SCHULEY v. BROWN

Filing 13

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - The petition of Justin Schuley for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. WVD 16-03-0050. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Schuley's habeas petition must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 3/6/2017.(RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

JUSTIN SCHULEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BROWN Superintendent,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:16-cv-00284-WTL-DKL

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
The petition of Justin Schuley for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. WVD 16-03-0050. For the reasons explained in this Entry,
Schuley’s habeas petition must be denied.
Discussion
A. Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process
requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision maker, a written statement articulating
the reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the
record” to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674,
677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B. The Disciplinary Proceeding
On March 7, 2016, Correctional Officer F. Allen issued a Report of Conduct charging
Schuley with assault with a weapon in violation of Code A-102. The Report of Conduct states:
On 3-7-16 at approx. 8:04 pm I, C/O F. Allen was assigned to north yard when a
10-10 was called out for EHU core area. I was first to respond and witnessed
Offender Schuley, Justin #238991 striking Offender Griffin, Michael #213400
with what appeared to be a lock attached to a string. I gave clear verbal orders for
Offender Schuley to stop and he did not comply. I administered a one second
burst of OC to the target area of Offender Schuley and he complied with my
orders to stop. Both offenders were placed in mechanical restraints with no further
incident.
Schuley was notified of the charge on March 9, 2016, when he was served with the
Report of Conduct and the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (Screening Report). The Screening
Officer noted that Schuley did not request any witnesses or evidence.
The Hearing Officer conducted a disciplinary hearing on March 10, 2016. The Hearing
Officer noted Schuley’s statement, “That sounds about right.” Relying on the staff reports,
statement of the offender, confiscation slip, and photos, the Hearing Officer determined that
Schuley had violated Code A-102.
The sanctions imposed included a written reprimand, one month of phone restriction, one
year of disciplinary segregation, restitution for medical bills of the victim, the deprivation of 54
days of earned credit time, and the demotion from credit class I to III. The Hearing Officer
imposed the sanction because of the seriousness and nature of the offense and the degree to
which the violation disrupted or endangered the security of the facility.
Schuley’s appeals were denied and he filed the present petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

C. Analysis
Schuley argues that his due process rights were violated because, in addition to the
disciplinary sanction, outside charges for battery were also brought against him. The respondent
argues that because Schuley did not raise this issue in his appeals, it is procedurally defaulted.
The respondent further argues that to the extent Schuley’s challenge is based on an alleged
violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policy, such a violation does not amount
to a deprivation of due process. Finally, the respondent argues that the filing of outside charges
as well as disciplinary charges does not violate the right protected Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to be free from multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments for the same
offense.
First, as the respondent points out, the only challenge raised in Schuley’s disciplinary
hearing appeal was an argument that the sanction was excessive. To obtain review of a claim for
habeas relief, a prisoner must first exhaust his state administrative remedies. Markham v. Clark,
978 F.2d 993, 995–96 (1992); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), (c). Exhaustion requires that the
prisoner present each claim he seeks to raise in his habeas petition at each level of the
administrative appeals process. Markham, 978 F.2d at 995-96; see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,
526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). But it appears that the outside charges against Schuley were brought
after he filed his disciplinary hearing appeals. The Court will not find, therefore, that Schuley
failed to exhaust this argument.
Next, to the extent that Schuley argues that IDOC policy was violated, this does not state
a due process claim. See Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1996); Keller v. Donahue,
2008 WL 822255, 271 Fed.Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2008) (in a habeas action, an
inmate “has no cognizable claim arising from the prison’s application of its regulations.”);

Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D.Ind. 1997) (violations of the Indiana Adult
Disciplinary Policy Procedures do not state a claim for federal habeas relief).
Finally, Schuley has not shown that the combination of the prison disciplinary sanction
and outside charges for the same conduct violate his right to be free from multiple punishments
for the same offense. This is because prison discipline is not a “prosecution” for double jeopardy
purposes. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the application of prison
discipline in addition to state criminal charges does not violate double jeopardy. Garrity v.
Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152–53 (7th Cir. 1994).
D. Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. For the reasons discussed above, there was no arbitrary
action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events
identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which
entitles Schuley to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Schuley’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now
issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/6/17

_______________________________

Distribution:

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Marjorie H. Lawyer-Smith
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]

JUSTIN SCHULEY 238991
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only