lasting 20 minutes or less.
In this Motion, Plaintiffs allege that, just as Metal Technologies engaged in illegal rounding
by failing to pay employees for pre- and post-shift clock-ins, it also engaged in illegal rounding by
automatically deducting 30 minutes for meal breaks, even if employees took less time for meals.

21

[Filing No. 341 at 32-33.] Metal Technologies responds that Plaintiffs’ lunch break-related
rounding claims are foreclosed by this Court’s prior ruling on the class/collective certification, and
that any lunch break rounding claims were not included in the Court’s certification. [Filing No.
331 at 26-27.] Plaintiffs reply that this claim is distinct from the unpaid meals claim being raised
in Kolish and is instead a subset of the overall illegal rounding claim discussed above.
Plaintiffs state unequivocally in their reply brief here that the lunch-related rounding claim
does not involve instances in which employees took a lunch break of 20 minutes or less, which are
the purported “unpaid” lunch breaks covered instead by Kolish. 2 [Filing No. 341 at 32.] Therefore,
while the Plaintiffs do not explicitly state this, the only possible meal-time rounding encompassed
by this case involves lunch breaks that lasted 21 to 29 minutes, but which were “rounded up” to
30 minutes by Metal Technologies.
At the certification stage, Plaintiffs’ briefing regarding lunch breaks focused almost
exclusively on the zero to twenty-minute, unpaid lunch claims. Plaintiffs’ explanation regarding
any rounding issues was minimal, and they never explicitly defined what constituted lunch break
rounding, once the unpaid 20-minute lunch claims were carved out. Plaintiffs did make one
reference to the rounding claim at the certification stage. They specifically listed the lunch-related
rounding alongside the shift start and end time rounding in the factual summary of their brief in
support of their Motion for Certification. [Filing No. 54 at 5 (“Metal Technologies disregards the
actual times an employee records his/her lunch (time clocked out until time clocked back in) and

2

Plaintiffs’ instant briefing, however, does not always maintain the clear separation between the
unpaid meal breaks claim raised in Kolish and the alleged rounding at issue here. For example, in
their brief in support of summary judgment, Plaintiffs state that Ms. Conrad admitted to rounding
time records in Metal Technologies’ favor by deducting 30 minutes from employees’ paid work
days when the employees’ lunch breaks were 20 minutes or less. [Filing No. 322 at 7.]
22

rounds the recorded lunch time up (in Metal Technologies’ favor) and treats the employee as
though he/she got to take a full thirty (30) minute, unpaid lunch break.”)]. The Court’s certification
order did not specifically exclude those rounding claims from the certified collective and classes,
so the Court concludes that those alleged violations (21 to 29 minutes “rounded” to 30) are
contained within the class certified by the Court.
During the pendency of this Motion, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify filed in
Kolish.3 In that case, as here, Plaintiffs rely on time and payroll records to support their claim.
The Court concluded that the time records concerning Plaintiffs’ lunch clock-ins and clock-outs
were not sufficiently reliable to establish Plaintiffs’ actual lunch breaks.

Kolish v. Metal

Technologies, 2017 WL 525695, *7 (S.D. Ind. 2017). For example, the records indicate that named
Plaintiff Fannie Kolish clocked out and back in for lunch during the same minute on 88 different
occasions. [Kolish v. Metal Technologies, Filing No. 54-5 at 11.] In her deposition, Ms. Kolish
could not explain why she would have clocked out and back in within one minute. [Kolish v. Metal
Technologies, Filing No. 54-5 at 11.] The same records are at issue here, and the Court cannot
ignore the evidentiary deficiencies identified in that case, involving significantly overlapping
plaintiffs and the same defendant.
But even setting aside the evidentiary issues, Plaintiffs do not address the fact that Ms.
Conrad’s testimony (the only evidentiary support they cite aside from timekeeping and payroll
records) does not establish that any lunch-related rounding was non-neutral. Ms. Conrad testified
repeatedly that Metal Technologies always automatically deducts 30 minutes for lunch, and
Plaintiffs cite no testimony or other evidence stating that employees who took longer than 30

3

Kolish and Weil are consolidated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) for discovery purposes, and
the Court cites to record evidence from Kolish where relevant. [Filing No. 317 at 1.]
23

minutes for lunch did not receive the benefit of having their time rounded down to 30 minutes.
The testimony cited by Plaintiffs, in fact, involves only lunch breaks lasting twenty minutes or
less. [See Filing No. 321-1 at 67-70.] For all of these reasons, as with the other elements of its
illegal rounding claim, Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that genuine disputes of material fact
exist regarding the issue of liability on Plaintiffs’ FLSA and IWPA claims, and therefore Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.
III.
METAL TECHNOLOGIES’ MOTION FOR DECERTIFICATION
The Court turns next to Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify. This Court conditionally
certified one sub-class under the FLSA and certified two sub-classes under Rule 23 and the IWPA.
[Filing No. 79 at 34.] Metal Technologies moves to decertify the following subclasses under the
FLSA and IWPA, respectively:
•

Present and former hourly paid Metal Technologies employees who worked
at any time from January 20, 2012 to the present and who, as shown by
Metal Technologies’ time and pay roll records, were not timely paid regular
wages or overtime compensation on one or more occasion for time worked;
and

•

Hourly paid employees from Metal Technologies who presently work there
or voluntarily terminated their employment, who worked at any time from
January 20, 2013 to the present and who, as shown by Metal Technologies’
time and pay roll records, were not timely paid regular wages on one or
more occasion for time worked.

[Filing No. 333 at 2, citing Weil v. Metal Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 286396 (S.D. Ind. 2016).]
Plaintiffs oppose decertification. [Filing No. 345.]
A. Standard of Review
An employee may only bring a collective action on behalf of other employees who are
similarly situated. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Therefore, to decide whether to initially certify a collective
24

action, the Court must determine whether members of the proposed class are, in fact, similarly
situated. Campbell v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2010 WL 3326752, *3-4 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
Courts within this Circuit typically use a two-step inquiry. Scott v. NOW Courier, Inc., 2012 WL
1072751, *7 (S.D. Ind. 2012); Lallathin v. Ro Ro Inc., 2010 WL 2640271, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
The first step, also known as the notice stage, involves analysis of the pleadings and affidavits that
have been submitted to determine whether notice should be given to potential class members.
Campbell, 2010 WL 3326752 at *3. This first step imposes a relatively low burden on Plaintiffs.
The second step of certification occurs after discovery has been largely completed and
allows a defendant the opportunity to seek decertification of the class or restrict the class because
various putative class members are not, in fact, similarly situated as required by the FLSA. Id. at
*3. Under this more stringent inquiry, courts typically consider the following factors: “(1) whether
plaintiffs share similar or disparate factual and employment settings; (2) whether the various
affirmative defenses available to the defendant would have to be individually applied to each
plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural concerns.” Threatt v. CRF First Choice, Inc., 2006 WL
2054372, *5 (N.D. Ind. 2006). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that they are similarly
situated. Crawford v. Prof’l Transportation, Inc., 2017 WL 1077660, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22,
2017). At this stage of the collective action inquiry, Plaintiffs must “demonstrate similarity beyond
simply claiming that the FLSA has been violated.” Creal v. Grp. O, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 831,
836-37 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Instead, Plaintiffs must show “an identifiable factual nexus that binds the
plaintiffs together as victims of a particular violation.” Id.
As for a Rule 23 class certification, “the judge remains free to modify it in the light of
subsequent developments in the litigation.” Gen. Tel. Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160
(1982). That includes the ability to decertify a class should circumstances so dictate. Eggleston

25

v. Chic. Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 1981). The
Court also notes the Seventh Circuit’s guidance in a case involving the appeal of a decertification
that
…despite the difference between a collective action and a class action and the
absence from the collective-action section of the Fair Labor Standards Act of the
kind of detailed procedural provisions found in Rule 23, there isn’t a good reason
to have different standards for the certification of the two different types of action,
and the case law has largely merged the standards, though with some terminological
differences.
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
B. Discussion
Metal Technologies argues that the FLSA and IWPA classes involving the alleged
rounding violations should be decertified. [Filing No. 333 at 21.] Metal Technologies contends
that Plaintiffs have not established that they are similarly situated, because they have not shown
that they were all victims of a common policy or practice that resulted in unpaid wages. [Filing
No. 333 at 22-26.] Metal Technologies also argues that at least one of its available defenses would
be difficult to prove on a representational basis, weighing in favor of decertification. [Filing No.
333 at 30-32.] And Metal Technologies contends that judicial economy would not be advanced
by proceeding to trial on a class-wide basis. [Filing No. 333 at 32-33.]
Plaintiffs respond that a motion to decertify is essentially a motion to reconsider. [Filing
No. 345 at 14.] Plaintiffs argue that because significant discovery had already been conducted
prior to the Court’s certification, no circumstances have changed, and therefore decertification is
not warranted. [Filing No. 345 at 15.] Plaintiffs contend that they have demonstrated that they
are similarly situated, in that the time card and payroll records establish that Metal Technologies
rounded Plaintiffs’ time, resulting in the underpayment of wages. [Filing No. 345 at 18-30.]

26

First, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that a decertification motion is
“essentially” a motion to reconsider. Regarding certification of a collective action, the decision to
initially certify a class is explicitly conditional, and it imposes a relatively low burden on Plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Scott, 2012 WL 1072751 at *7; Lallathin, 2010 WL 2640271 at *1. After discovery has
been largely completed, the Court then engages in the more stringent second step of the
certification inquiry. This well-established standard does not equate to a motion to reconsider. As
for the Rule 23 class certification, “the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent
developments in the litigation.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
Metal Technologies argues that all of the factors typically considered by the court weigh
in favor of decertification. The crux of its argument for decertification is the same as its argument
in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs have not shown that they
were subject to a common wage violation, because they have not shown that they, as a class or
individually, were working during pre- and post-shift clock-ins. 4 [Filing No. 333 at 21-30.]
Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown that they were similarly situated, or that they have suffered a
wage violation at all. Plaintiffs respond by reiterating the same arguments raised in their Motion
for Summary Judgment—that the time and payroll records show a rounding policy that resulted in
the underpayment of wages.
As the parties’ arguments regarding decertification track their summary judgment
arguments, the Court need not repeat them, or its own analysis. For the same reasons detailed
above regarding the denial of summary judgment, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated adequate similarity to support class certification. The “glue” necessary to bind

4

Nor have Plaintiffs shown, for that matter, that they were actually working during the 21-29
minute lunch break period shown on certain time records.
27

Plaintiffs’ claims together is, at a minimum, the contention that their time records establish that
they performed work for which they were not compensated. Without that, Plaintiffs lack both a
theory of liability and proof of any injury. Even the named Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they
performed uncompensated work during early and late clock-ins and clock-outs—let alone that
other Plaintiffs are similarly situated. As the Court has already concluded, simply pointing to
employees’ time and payroll records does not establish a per se violation of the FLSA and IWPA.
The Court therefore grants Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify.
IV.
METAL TECHNOLOGIES’ CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Metal Technologies has cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the pre-shift time
claims of several class members, and on two damages issues.
Regarding the pre-shift time claims, “when a collective action is decertified, it reverts to
one or more individual actions on behalf of the named plaintiffs, which is just what happens when
a Rule 23 class is decertified: the unnamed class members go poof and the named plaintiffs’ claims
revert to being individual claims.” Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 877 (7th
Cir. 2012). In other words, the class no longer exists, and the named Plaintiffs’ claims now proceed
as individual actions against Metal Technologies. Because Metal Technologies does not seek
summary judgment regarding either of the named Plaintiffs, their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is rendered moot by the Court’s grant of decertification.
Regarding the damages issues, Metal Technologies argues that the expert relied upon by
Plaintiffs erred (1) in calculating damages at the overtime rate under the IWPA, when Plaintiffs
specifically disclaim overtime claims and seek “straight-time” compensation; and (2) in
erroneously calculating straight-time damages. [Filing No. 331 at 50.] Metal Technologies asks
the Court to make several findings related to specific aspects of the expert report. Because the
28

Court has decertified the relevant subclasses, leaving only the two named Plaintiffs to proceed, the
Court questions whether the cited report will remain relevant at all. That report pertains to
damages calculated on a class-wide basis for classes that no longer exist. Calculating damages for
the two named Plaintiffs can perhaps be accomplished with reliance on testimonial evidence that
applies specifically to them. Therefore, the Court need not make specific findings regarding the
proffered expert report.
For the above reasons, the Court denies as moot Metal Technologies’ Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
•

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion as to liability on Plaintiffs’ wage deduction claim
under the IWPA, but only as to the period from January 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016.
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion as to liability for the remainder of the claim period.

•

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion as to liability on Plaintiffs’ time-rounding claims
under the FLSA and IWPA.
The Court GRANTS Metal Technologies’ Motion to Decertify, and DENIES AS MOOT

Metal Technologies’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

May 26, 2017
Date: _____________

Distribution:
Robert Peter Kondras, Jr.
HUNT HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP
[e-mail]
29

Robert F. Hunt
HUNT HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP
[e-mail]
Jacob H. Miller
HUNT HASSLER LORENZ KONDRAS LLP
[e-mail]
Melissa K. Taft
JACKSON LEWIS P.C. - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
Michael W. Padgett
JACKSON LEWIS P.C. - Indianapolis
[e-mail]
Brian D. Burbrink
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
[e-mail]
Todd J. Kaiser
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
[e-mail]

30