HAYES v. BERRY et al
Filing
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ORDER granting Defendants' 27 Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment. The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the correct spelling of defendant Captain Chalfin's name. (See Order). Copy to Plaintiff via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 7/3/2018. (MAC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
GREGORY HAYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BERRY Sergeant,
CHAIFIN Captain,
Defendants.
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No. 2:17-cv-00160-WTL-DLP
Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Directing Entry of Final Judgment
Plaintiff Gregory Hayes brought this civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based
on an alleged attack he suffered at the hands of another inmate and the alleged loss and destruction
of his property while he was incarcerated at Putnamville Correctional Facility (“Putnamville”).
His claims against Officers Laloux and Bolt regarding the loss and destruction of his property were
severed into a separate civil action. See Dkt. No. 8. What remain in this action are Mr. Hayes’s
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Sergeant Berry and Captain Chalfin. Presently
pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons explained
below, the motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 27, is granted.
I.
Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must set forth specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material
issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court views the record in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh
evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to
the fact-finder. O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Mr. Hayes failed to respond to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the
deadline for doing so has long passed. The consequence is that Mr. Hayes has conceded the
defendants’ version of the events. See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure
to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”); see S.D.
Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve a
response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the motion. The response
must . . . identif[y] the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends
demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment.”). Because Mr. Hayes failed to
respond to the defendants’ motion, and thus failed to comply with the Court’s Local Rules
regarding summary judgment, the Court will not consider allegations in Mr. Hayes’s complaint in
ruling on this motion. Although pro se filings are construed liberally, pro se litigants such as Mr.
Hayes are not exempt from procedural rules. See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758
(7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural
rules”); Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that procedural rules “apply
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to uncounseled litigants and must be enforced”). This does not alter the standard for assessing a
Rule 56 motion, but it does “reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative to
such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
II.
Factual Background
The following statement of facts was evaluated pursuant to the standard set forth above.
That is, this statement of facts is not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment
standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed evidence are presented in the light
reasonably most favorable to Mr. Hayes as the non-moving party with respect to the motion for
summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
At all times relevant to this action, Mr. Hayes was an inmate at Putnamville. On the
morning of January 2, 2017, Mr. Hayes and another inmate, Bayon, got into a fight. Defendants
have provided a surveillance video recording that captured the events surrounding the fight. See
Dkt. No. 33 (manual filing of a CD). Thus, the events that occurred and actions taken immediately
before, during, and immediately after the fight are not in dispute because the Court can base its
decision on the video evidence provided. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-81 (2007) (“[the
court] should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”) Specifically, the video
shows that:
Immediately prior to the fight, Mr. Hayes was seated at the foot of a bunk. Dkt. No. 33 at
00:32.
Bayon was returning to the bunks and as he walked in front of Mr. Hayes, Mr. Hayes gets
up and, unprovoked, begins to attack Bayon. Id. at 00:36. Mr. Hayes’s opening salvo was
to hit Bayon with a closed fist to the left side of Bayon’s face. Id.
Mr. Hayes and Bayon fight and wrestle for approximately twenty seconds.
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Sergeant Berry and another correctional officer can be seen approaching and running over
about ten seconds after the fight begins. Id. at 00:48.
Shortly after arriving, Sergeant Berry successfully breaks up the fight between Mr. Hayes
and Bayon. Id. at 00:58.
Mr. Hayes ultimately received a conduct report for assault/battery upon another person
without a weapon or inflicting serious injury. Dkt. No. 27-6, Dkt. No. 27-7.
Sergeant Berry and Captain Chalfin are correctional officers at Putnamville. They testify
that they are aware of the general procedures and preventative measures taken in the event of a
credible threat to inmate safety. They further testify that if they had been aware of any significant
risk to the health or safety of Mr. Hayes, they would have taken preventative measures, such as
moving either Mr. Hayes or Bayon to another dorm. Sergeant Berry further testifies that she was
not made aware of any risk of injury if Mr. Hayes and Bayon were not separated. Captain Chalfin
testifies that, prior to the January 2, 2017 incident, he was not made aware of any serious risk to
Mr. Hayes’s safety or health, but if he had, he would have recommended preventative measures
be put in effect to avoid the risk.
Sergeant Berry was on duty on January 2, 2017, but did not see how the altercation between
Mr. Hayes and Bayon began, but heard the commotion surrounding it. When she arrived at the
scene, Mr. Hayes and Bayon were still wrestling in between the two bunks. Sergeant Berry
attempted to break up the fight by yelling out verbal commands and spraying pepper spray in their
faces.
Captain Chalfin was not on duty on the morning of January 2, 2017, and therefore had no
involvement in Mr. Hayes’s and Bayon’s fight. His only knowledge of or involvement in the
alleged incident was through the review of Conduct Reports and Mr. Hayes’s Offender Grievances.
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III.
Discussion
Defendants move for summary judgment on Mr. Hayes’s failure to protect claim. They
argue that Mr. Hayes has failed to allege that either defendant was made aware of or disregarded
any excessive risk to his health or safety. They further argue that even if Mr. Hayes was able to
show the requisite knowledge of any risk, the undisputed evidence shows that their alleged inaction
was not the proximate cause of Mr. Hayes’s harm as he was the cause of his own harm by starting
the fight. Mr. Hayes did not respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the time
to do so has passed.
Not every harm caused by another inmate translates into constitutional liability for the
corrections officers responsible for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that deliberate indifference is not a strict liability
standard requiring jail officials to ensure the safety of their inmates. Palmer v. Marion County,
327 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2003).
Prison officials have a duty to protect those in their custody from violence at the hand of
other inmates. But liability of a prison official for failure to protect an inmate only materializes if
the official “‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Gevas v.
McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (1994)). Thus,
a claim that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to such a risk has both an objective and a
subjective component. First, the harm to which the prisoner was exposed must be an objectively
serious one. See Gevas, 798 F.3d 475 (being stabbed by cellmate constitutes serious harm); Brown
v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (“a beating suffered at the hands of a follow detainee
... clearly constitutes serious harm”).
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The subjective prong of the deliberate indifference claim “requires that the official must
have actual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk in order to be held liable;
specifically, he ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.’” Gevas, 798 F.3d at
481 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In addition to knowing that the inmate faced a substantial
risk of serious harm, an official will only be liable when he disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; see also Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d
742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006).
Both Captain Chalfin and Sergeant Berry have asserted that, prior to the January 2, 2017,
altercation, they were not aware of any serious risk to Mr. Hayes’s safety or health if he and Bayon
were not separated. Both assert that if they had been aware, they would have taken reasonable
measures to prevent injury to Mr. Hayes, such as moving either Mr. Hayes or Bayon to another
dorm.
Mr. Hayes has not responded or disagreed with defendants’ assertions. He has therefore
failed to satisfy the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference claim, and failed to show that
defendants failed to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, because
there is no material issue for trial, summary judgment is warranted in defendants’ favor.
IV.
Conclusion
It has been explained that “summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out
truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1598 (1998).
This is a vital role in the management of court dockets, in the delivery of justice to individual
litigants, and in meeting society’s expectations that a system of justice operate effectively. Indeed,
“it is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal
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of a trial when the outcome is foreordained,” and in such cases, summary judgment is appropriate.
Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1983).
Mr. Hayes has not identified a genuine issue of material fact as to his claims in this case
and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Dkt. No. 27, is granted.
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the correct spelling of defendant
Captain Chalfin’s name.
Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
_______________________________
7/3/18
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
GREGORY HAYES
911536
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1946 West U.S. Hwy 40
Greencastle, IN 46135
Ryan J. Guillory
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CURTIS HILL
ryan.guillory@atg.in.gov
Ryan Joseph Sterling
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
ryan.sterling@atg.in.gov
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