MILLER - BASINGER v. MAGNOLIA HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.

Filing 57

ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EQUITABLY TOLL THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR PUTATIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION MEMBERS - The Court DENIES Miller-Basinger's 18 Motion to Equitably Toll the Limitations Period for Putative Collective Action Members. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 2/22/2016. (GSO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
LESLIE SHAYNE MILLER-BASINGER,
individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAGNOLIA HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
MAGNOLIA HEALTH MANAGEMENT,
LLC, and STUART REED,
Defendants.

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) No. 2:15-cv-00089-WTL-DKL
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ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EQUITABLY TOLL THE LIMITATIONS
PERIOD FOR PUTATIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION MEMBERS
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff Leslie Shayne Miller-Basinger’s (“MillerBasinger”) motion to equitably toll the limitations period for putative collective action members
to this lawsuit’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims [Dkt. No. 18]. This motion is fully
briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the motion for the reasons, and to the
extent, set forth below.
I.

BACKGROUND

Miller-Basinger alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). She brings
these claims as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), allowing an employee to bring a
lawsuit on behalf of all similarly situated employees. She also alleges violations of the
Rehabilitation Act, state minimum wage and overtime laws, and a state-law breach of contract
claim, all of which she brings as class action claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3). Miller-Basinger filed this lawsuit on March 30, 3015. At the same time, she filed a
Motion to Certify Class Action and FLSA Collective Action and a motion to stay this Court’s

ruling on that motion. Originally, Miller-Basinger named Magnolia Health Systems, Inc.
(“MHS”) as the only defendant in this case. During a status conference on May 6, 2015, MHS
denied employing Miller-Basinger. See Dkt. No. 21 at 2. At that time, the Court ordered the
commencement of discovery related to determining Miller-Basinger’s proper employer. See
Dkt. No. 15; Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 3. On June 17, 2015, Miller-Basinger filed the instant motion. On
August 20, 2015, Miller-Basinger filed an amended complaint (Dkt. No. 30), adding as
defendants Magnolia Health Management, LLC, and Stuart Reed. 1
II.

FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

The FLSA requires that an action “be commenced within two years after the cause of
action accrued” unless the violation was willful, in which case the statute of limitations is three
years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). FLSA actions commence as follows:
on the date when the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or
class action . . . it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual
claimant – (a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named
as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party
plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought; or (b) if
such written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so appear – on the
subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which the
action was commenced.
29 U.S.C. § 256. An individual can join the collective action only by consenting to become a
participant. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought.”); see also Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d
770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2013) (comparing requirement that FLSA collective action plaintiffs must

1

For purposes of this Entry, the Court refers to MHS, Magnolia Health Management,
LLC, and Stuart Reed collectively as Defendants and to MHS separately because, at the time of
briefing related to this motion, it was the only defendant in this lawsuit.
2

opt in to action with procedure of opting out of class actions governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23);
Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
III.

DISCUSSION

Miller-Basinger requests that the doctrine of equitable tolling apply to the putative FLSA
collective action members so that the statute of limitations does not run to bar their claims. She
argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because MHS “intends to argue that it is not
the actual employer of [Miller-Basinger],” Dkt. No. 19 at 1, and that discovery related to
determining the proper defendants “has delayed any ruling upon [Miller-Basinger]’s Motion to
Certify Combined Class Action and FLSA Collective Action . . . which was filed on the same
day Basinger filed her Complaint,” id. at 2. 2 Miller-Basinger argues that “[t]his delay causes
unfair prejudice to those potential class members who will receive Notice of the lawsuit and will
wish to opt in.” Id. She further argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled “from the
original March 30, 2015 date [Miller-Basinger] filed her motion to certify an FLSA collective
action . . . until such time after the Court can rule on that Motion to Certify FLSA Collective
Action and Defendant provides a list of names and addresses of potential opt-in plaintiffs.” Id. at
6. At the time Miller-Basinger filed her reply brief on July 17, 2016, she had requested, but not
yet received from Defendants, the names and addresses of potential collective action plaintiffs.
Dkt. No. 24 at 2.

2

It does not appear to the Court that Miller-Basinger was concerned about potential
prejudice to putative collective action members when she actively sought to stay the Court’s
ruling on her Motion to Certify Class Action and FLSA Collective Action. Indeed, she moved to
stay the Court’s ruling on that motion at the same time as she filed the motion and her original
complaint, i.e., before MHS raised its argument that it did not employ her. See Dkt. No. 4. She
also requested a hearing at that time “so that the parties can address the discovery and briefing
issues to the Court and so that the Court can schedule necessary deadlines,” id., which would
itself delay proceedings.
3

In response, MHS argues the Court does not have jurisdiction to toll the statute of
limitations as to parties who have not yet consented to the lawsuit. Dkt. No. 21 at 4. MHS cites
to United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986), which vacated as premature a
lower court’s decision to toll the statute of limitations with respect to individuals to whom notice
of the FLSA collective action would be sent. In that case, the court reasoned that tolling the
statute of limitations would require the court to issue an advisory opinion and “general principles
derived from the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution [leave] a federal court [] without power to give advisory opinions, because such
opinions cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before it.” Id.; see also Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013) (discussing advisory opinions in
FLSA context).
Although Miller-Basinger responded to this argument by citing cases in which various
courts have tolled the statute of limitations to avoid prejudice to potential FLSA collective action
plaintiffs (see Dkt. No. 24 at 2-3), the Court agrees with MHS. It is premature for this Court to
toll the statute of limitations for potential plaintiffs because doing so would require the Court to
issue an advisory opinion, which would impermissibly “address[] the rights of parties not before
the Court.” See, e.g., Weil v. Metal Tech., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00016-JMS-DKL, 2015 WL
5827594, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 6, 2015) (denying for the same reasons motion to equitably toll
the statute of limitations for putative FLSA collective action members).
Non-parties to a collective action are not subject to claim preclusion. Tice v. American
Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 1998) (given opt-in nature of collective actions under
29 U.S.C. § 216(b), claim preclusion not applicable to ADEA plaintiff who did not consent to
earlier suits challenging same policy at issue in his case); see also McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat.

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Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, (9th Cir. 2007). “[G]iving notice to potential plaintiffs of a collective
action has less to do with the due process rights of the potential plaintiffs and more to do with the
named plaintiffs’ interest in vigorously pursuing the litigation and the district court’s interest in
managing collective actions in an orderly fashion.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). To be sure,
any putative collective action member may protect her interests and avoid prejudice by filing a
new FLSA lawsuit or consent in this lawsuit, if she so desires.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Miller-Basinger’s Motion to Equitably
Toll the Limitations Period for Putative Collective Action Members [Dkt. No. 18].
SO ORDERED: 2/22/16
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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