JONES v. BROWN
Filing
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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The petition Jimmy D. Jones for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. WVE 13-10-0002. There was no arbitrary a ction in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Jones to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Mr. Jones's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/26/2018.(DMW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
JIMMY D. JONES,
Petitioner,
v.
RICHARD BROWN,
Respondent.
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No. 2:17-cv-00516-JMS-MJD
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petition Jimmy D. Jones for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. WVE 13-10-0002. For the reasons explained in this Order, Mr.
Jones’s habeas petition must be denied.
A.
Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process.
The due process
requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record”
to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.
2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
B.
The Disciplinary Proceeding
On September 27, 2013, Victoria Lloyd wrote a Conduct Report charging Mr. Jones with
A-111/113, conspiracy to traffic. Dkt. 10-1. The Conduct Report states:
On 09/27/2013, routine opening of mail was made of mail going to Jimmy Jones
891782[.] Concealed within the mailed material I found the below listed contraband
and confiscated the mailed material per policy. The mailed material was addressed
to Jimmy Jones 891728 P.O. Box 1111 Carlisle, IN 47838[.] Return address read
Evelyn Hollibaugh 1844 Winston Ave. Indianapolis, IN 46218. Had offender
Jimmy Jones been successful in obtaining the mailed material, the contraband listed
below would have entered the facility where it could be used, sold, traded, etc.
thereby breaching the safety and security of the facility and placing offenders and
staff in peril[.]
The contraband found in this instances was as follows: 3 Orange Strips with N8 on
them (Suboxone Strips) hidden in the return address lab[el] of a greeting card style
mail.
The offender named in the charging document was in violation of the ADPP
A111/A113 in that he conspired, attempted to conspire, aided or abetted with
another to traffic[] via the US Mail.
Id. Two cards were confiscated, and photographs were taken of the card, envelope, label, and
Suboxone strips. Dkt. 10-2. 1 In addition, the Facility Lead Investigator, Robbie Marshall,
provided an email and additional photo evidence, see dkt. 10-3 at 2-4, corroborating that the
confiscated items were Suboxone strips, stating:
On September 27, 2013, inmate Jimmy Jones # 891782 received correspondence.
Concealed in the correspondence, Suboxone was located. The Suboxone was
identified by unique characteristics, such as[:] color (orange), size (approx. ¾”)
and markings (N8) on the strips. These features are utilized as recognizable
characteristics that help aid in identification of said substances.
Dkt. 10-3 at 1.
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Mr. Jones was charged for two different attempts to traffic because he was mailed two different
cards, each with Suboxone. Mr. Jones challenged related prison disciplinary No. WVE 13-100001 in Jones v. Brown, No. 2:17-cv-00515-WTL-DLP.
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Mr. Jones was notified of the charge on October 2, 2013, when he received the Screening
Report. Dkt. 10-4. He pleaded guilty to the charge, did not wish to have a lay advocate, and did
not request any witnesses or any physical evidence. Id. He also waived his right to 24 hours’
advance notice before the disciplinary hearing. Id.
The prison disciplinary hearing was held on October 2, 2013. According to the notes from
the hearing, Mr. Jones stated, “I plead guilty.” Dkt. 10-5. Based on the staff reports and Mr.
Jones’s guilty plea, the hearing officer found Mr. Jones guilty of A-111/113, conspiracy to traffic.
The sanctions imposed included ninety days of earned-credit-time deprivation and a suspended
credit class demotion.
Mr. Jones appealed to the Facility Head and the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC)
Final Reviewing Authority, both of which were denied. He then brought this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
C.
Analysis
Mr. Jones’s habeas petition challenges his prison disciplinary conviction solely on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. See dkt. 2. He alleges that
he has no control over who or what people might attempt to send to him through the mail. In his
reply, he further elaborates that there is no evidence that he conspired and instructed anyone to
send him Suboxone through the mail. See dkt. 12. The respondent asserts that there is “some
evidence” to support his conviction. Dkt. 10.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting
it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th
Cir. 2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence
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standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some evidence”
standard is much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat v. Broyles,
288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at
455-56.
The Adult Disciplinary Code Section A-111 is entitled “Conspiracy/Attempting/Aiding or
Abetting,” and is defined as: “[a]ttempting or conspiring or aiding and abetting with another to
commit any Class A offense.” Indiana Department of Correction Adult Disciplinary Process,
Appendix I: Offenses, available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_IOFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf. Code Section A-113 is entitled “Trafficking,” and is defined as:
“[e]ngaging in trafficking (as defined in IC 35-44.1-3-5) with anyone who is not an offender
residing in the same facility.” Id. Attempt is defined as “when an offender commits acts which
showed a plan to violate…a Department or facility rule…when the acts occurred.” See IDOC
Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders, available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04101_The_Disciplinary_Code_for_Adult_Offenders___6-1-2015.pdf. IC 35-44.1-3-5 defines a
person who commits trafficking to be “[a] person who, without the prior authorization of the person
in charge of a penal facility or juvenile facility, knowingly or intentionally: (1) delivers, or carries
into the penal facility or juvenile facility with intent to deliver, an article to an inmate or child of
the facility.”
The Conduct Report in this case establishes that Mr. Jones was the intended recipient of a
controlled substance without authorization of prison officials. A rational adjudicator could readily
conclude that Mr. Jones was attempting to traffic that controlled substance into the prison.
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Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal habeas
court “will overturn the . . . [conduct board’s] decision only if no reasonable adjudicator could
have found … [the petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented”); see
also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (“The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically
precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.”). The Court will not
reweigh the evidence. The Conduct Report and the thorough investigation by Investigator
Marshall are “some evidence,” under Ellison, supporting the hearing officer’s finding that Mr.
Jones was guilty of conspiring to traffic. Accordingly, habeas relief is not available to Mr. Jones.
D.
Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Jones to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/26/2018
Distribution:
JIMMY D. JONES
891782
MIAMI - CF
MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
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Andrea Elizabeth Rahman
OFFICE OF THE INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
andrea.rahman@atg.in.gov
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