HAMPTON v. BROWN et al

Filing 20

ORDER denying 15 Motion for TRO; denying 16 Motion to Appoint Counsel. **SEE ORDER** Copy to plaintiff via US mail. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 7/20/2015. (AH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
EDWARD M. HAMPTON,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
DICK BROWN, Superintendent, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00135-WTL-MJD

Entry on Pending Motions
I.
The plaintiff’s motion for counsel [dkt 16] is denied. The defendants have not responded
to the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit has found that “until the defendants respond to the
complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel . . . cannot be gauged.” Kadamovas v.
Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court notes that the plaintiff asserts that he has
made “repeated efforts” to obtain counsel. Should the plaintiff renew his motion for counsel after
the defendants have responded to the complaint, he should specifically demonstrate how he has
“made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so.” Pruitt
v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).
II.
The plaintiff moves for a temporary restraining order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65. He asks the Court to prevent the defendants “and each of their officers, agents,
[and] employees . . . from having any physical contact or direct interaction, of any kind” with him
other than to resolve the instant suit.

Requests for temporary restraining orders are governed by the same general standards that
govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977). To prevail on his motion, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) he will
suffer irreparable harm which, absent injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm the
respondent will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed by
the injunction. See Goodman v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof'l Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th
Cir. 2005); see also Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2002);
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff has not attempted to make any of the four showings necessary to receive a
temporary restraining order, except arguably the third. To the extent he alleges that he will suffer
irreparable harm, he states only that not preventing the defendants and their employees from
having contact with him will “make him vulnerable . . . to excessive searches and attempts to
deliberately hinder [him] from many . . . privileges.” Such a potential for harm is insufficient to
show irreparable harm. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to show that any of the factors weigh in
favor of granting the temporary restraining order, and his motion must be denied.
Additionally, the requested restraining order is overly broad and thus would not be granted
even if the plaintiff had made the necessary showing. The plaintiff requests that the Court
essentially prevent all prison employees from interacting with him. But the plaintiff’s claims relate
solely to his placement in the Restricted Movement Unit and how this placement prevents him
from utilizing education courses and other privileges. As the four factors necessary to obtain a
temporary restraining order suggest, there must be “a relationship between the injury claimed in
the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251

(10th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122
F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir.1997) (“A district court should not issue an injunction when the injunction
in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in
the suit.”). The plaintiff’s dramatic request to prevent the defendants and all their employees from
having contact with him is well beyond the contours of his claims. For this additional reason, the
plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order [dkt 15] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
Date: 7/20/15

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
EDWARD M. HAMPTON
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
P.O. Box 1111
CARLISLE, IN 47838