CARR v. BROWN
Filing
21
Entry Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The petition of David Carr for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. WVD 17-06-0051. For the reasons explaine d in this Entry, Mr. Carr's habeas petition must be granted. Because there was insufficient evidence of Mr. Carr's guilt, the disciplinary finding of guilt was arbitrary and that finding and the sanctions imposed must be VACATED AND RESCINDED. Accordingly, Mr. Carr's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 3/22/2018.(RSF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DAVID H. CARR,
Petitioner,
v.
RICHARD BROWN,
Respondent.
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No. 2:17-cv-00482-JMS-DLP
Entry Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petition of David Carr for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. WVD 17-06-0051. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr.
Carr’s habeas petition must be granted.
A.
Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process.
The due process
requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating
the reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the
record” to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674,
677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
B.
The Disciplinary Proceeding
On June 7, 2017, Correctional Officer Chapman, along with Correctional Officer
Stephens, searched Carr’s cell. They found two metal spring clips, two mechanical pencils, and
paper that had been soaked in a brown liquid which smelled like coffee and was shaped like a
rose. The items were confiscated and photographed. Mr. Carr was charged with a violation of
Rule 202, Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance. Mr. Carr received notice of the rule
violation and his rights on June 8, 2017 where he requested and received a lay advocate. He
pleaded not guilty and the case was set on June 14, 2017.
At screening, Mr. Carr requested to be drug screened which was denied as irrelevant to
the charge. Mr. Carr requested as evidence the item confiscated during the search, but this
request was denied as irrelevant. A copy of the rule on drug paraphernalia was given to Mr. Carr
and he was told there was no memorandum at the correctional facility about the possession rule.
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) held the disciplinary hearing on June 14,
2017, noting Mr. Carr had not requested a continuance. The DHO considered the staff reports,
the statements of the offender, the statement of CO Chapman, the confiscation slip and the
submitted photograph. The DHO found Mr. Carr guilty of violating Rule 202, Possession of
Controlled Substance.
The DHO sentenced Mr. Carr to one month loss of kiosk privileges, a written reprimand
not to possess paraphernalia, a loss of thirty days credit time and the loss of one credit class,
suspended. These sanctions were issued because of the seriousness of the offense, the nature of
the offense, Mr. Carr’s attitude and demeanor during the hearing, the degree to which the
violation disrupted/endangered the security of the facility, and the likelihood of the sanction
having a corrective effect.
Mr. Carr appealed to the Facility Head on June 20, 2017 and that appeal was denied. He
then resubmitted his appeal and it was granted in part to the extent that the conviction was
amended to B-215, Unauthorized Possession of Property. He then filed this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
C.
Analysis
Mr. Carr challenges the disciplinary action against him arguing that his right to present
evidence was denied because he requested production of an art project he was working on and a
drug screening. He also argues that the hearing officer was not impartial. Finally, he argues that
the evidence was insufficient. Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction,
the Court need not address Mr. Carr’s other arguments.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting
it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th
Cir. 2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence
standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some
evidence” standard is much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat
v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 455-56.
After his appeal was granted in part, Mr. Carr was convicted of B-215, Unauthorized
Possession of Property. That section is defined as “[u]nauthorized possession, destruction,
alteration, damage to, or theft of State property or property belonging to another.” Indiana
Department of Correction Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I: Offenses, available at
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.
On
the
other hand, Adult Disciplinary Code Section C-353, a lesser form of the same offense, is also
entitled “Unauthorized Possession of Property,” but is defined as “[a]ny unauthorized
possession, alteration, removal or relocation of personal property.” Id.
Based on the wording of the disciplinary code, in order to convict Mr. Carr under B-215,
it must be shown that the property “belong[s] to another.” Indeed, the existence of the similar,
but lesser, offense C-353 makes the element “belong[s] to another” of at least some importance
and relevance. Here, it may be that the property at issue was unauthorized, but there is no
evidence that the property belonged to anyone other than Mr. Carr. Because there are no facts or
evidence presented by the respondent that the property “belong[ed] to another,” the “some
evidence” standard is not met.
D.
Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. Because there was insufficient evidence of Mr. Carr’s
guilt, the disciplinary finding of guilt was arbitrary and that finding and the sanctions imposed
must be VACATED AND RESCINDED. Accordingly, Mr. Carr’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is GRANTED.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/22/2018
Distribution:
DAVID H. CARR
117630
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Katherine A. Cornelius
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
katherine.cornelius@atg.in.gov
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