TAYLOR v. SMITH et al

Filing 35

ORDER denying 19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Mr. Taylor has not shown he is entitled to injunctive relief. **SEE ORDER** Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 8/13/2015. (AH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DAVID G. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFERY SMITH, MARY RANKIN,
ESTHER HINTON,
Defendants.

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) No. 2:15-cv-0071-WTL-WGH
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Entry Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff, David Taylor, asks this Court to grant his motion for preliminary injunction
requiring the medical staff at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility to provide medical treatment
for his hepatitis C. In his complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that prison officials violated his Eighth
Amendment rights when they were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court denies Mr. Taylor’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
I. Background
Mr. Taylor alleges that the defendants discontinued treatment for his hepatitis C infection
in December of 2013 after he tested positive for the use of methamphetamines.1 He states that he
has not used methamphetamines or any other unauthorized substances since that time, and the
discontinuation of his treatment for hepatitis C has had an adverse effect on his health, causing an
increase in his viral load, fatigue, poor stamina, inability to concentrate, join pain, muscle aches,
chronic itching, digestive problems, persistent headaches and damage to his liver. In his motion
for preliminary injunction, Mr. Taylor alleges that he will “continue to suffer immediate and

1

Mr. Taylor attached a directive for the management of hepatitis C by the Indiana Department of Correction
to his complaint. The directive indicates that “recent substance or alcohol use during incarceration” is an
“absolute contraindication to antiviral therapy.” [dkt. 1, at pg. 4].

irreparable harm in the nature of total liver failure and ultimately death” if the defendants do not
resume his treatment for hepatitis C. [dkt. 19, at pg. 2]. Defendant Rankin has filed an answer to
the complaint, while a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Hinton is pending. Both defendant
Rankin and Hinton responded to the motion for preliminary injunction.
Inmates at the Indiana Department of Correction with chronic hepatitis are seen in the
Chronic Care Clinic (“Clinic”) where they are regularly evaluated and undergo laboratory testing
to monitor their condition. [dkt. 23, Ex. A-2]. These evaluations include testing to determine liver
enzyme elevations and other measurements, which can fluctuate dramatically in hepatitis patients.
[dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 12]. Based on the results of this testing, inmates are prioritized for treatment
based upon the advancement of hepatic fibrosis, or cirrhosis, whether the patient is a liver
transplant recipient or has a HIV co-infection, or whether the patient has a comorbid medical
condition associated with hepatitis, such as certain types of lymphomas. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 13].
Mr. Taylor has hepatitis C and has been a patient at the Clinic since December of 2013.
His treatment was discontinued when he tested positive for methamphetamine. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶
16]. As a patient at the Clinic, Mr. Taylor’s condition is regularly monitored and evaluated and his
results do not indicate significant fibrosis for prioritization for treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 16].
Mr. Taylor was seen in the Clinic on March 5, 2015, and May 22, 2015, and which time he denied
having any abdominal pain, bloating, edema, easy bruising/bleeding, change in bowel habits,
melena, hematochezia, rectal bleeding, jaundice, weight loss, or night sweats. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶
14]. Plaintiff’s alleged complaints of “chronic fatigue, poor stamina, inability to concentrate, joint
pain, muscle aches, chronic itching, digestive problems, and persistent headaches,” [dkt. 1, p. 6],
are not indicative of a life-threatening situation, are nonspecific, and are not likely related to his
hepatitis infection. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 15]. There is also no indication in his medical record that Mr.

Taylor relayed these generalized complaints during his latest Clinic appointments. [dkt. 23, Ex.
A, ¶ 15].
Mr. Taylor is on a watch list for treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 17]. However, there is nothing
in this medical records, including recent laboratory testing and evaluations to indicate a serious
risk to his health exists if he does not receive immediate treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 17]. Hepatitis
is a slow progressing disease, and his not receiving treatment at this time will have no significant
effect on his infection or his overall health. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 20].
II. Preliminary Injunction Standard
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). There are four requirements a movant
must establish to be entitled to a preliminary injunction: (a) likely of success on the merits; (b)
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (c) the balance of equities tips in the movants
favor; and, (d) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365,
374 (2008). The “movant has the burden to show that all four factors . . . weigh in favor of the
injunction.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 2009). “If the
court determines that the moving party has failed to demonstrate any one of these [ ] threshold
requirements, it must deny the injunction.” Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of
U.S.A., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
Mr. Taylor has failed to establish his right to injunctive relief. Mr. Taylor has not shown
that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims or that he will suffer irreparable harm if
immediate relief is not granted.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The defendants argue that Mr. Taylor is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because he
has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. Mr. Taylor’s claim is brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a valid Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical
care, Mr. Taylor must “allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (U.S. 1976). A
deliberate indifference claim is comprised of two elements: one objective and one subjective.
McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013). The defendants do not dispute that Mr. Taylor
suffers from a serious medical condition.
Mr. Taylor wants medical treatment that he is not receiving. A dispute about his proper
course of treatment does not state a claim of deliberate indifference. “Under the Eighth
Amendment, [the plaintiff] is not entitled to demand specific care. She is not entitled to the best
care possible. She is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm to
her. The defendants have taken those measures.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.
1997). Mr. Taylor “is not entitled to demand specific care.” Id. Here, the defendants have taken
proper measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Taylor’s health. More
specifically, the defendants are aware of Mr. Taylor’s condition as he has been seen in the Clinic
since 2013. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 16]. As a patient at the Clinic, Mr. Taylor’s condition is regularly
monitored and evaluated and his results do not indicate significant fibrosis for prioritization for
treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 16]. Mr. Taylor was seen in the Clinic on March 5, 2015, and May
22, 2015, at which time he denied having any abdominal pain, bloating, edema, easy
bruising/bleeding, change in bowel habits, melena, hematochezia, rectal bleeding, jaundice, weight

loss, or night sweats. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 14; Ex. A-1, pp. 23-26, 29-32]. Plaintiff’s alleged
complaints of “chronic fatigue, poor stamina, inability to concentrate, joint pain, muscle aches,
chronic itching, digestive problems, and persistent headaches,” [dkt. 1, p. 6], are not indicative of
a life-threatening situation, are nonspecific, and are not likely related to his hepatitis infection.
[dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 15]. Nor is there any indication in his medical record that Mr. Taylor relayed
these generalized complaints during his latest Clinic appointments. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 15].
Mr. Taylor is on a watch list for treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 17]. However, there is nothing
in this medical records, including recent laboratory testing and evaluations to indicate a serious
risk to his health exists if he does not receive immediate treatment. [dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 17].
Because the defendants are aware of and monitoring Mr. Taylor’s disease, he has not
shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the claim by showing the defendants are
consciously disregarding the risk that this disease poses to his health.
B. Irreparable Harm
“Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned
for.... [T]he injury must be of a particular nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for
it.” Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 196 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, defendants argue that
Mr. Taylor cannot show an actual injury or imminent irreparable injury because the medical
records show that he is not facing an immediate risk to his health from the lack of treatment for
the hepatitis. Mr. Taylor has not presented any evidence to rebut this showing. The Court agrees
that Mr. Taylor’s health is not at immediate risk due to not receiving treatment for hepatitis.
C. Balance of Harms
Because Mr. Taylor seeks injunctive relief, he has the burden of proving by a clear showing
that a balancing of the equities falls in his favor. Mazurek 520 U.S. at 972. Mr. Taylor states that

the equities fall in his favor because he alleges that if he continues not receiving treatment for his
disease, he will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the nature of total liver failure and
ultimately death. However, the facts simply do not bear this out. Mr. Taylor is a patient in the
Clinic where his condition is being monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. At this time, Mr.
Taylor’s test results did not support a conclusion that he needs immediate treatment for hepatitis.
[dkt. 23, Ex. A, ¶ 17].
D. Public Interest
Mr. Taylor does not address this factor. The defendants argue that the public interest is in
their favor to the extent that prisons should be given deference as to the day to day maintenance
and medical care of the inmates. The Court agrees that the defendants should be accorded
deference at this time to provide the most appropriate medical treatment for Mr. Taylor’s disease.
The Seventh Circuit has previously stated that, “. . . federal courts are most reluctant to interfere
with the internal administration of state prisons because they are less qualified to do so than prison
authorities.” See Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir.1997). As the Supreme Court has
stated:
The problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not
susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security. ‘Such considerations are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated
their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgments in such matters.’
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827) (citations and footnotes omitted). A prison medical professional’s “treatment decisions will
be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded

under those circumstances.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 2008)(internal
quotations omitted).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Taylor has not shown he is entitled to injunctive relief.
Accordingly, his motion for a preliminary injunction [dkt. 19] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
August 13, 2015
Date:______________
Distribution:
David G. Taylor, #31700
Wabash Valley Correction Facility
Electronic Service Participant
Court Only
Electronically registered counsel.

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana