WALLACE, JR et al v. J.E. KRUEGER

Filing 3

ENTRY Dismissing Action and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - Accordingly, the petitioner's § 2241 habeas petition reveals on its face that he is not entitled to relief, and it is therefore summarily dismissed (SEE ENTRY). Copy sent to Petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/20/2017.(DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

WALTER WALLACE, JR,
Petitioner,
v.
J.E. KRUEGER WARDEN,
Respondent.

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No. 2:17-cv-00266-JMS-MJD

Entry Dismissing Action and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petitioner initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that
appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). For the
reasons stated below, the petitioner’s habeas petition is legally insufficient on its face and thus
summary dismissal is appropriate.
The petitioner is currently incarcerated at the federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, which
is within the Southern District of Indiana. He is serving the executed portion of sentences imposed
by the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Southern District
of Illinois. He was sentenced by these courts to terms of incarceration of 141 months and 151
months, respectively (portions of which run concurrently), and ordered by both to pay substantial
restitution. See No. 4:11-cr-00186-RWS (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2013); No. 3:11-cr-30118-WDS (S.D.
Ill. Nov. 9, 2013).
In his habeas petition, the petitioner argues that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has been
improperly withdrawing $25.00 per month from his account pursuant to the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). He maintains that this is improper, and asks the Court to enjoin

these collections, because the BOP “does not have the authority to force the Petitioner to pay his
restitution, [since] the sentencing court did not fix a restitution[] payment schedule.” Filing No. 1
at 2. The petitioner acknowledges that he agreed to participate in the IFRP and pay the scheduled
payments, but he only did so “to avoid the adverse[ ]consequences” imposed by the BOP “for not
agreeing” to participate. Filing No. 1 at 3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 545.11).
The IFRP is meant to “encourage[] each sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate
financial obligations.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. Under the IFRP, prison staff “shall help th[e] inmate
develop a financial plan and shall monitor the inmate’s progress in meeting” his obligations. 28
C.F.R. § 545.11. “Inmates who do not participate may lose a number of privileges identified in
28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d), which include participating in the UNICOR prison job training program,
furloughs, and outside work details, and having higher commissary spending limits, access to
higher-status housing, and access to community-based programs.” United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d
331, 334 (7th Cir. 2010).
The petitioner is correct that “the Bureau of Prisons lacks the power to compel participation
in the IFRP.” Id. at 335. But the petitioner admits in his petition that he agreed to participate in
the IFRP. Simply because there are consequences for not agreeing to participate does not mean
that he was forced to agree. As made clear in Boyd, “a prisoner may choose . . . to bear the
consequences of not participating.” Id. But it is not unlawful for the BOP to impose consequences
for making that choice. See Day v. Daniels, 673 Fed. Appx. 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The [BOP]
does not contend that he must participate in the [IFRP]. But if he withdraws from the program,
the [BOP] may impose consequences, such as restrictions on commissary spending, working,
housing, and programming. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d).”).

In short, the petitioner has a choice to participate in the IFRP or suffer the consequences
imposed by the BOP, and he chose the former. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that requiring
inmates to choose between these two options is not unlawful. Accordingly, the petitioner’s § 2241
habeas petition reveals on its face that he is not entitled to relief, and it is therefore summarily
dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 6/20/2017

Distribution:
WALTER WALLACE, JR
38586-044
TERRE HAUTE - FCI
TERRE HAUTE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 33
TERRE HAUTE, IN 47808