STONE v. KNIGHT et al
Filing
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ENTRY GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - Plaintiff Donald Stone filed this action on September 6, 2017, contending that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated in the Indiana Depar tment of Correction (IDOC). Specifically, Mr. Stone claims that Lieutenant Dustin Fish slammed him to the ground with excessive force, injuring his shoulder. Defendant Fish has moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Stone failed to exhaust h is available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before filing this lawsuit. Mr. Stone has not responded to the motion. Mr. Stone's action should not have been brought and must now be dismissed without prejudice. Sergeant Fish's motion for summary judgment, dkt. 17 , is granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 3/22/2018.(RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DONALD STONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
D. FISH Sergeant/Correctional Officer,
Defendant.
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No. 2:17-cv-00429-JMS-MJD
ENTRY GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Donald Stone filed this action on September 6, 2017, contending that his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of
Correction (IDOC). Specifically, Mr. Stone claims that Lieutenant Dustin Fish slammed him to
the ground with excessive force, injuring his shoulder. Defendant Fish has moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Mr. Stone failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before filing this
lawsuit. Mr. Stone has not responded to the motion.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” designated evidence which
“demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant may not rest upon mere
allegations. Instead, “[t]o successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Trask–Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008). “The non-movant
will successfully oppose summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to
rebut the motion.” Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
In accordance with Local Rule 56-1(f), the Court assumes that facts properly supported by
the movant are admitted without controversy unless the nonmovant specifically disputes them.
Therefore, a nonmovant who fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment effectively
concedes that the movant’s version of the facts is accurate. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an
admission.”). This does not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56 motion, but it does “reduc[e]
the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v.
Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
II. Discussion
A. Undisputed Facts
At all times relevant to his Complaint, Mr. Stone was confined by the IDOC at Plainfield
Correctional Facility (PCF). The IDOC has an Offender Grievance Process that is intended to
permit inmates to resolve concerns and complaints relating to their conditions of confinement prior
to filing suit in court. According to IDOC policy, an inmate is provided with information about the
Offender Grievance Process during admission and orientation upon arrival at an IDOC facility.
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The Offender Grievance Process consists of three steps. It begins with the offender
contacting staff to discuss the matter or incident subject to the grievance and seeking informal
resolution. This step must be completed within five (5) business days from the date of the incident.
If the offender is unable to obtain a resolution of the grievance informally, he may submit a formal
grievance to the Offender Grievance Specialist of the facility where the incident occurred. A
formal grievance must be filed within twenty (20) working days from the date of the alleged
incident. If the formal written grievance is not resolved in a manner that satisfies the offender, he
may submit an appeal. Exhaustion of the grievance procedure requires pursuing a grievance to the
final step.
The IDOC maintains records of all informal grievances, formal grievances, and appeals
filed by offenders. The IDOC’s records reflect that Mr. Stone did not file any grievances while
incarcerated in the IDOC. 1
B. Exhaustion
Sergeant Fish argues that Mr. Stone failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
as required by the PLRA. The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative
remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s
1
Although this case concerns an incident that allegedly occurred at PCF, see dkt. 18 at 1, much of the
evidence Sergeant Fish presented regarding the Offender Grievance Process and inmates’ access to it refers
specifically to grievance procedures at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF). See, e.g., dkt. 17-1
at ¶¶ 2, 5, 8. Nevertheless, the Court understands that the IDOC’s three-step Offender Grievance Process,
the requirements for exhausting that process, and the IDOC’s policy of informing inmates of the process
upon their arrival at an IDOC facility are IDOC-wide (and not facility-specific) policies. See Dkt. 17-2.
Moreover, Sergeant Fish has clarified that his records showing that Mr. Stone never filed a grievance
document a search for grievances filed at both WVCF and PCF. Dkt. 17-1 at ¶ 25. Therefore, the Court
finds no dispute that Mr. Stone was obligated to complete the three-step Offender Grievance System, that
IDOC policy required that Mr. Stone be informed of that three-step policy upon his arrival at PCF, and that
he never filed any grievance with respect to this incident.
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deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function
effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655
(7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and
appeals ‘in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.’”) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Strict compliance is required with respect to
exhaustion, and a prisoner must properly follow the prescribed administrative procedures in order
to exhaust his remedies. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement is not subject to either waiver by a court or futility or inadequacy
exceptions. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, n.6 (2001); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,
112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992) (“Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.”).
C. Discussion
Sergeant Fish has shown that Mr. Stone failed to avail himself of all administrative
remedies before filing this civil action. In fact, IDOC records indicate that Mr. Stone did not
complete any step in the Offender Grievance Process. Mr. Stone did not respond to Sergeant Fish’s
motion for summary judgment, and no other document Mr. Stone has filed in this action indicates
that he participated in the Offender Grievance Process. It is therefore undisputed that Mr. Stone
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the PLRA before filing this
lawsuit.
The consequence of these circumstances, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is that Mr.
Stone’s action should not have been brought and must now be dismissed without prejudice. See
Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that “all dismissals under § 1997e(a)
should be without prejudice.”).
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III. Conclusion
Sergeant Fish’s motion for summary judgment, dkt. [17], is granted. Judgment consistent
with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/22/2018
Distribution:
DONALD STONE
120486
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Jill Esenwein
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
jill.esenwein@atg.in.gov
Parvinder Kaur Nijjar
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
parvinder.nijjar@atg.in.gov
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