DAUGHERTY v. SUPERINTENDENT

Filing 6

Order (1) Dismissing Claim under Indiana Law as Insufficient, (2) Dismissing Claim Based on United States Sentencing Guidelines as Insufficient, and (3) Directing Petitioner to File Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Jennings Daugh erty challenges the 33 year sentence imposed following his convictions in the Wayne Superior Court for two counts of being a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm and one count of intimidation. The arguments Daugherty has presented do not warrant the relief he seeks. As explained, therefore, the claims based on those arguments are dismissed. He shall have through October 14, 2016 in which to further supplement his petition for writ of habeas corpus by setting forth a viable claim for relief. (See Order.) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 9/9/2016.(BRR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
JENNINGS DAUGHERTY,

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Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

No. 2:16-cv-309-WTL-DKL

Order (1) Dismissing Claim under Indiana Law as Insufficient,
(2) Dismissing Claim Based on United States Sentencing Guidelines as Insufficient,
and (3) Directing Petitioner to File Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
I.
Jennings Daugherty challenges the 33 year sentence imposed following his convictions in
the Wayne Superior Court for two counts of being a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm
and one count of intimidation. See Daugherty v. State, 948 N.E.2d 868 (Ind.Ct.App.), transfer
granted, opinion vacated, 962 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 2011), vacated, 955 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. 2011). He
seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), asserting that the sentence is unlawful.
The scope of federal habeas review is limited. A federal court may grant habeas relief to a
petitioner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(emphasis added)). “[I]t is only noncompliance
with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the
federal courts. . . . It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).

Daugherty’s petition is governed by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Where a
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas relief is available under the
deferential AEDPA standard only if the state court's determination was (1) “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Cullen
v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Daugherty was notified of the AEDPA standard as just noted and was directed to
supplement his habeas petition to suggest the presence of one or more claims which satisfy the
AEDPA standard. He has responded with his filing of August 25, 2016.
II.
Daugherty’s filing of August 25, 2016 presents two themes. The first theme is that the
trial court violated state law concerning the imposition of consecutive sentences. The second
theme is that the trial court also violated the United States Sentencing Guidelines in imposing
Daugherty’s sentence.
A.
The claim that the trial court violated Indiana state law in imposing consecutive sentences
is summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in
the United States District Courts. The reason for the dismissal of this claim is that “[e]rrors of state
law in and of themselves are not cognizable on habeas review.” Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566,
574 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]o say that a petitioner's claim
is not cognizable on habeas review is thus another way of saying that his claim ‘presents no federal

issue at all.’” Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bates v. McCaughtry,
934 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1991). Additionally, “a court does not have ‘pendent’ jurisdiction over
non-cognizable habeas claims.” Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 721 (7th Cir. 2008)(citing
Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d
433, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1982).
No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the dismissal of the claim just
discussed.
B.
The second theme or argument presented in the petitioner’s response is that the imposition
of consecutive sentences also violated the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This argument is
misplaced and will not support the relief which is sought, however, because those Guidelines
regulate sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system,” 28 U.S .C. §
991(b)(1)(emphasis added), and “[n]o provision was made for application of the guidelines in state
courts.” Hundsdorfer v. Stewart, 2009 WL 1783436, at *11 (D.Ariz. June 18, 2009); see also
Government of Virgin Islands v. Bowling, 866 F.2d 610, 614 (3rd Cir. 1989)(“the legislative
history is replete with references to ‘Federal system,’ ‘Federal judges,’ ‘Federal offenders,’
‘Federal criminal cases,’ ‘Federal criminal justice system,’ ‘Federal Courts,’ ‘Federal sentencing
law.’”).
Any claim based on the argument just discussed is likewise summarily dismissed as legally
insufficient, and no partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the dismissal of such claim.
III.
The arguments Daugherty has presented do not warrant the relief he seeks. As explained,
therefore, the claims based on those arguments are dismissed. He shall have through October 14,

2016 in which to further supplement his petition for writ of habeas corpus by setting forth a
viable claim for relief. Any claim which is stated, moreover, must conform to the AEDPA standard
reviewed in Part I of this Entry. This means that as to any claim decided on the merits by the
Indiana state courts the supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus must state whether and
how the state court's determination was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
and/or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.”
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
Date: 9/9/16

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
JENNINGS DAUGHERTY
961303
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
CARLISLE, IN 47838