MELENDEZ v. JULIAN et al
Filing
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Entry Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - Plaintiff Alex A. Melendez, a federal inmate incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute, Indiana, brought this Administrati ve Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, action challenging a Bureau of Prisons decision denying him placement in a halfway house, home confinement, or a residential re-entry center. Defendant asserts that Mr. Melendez did not attempt to exhaust thi s problem through available administrative grievance procedures. He seeks summary judgment against Mr. Melendez. Alex Melendez admits that he did not attempt to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing this action. There are n o facts in dispute concerning this issue, and therefore the PLRA requires this action to be dismissed. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, dkt. 15 , is granted and this case is dismissed without prejudice. Final judgment shall now issue. (See Entry.) Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 1/2/2018. (RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
ALEX A. MELENDEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK S. INCH, Director, Federal Bureau
of Prisons, 1
Defendant.
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No. 2:17-cv-00202-JMS-MJD
Entry Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Alex A. Melendez, a federal inmate incarcerated in the Federal Correctional
Institution Terre Haute, Indiana, brought this Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, action
challenging a Bureau of Prisons decision denying him placement in a halfway house, home
confinement, or a residential re-entry center. Defendant asserts that Mr. Melendez did not attempt
to exhaust this problem through available administrative grievance procedures. He seeks summary
judgment against Mr. Melendez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) – the Prison Litigation Reform
Act – which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing any action concerning
prison conditions. Mr. Melendez admits he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. He writes
that he was intimidated to not attempt exhaustion, but offers no evidence in support of that
assertion. For the reasons explained below, defendant is entitled to summary judgment and
Mark S. Inch is now the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The clerk is directed to
modify the docket to replace Thomas R. Kane with Mr. Inch as defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 25(d).
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Mr. Melendez has failed to come forward with evidence to establish a genuine issue of material
fact.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of
its motion, and identifying those portions of designated evidence that demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After “a
properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A factual issue is material only if resolving the factual issue might change the outcome of
the case under the governing law. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). A
factual issue is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court “may not ‘assess the credibility of witnesses,
choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting
evidence.’” Bassett v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 803, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Stokes v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010)). Instead, it must view all the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual
disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
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III. Discussion
It is not necessary to detail the Bureau of Prison’s administrative grievance process because
Mr. Melendez acknowledges he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. In his response
opposing summary judgment, Mr. Melendez writes that he
has made substantial efforts to resolve the matters in this case through written
request to the administration, meetings with his Case Manager and Unit team.
Further he was advised by his Unit Team/Case Manager Purdue that it would be
useless to go outside of the Camp Administration to seek any relief because none
would be forth coming. The Camp Administrator Sweeny also said the same and
implied to go outside via of any administrative remedy would cause difficulty to
the Petitioner.
Response, dkt. 20, p. 1. These assertions are unsworn. No affidavit or declaration made under
penalty of perjury supporting these assertions is provided. Defendant contends that
Mr. Melendez’s assertions should therefore not be considered by the Court. Reply, dkt. 21, pp. 4-5.
The Court agrees. Even if the statements could be considered to establish that Mr. Melendez
believed it would be futile to exhaust his administrative remedies, that belief cannot excuse the
failure to exhaust. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001); Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d
690, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An inmate’s perception that exhaustion would be futile does not excuse
him from the exhaustion requirement.”)
The grievance procedure was available to Mr. Melendez but he did not attempt to use it.
Dkt. 16-1, ¶ 8 (Affidavit of R. Parris). Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Mr. Melendez
was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). This exhaustion requirement is
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mandatory and cannot be waived. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 85 (2006).
Mr. Melendez also argues that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment, but his assertions concern the merits of his complaint and do not address the
question of exhaustion. Finally, his suggestion that this action – brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act – is not subject to administrative exhaustion is without merit. Actions brought under
any federal statute that concern prison conditions, including the Administrative Procedure Act, are
subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602 (7th Cir.
2004).
IV. Conclusion
Alex Melendez admits that he did not attempt to exhaust his available administrative
remedies prior to filing this action. There are no facts in dispute concerning this issue, and therefore
the PLRA requires this action to be dismissed. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
dkt. [15], is granted and this case is dismissed without prejudice. Final judgment shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/2/2018
Distribution:
Alex A. Melendez
43740-424
Terre Haute - USP
Terre Haute U.S. Penitentiary
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. Box 33
Terre Haute, IN 47808
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Rachana Nagin Fischer
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
rachana.fischer@usdoj.gov
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