SPRY v. SMITH

Filing 14

Entry Discussing Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability - An Indiana jury found David Spry guilty of attempted murder. Spry now challenges that conviction, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons exp lained in this Entry, Spry's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue. Judgment consistent with this Entry sh all now issue. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court finds that Spry has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it "debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability. (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/27/2017.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DAVID SPRY,
Petitioner,
v.
BRIAN SMITH,
Respondent.

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No. 2:17-cv-00120-JMS-MJD

Entry Discussing Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Denying Certificate of Appealability
An Indiana jury found David Spry guilty of attempted murder. Spry now challenges that
conviction, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Spry’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition,
the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
I. The Habeas Petition
In an attempt to “curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law,” Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, revised several of the statutes governing federal habeas relief.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). “Congress enacted AEDPA to advance the finality
of criminal convictions.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005). “To that end, it adopted a tight
time line, a one-year limitation.” Id. Along with triggering dates not applicable here, “[u]nder 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief has just one year after his

conviction becomes final in state court to file his federal petition.” Gladney v. Pollard, 799 F.3d
889, 894 (7th Cir. 2015).
Subject to exceptions not applicable here, Spry had one (1) year from the date his
conviction became final to file a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus. His conviction became
final on March 2, 2000, which was the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari
review following the Indiana Supreme Court’s February 2, 2000 denial of his petition to transfer.
The running of the statute of limitations was tolled during the time a properly filed action
for post-conviction relief was pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d
674, 682 (7th Cir. 2014). In this case, such an action was pending between April 26, 2000 and July
5, 2011.
At the time Spry filed his action for post-conviction relief, 55 days of the statute of
limitations had passed. This left a balance of 310 days of the 1-year statute of limitations. That
period expired on May 13, 2012. Spry’s habeas petition was ultimately filed on March 15, 2017.
This was four years, ten months and two days after the statute of limitations had expired and this
is the extent to which Spry’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was untimely filed.
“[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear before his claim
is properly presented to the district court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In this case, Spry has encountered the hurdle
produced by the 1-year statute of limitations. He has not shown the existence of circumstances
permitting him to overcome this hurdle, and hence is not entitled to the relief he seeks. His petition
for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore dismissed as untimely without a decisions being made as
to the merits of his claims. See Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 982 (6th Cir. 2007).

Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
II. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court finds that
Spry has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it “debatable whether [this court] was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/27/2017

Distribution:
DAVID A. SPRY
865135
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Chandra Hein
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]