GUY v. ARAMARK FOOD SERVICES
Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment - Plaintiff Dante Guy is an Indiana inmate incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility. He brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Aramark Food Services, the company which pr ovides meals for inmates of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"). He alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("WVCF"), he broke a tooth on a foreign object in one of his meals. He further asserts that Aramark has repeatedly been notified of foreign objects found in the meals it serves, but has failed to rectify this situation. Arguing that Guy failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to these claims, the defendants move for summary judgment. Guy has not responded. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment, dkt. 30 , is granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/19/2017. (RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DANTE D. GUY,
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Dante Guy is an Indiana inmate incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional
Facility. He brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Aramark Food Services, the
company which provides meals for inmates of the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”).
He alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“WVCF”),
he broke a tooth on a foreign object in one of his meals. He further asserts that Aramark has
repeatedly been notified of foreign objects found in the meals it serves, but has failed to rectify
Arguing that Guy failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to
these claims, the defendants move for summary judgment. Guy has not responded. For the
following reasons, the motion for summary judgment, dkt. , is granted.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l–
Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). In determining the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the Court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986).
Guy has not opposed the motion for summary judgment, either with evidentiary material
or with a narrative statement suggesting that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment
based on the pleadings and the evidentiary record. He has not filed a statement of material facts
in dispute. The consequence of these circumstances is that Guy has conceded the defendant’s
version of the facts. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by
the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”); Waldridge v. American
Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994). This does not alter the standard for
assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and inferences
relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
II. Undisputed Facts
The Offender Grievance Process is meant to provide a mechanism for every inmate to
express complaints and topics of concern, for the efficient and fair resolution of legitimate
offender concerns, and for facility and IDOC management to be better informed and better able
to carry out the IDOC’s mission and goals. Information on the Offender Grievance Process is
included with the Admission & Orientation (A & O) Paperwork for inmates entering WVCF. A
copy of the policy for the Offender Grievance Process is also available to inmates through the
The Offender Grievance Process consists of three stages. First, an inmate must attempt to
resolve the grievance informally through officials at the facility. Second, if the inmate is unable
to obtain a resolution informally, the inmate may submit a formal grievance to the designated
staff person. The appropriate form for submitting grievances is available upon request to inmates
through their Caseworker or Casework Manager. Third, if the formal grievance is not resolved in
a manner that satisfies the offender, he may submit an appeal (Level II) within ten working days
from the date of receipt of the grievance response. The Offender Grievance Process is not
complete until the inmate completes the appeal process.
Guy was incarcerated at WVCF at the time of the alleged incident. Guy never filed any
grievances relating to foreign objects in his food or a chipped tooth that he suffered as a result of
a foreign object in his food.
The defendant argues that Guy’s claims must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies with respect to those claims. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before
bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted). The exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA is one of “proper exhaustion” because “no adjudicative system can
function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). This means that the prisoner plaintiff must have
completed “the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,
including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Id. at 84; see also Dale v.
Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit
inmate complaints and appeals ‘in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.’”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
The defendant has shown that Guy did not fully exhaust his available administrative
remedies as required by the PLRA. He did not file any grievances related to his claims in this
case. He has not responded to the motion for summary judgment and therefore has not disputed
these facts. It is therefore undisputed that Guy failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies with regard to his claims in this case. The consequence of these circumstances, in light
of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is that Guy’s claims should not have been brought and must now be
dismissed without prejudice. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024 (explaining that “a prisoner who does
not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies,
and thus is foreclosed by § 1997e(a) from litigating”); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th
Cir. 2004)(“We therefore hold that all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. , is granted. Judgment
consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DANTE D. GUY
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
Christopher Douglas Cody
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
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