GALLEGOS v. KRUEGER

Filing 9

ENTRY Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - Accordingly, Gallegos has likewise failed to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue (SEE ENTRY). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 9/18/2017.(DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

RAYMO FALCON GALLEGOS,

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Petitioner,
vs.
WARDEN KRUEGER,
Respondents.

No. 2:17-cv-00082-WTL-MJD

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
I.
Raymo Falcon Gallegos is an inmate confined in this District seeking a writ of habeas
corpus based on his contention that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly
computed his federal sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California in No. CR-11-00592-001 (“the federal sentence”). Although Gallegos disparages the
government’s explanation, the Court finds that explanation to be entirely in accord with both the
facts and the controlling law.
Having thus considered the pleadings and the expanded record, and being duly advised,
the Court finds that Gallegos’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.

Discussion
The federal sentence was imposed on February 22, 2013. It was initially for a term of 100
months and was later reduced to 92 months. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), “[a] sentence to a
term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” Credit for
prior custody is specifically addressed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any
time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the
commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited
against another sentence.
In calculating the sentence, the BOP determines (1) when the federal sentence commenced, and
(2) whether there are any credits to which the prisoner may be entitled. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585. In
other words, a federal prisoner can receive credit for certain time spent in official detention before
his sentence begins, as long as that time has not been credited against any other sentence. However,
“Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention
time.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992). The Seventh Circuit has likewise made
clear that § 3585(b) forbids the BOP from giving prior custody credit when that credit has been
applied to another sentence. See Gigsby v. Bledsoe, 223 Fed.Appx. 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000). In Gigsby, the Seventh Circuit determined that
where the state credited the petitioner for time spent in custody before the commencement of his
federal sentence, he was not entitled to the same benefit from the BOP merely because his
subsequent federal sentence was ordered to run concurrently. Gigsby, 223 Fed.Appx at 489.

The pivotal facts in this case are undisputed and are these: The federal sentence was
imposed on February 22, 2013. At the time, Gallegos was serving a sentence imposed by the
California state courts. He had come into federal custody on October 28, 2011 pursuant to a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Gallegos received credit from the State of California for
various the state court sentences until he was released to the exclusive custody of federal
authorities on May 5, 2014. More specifically, Gallegos received credit from the State of California
for the period of time for which he seeks credit in the present case. By the same token, however,
Gallegos was given prior credit time for the period from July 17, 2012 through May 4, 2014.
Gallegos being physically in the custody of federal authorities is not determinative. A
prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosenquendum remains in the primary
jurisdiction of the first jurisdiction “unless and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction
over the prisoner.” Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000); BOP Program Statement
5880.28 § 3b (1999) (emphasizing that ad prosenquendum writs do not effect a transfer to federal
custody). Until then, a prisoner in the primary custody of a state earns no credit against the federal
sentence for any period credited toward an undischarged state sentence. See Sinito v. Kindt, 954
F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kanton, 362 F.2d 178, 179 (7th Cir. 1966). Here,
California did not relinquish jurisdiction prior to the time that Gallegos completed his state
sentences. That was the point at which his service of the federal sentence commenced. See 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a)(“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is
received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service at, the
official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”).

Conclusion
As explained above, Gallegos has failed to show that the BOP has miscalculated the federal
sentence or has improperly denied him credit toward that sentence. See, e.g., Matthews v.
Hollingsworth, 2011 WL 2534017, at *4 (S.D.Ill. June 27, 2011) (“Once the state sentence began
accruing credit towards petitioner’s incarceration, the [BOP] properly refused to credit petitioner's
federal sentence for the same time. Neither the subsequent order that his federal and non-federal
sentences run concurrently, nor the fact that petitioner was temporarily detained by federal
authorities during his state sentence transform his time spent in state prison into presentence
nonfederal time for purposes of § 3585(b).”). Accordingly, Gallegos has likewise failed to show
that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.
II.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/18/17

_______________________________

Distribution:

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

RAYMO FALCON GALLEGOS
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