PEDROZA v. BROWN

Filing 19

ENTRY Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The petition of Pablo Pedraza for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. ISP 17-07-0358. Accordingly, Mr. Pedraza's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue (SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 7/18/2018.(DWH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

PABLO PEDRAZA,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN,
Respondent.

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No. 2:17-cv-00481-WTL-DLP

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment

The petition of Pablo Pedraza for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. ISP 17-07-0358. On July 9, 2017, two inmates were assaulted on the
recreation yard at Indiana State Prison. They received serious injuries that required treatment at
outside hospitals. Mr. Pedraza was charged with participating in the attacks. For the reasons
explained in this Entry, Mr. Pedraza’s habeas petition must be denied.
A.

Overview

Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process.

The due process

requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record”
to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.
2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B.

The Disciplinary Proceeding

The conduct giving rise to the discipline occurred while Mr. Pedraza was housed at the
Indiana State Prison. On July 19, 2017, Mr. Pedraza was charged in case ISP 17- 07-0358 with
offense A-102/111, conspiracy/attempt/aiding an assault/battery with a weapon. The conduct
report states:
On 7/9/2017, at approximately 4:30pm offender Pablo Pedraza #178344 housed in
BCH cell 534 went to recreation with his housing unit BCH and units F-dorm and
ICH and conspired and or aided in the assault of offender Washington #978703 also
from BCH. Washington sustained severe bodily injuries from the assault that
required outside medical attention from a local hospital. During the assault on
Washington, offender Hawkins #956724 from BCH also sustained severe bodily
injuries that required outside medical attention from another hospital to treat his
specific type of injuries.
An investigation was launched. During this altercation at recreation in the rec yard,
Pedraza was seen kicking Washington while Washington lay on the ground by the
basketball court. Pedraza was seen with a weapon (knife) in his hand as he
attempted to run away from staff as the area was being secured. Pedraza was seen
discarding the weapon and the weapon was found in the outside bathroom where
Pedraza was seen discarding it. Pedraza was also seen using the horseshoes as
weapons.
Pedraza participated in STG activity with three (3) other Latin King members for
this offense.
Dkt. No. 8-1. After the assault, Mr. Pedraza was transferred to Wabash Valley, where the
disciplinary process continued.
On August 4, 2017, Mr. Pedraza was notified of the charge of conspiracy/attempt/aiding
in an assault/battery with a weapon and served with a copy of the conduct report and screening
report. Mr. Pedraza was advised of his rights, pleaded not guilty, and declined the option to have
a lay advocate appointed. Mr. Pedraza requested witness statements from inmates Mr. Mueller and
Mr. Washington, and he also requested a video review. Dkt. No. 8-2.

Mr. Pedraza’s disciplinary hearing was postponed once because Wabash Valley was
waiting to hear back from the State Prison concerning the video request. On August 16, 2017, the
screening officer received an email from personnel at the State Prison confirming that no video
was available because there were no video cameras in the area of the yard where the assault
occurred. Dkt. No. 8-4.
The screening officer obtained statements from Mr. Mueller and Mr. Washington. Mr.
Mueller stated:
Pablo Pedraza had nothing to do with the incident that took place on July 9, 2017.
It was a simple case of being in the wrong place at the right time. If you want to be
honest he’s a victim who got assault because he was in the wrong place at the wrong
time. Furthermore the conduct says the incident occurred at 4:30pm on the rec yard
but the facility was on lockdown at 2:00pm so that isn’t even possible, for him to
be in the rec yard at that time.
Dkt. No. 8-6. Mr. Washington wrote, “I didn’t assault him? I know nothing! I seen nothing!” Dkt.
No. 8-7.
On August 21, 2017, the hearing officer held a hearing in case ISP 17-07-0358. Mr.
Pedraza pleaded not guilty and made the following statement: “Not guilty—they didn’t see me
with a knife and they didn’t find me [with] a knife. The facility was on lock down at 2pm—we
went to 11 to 130pm—they wrote me up because I refused to cooperate with IA.” Dkt. No. 8-5.
After considering the conduct report, Mr. Pedraza’s statement, and the witness statements, the
hearing officer found Mr. Pedraza guilty as charged. Mr. Pedraza’s sanctions included a 90-day
loss of earned good-time credit and a one-step demotion to credit class II. Id.
Mr. Pedraza appealed to the facility head and the Indiana Department of Correction final
reviewing authority. Both appeals were denied. He then brought this petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

C.

Analysis

Mr. Pedraza asserts that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer did
not try to verify the veracity of Mr. Pedraza’s witness statements with the Indiana State Prison.
Dkt. 1. He also contends that his right to an impartial decision maker was violated because of the
hearing officer’s failure to verify his defense. Dkt. No. 16.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Pedraza’s first claim is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence” standard. “[A]
hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting it and
demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir.
2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The Conduct Report
“alone” can “provide[] ‘some evidence’ for the . . . decision.” McPherson v. McBridge, 188 F.3d
784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, the conduct report provides some evidence that Mr. Pedraza was guilty of the charged
violation. The conduct report states that Mr. Pedraza was seen kicking one of the victims, using
horseshoes as weapons, and discarding a knife as he ran from the area. Mr. Pedraza presented
evidence that disputed this version of events. It was within the hearing officer’s discretion to weigh
the credibility and veracity of evidence presented on behalf of the facility and by Mr. Pedraza, and
to find him guilty of the charged offense.
2. Denial of Evidence

Mr. Pedraza’s claim could be construed as a denial of evidence to the extent that he argued
at the hearing that the conduct report could not be true because it stated that the events occurred at
a time when the Indiana State Prison was on lock-down, and requested that the hearing officer
confirm his assertion with the Indiana State Prison.
The “first question” when evaluating a petitioner’s claim that he was denied requested
evidence is whether a “timely request” was made for that evidence. Ashby v. Davis, 82 Fed.
Appx. 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). Contrary to the respondent’s argument, a request is timely if it
is made “either before or at the hearing.” Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002).
Nevertheless, that argument does not help Mr. Pedraza because the error was harmless. Jones
v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011). The conduct report incorrectly states that the charged
conduct occurred later than it actually did. If Mr. Pedraza had been given evidence that the
Indiana State Prison was on lock-down at 2:00 pm on the day in question, it would not have
changed the outcome of his disciplinary hearing. He does not dispute that the victims were
seriously injured and required treatment at outside hospitals. There is little doubt that Indiana
State Prison instituted a lock-down after the events recounted in the conduct report. The
misreported time of those events on the conduct report does not invalidate Mr. Pedraza’s
conviction. He is not entitled to relief on this ground.
3. Denial of an Impartial Decision Maker
In his traverse, Mr. Pedraza characterizes his claim as the denial of an impartial decision
maker. The respondent countered in his reply that Mr. Pedraza did not exhaust available
administrative remedies and is therefore barred from raising this claim. Setting aside the
exhaustion issue, Mr. Pedraza is not entitled to relief on this ground.
A prisoner in a disciplinary action has the right to be heard before an impartial decision

maker. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. A “sufficiently impartial” decision maker is necessary in order to
shield the prisoner from the arbitrary deprivation of his liberties. Gaither v. Anderson, 236 F.3d
817, 820 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Hearing officers “are entitled to a presumption of honesty
and integrity” absent clear evidence to the contrary. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666; see Perotti v.
Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47
(1975)). Indeed, the “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high,” and hearing
officers “are not deemed biased simply because they presided over a prisoner’s previous
disciplinary proceeding” or because they are employed by the IDOC. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666.
Instead, hearing officers are impermissibly biased when, for example, they are “directly or
substantially involved in the factual events underlying the disciplinary charges, or in the
investigation thereof.” Id. at 667. Mr. Pedraza has not claimed that the hearing officer was
involved in the factual events underlying his charge or in its investigation. Instead, he believes
that only a biased decision maker could have rejected his defense. This claim fails because, as
discussed above, there is some evidence that he was guilty of the charged conduct and it is within
the decision maker’s discretion to weigh competing evidence.
D.

Conclusion

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Pedraza to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Pedraza’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/18/18

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
PABLO PEDRAZA
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Aaron T. Craft
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]