PURVIS v. ARAMARK CORP., LLC et al

Filing 50

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Summary Judgment - Plaintiff Willard Purvis, an inmate at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash Valley"), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging tha t he was denied a job in the prison kitchen and that this action was the result of retaliation against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. 33 , is granted in part and denied in pa rt. The motion is granted as to all claims against defendants Adams, Hollingsworth, Strader, and Aramark. The claims against these defendants are dismissed and the clerk shall terminate these defendants on the docket. The motion is denied as to de fendant Bedwell. No partial final judgment shall issue as to the claims resolved in this Order. The Court will direct further proceedings on the claims against Mr. Bedwell, including setting a settlement conference, in a separate order. If Mr. Purv is wants to request that the Court assist him in recruiting counsel to represent him, he should file a motion on the Court's form. The clerk shall include a form motion for assistance with recruiting counsel with Mr. Purvis's copy of this Order. (See Order.) Signed by Judge James R. Sweeney II on 8/13/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Motion for Assistance with Recruiting Counsel Form) (DMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
WILLARD PURVIS,

ARAMARK
LLC, et al.

)
)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, )
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)
Defendants.
)

No. 2:18-cv-00006-JRS-DLP

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Willard Purvis, an inmate at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“Wabash
Valley”), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was denied a job in the
prison kitchen and that this action was the result of retaliation against him in violation of his First
Amendment rights. He sues Ms. Adams, Daniel Bedwell, Mr. Hollingsworth, and Amy Strader,
food service employees who are employed by Aramark Correctional Services (“Aramark”). He
also sues Aramark alleging that Aramark engaged in a policy or practice of retaliating against
prisoners. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on Mr. Purvis’s claims. Mr. Purvis
has responded and the defendants have replied. For the following reasons, the motion for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there
is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific,
admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc.,
906 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Johnson v.
Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018).
II. Facts
Daniel Bedwell is the Food Services Director for Aramark at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 35-1 ¶
2. Mr. Bedwell oversees all aspects of food service at the Wabash Valley. Id. ¶ 3. The Indiana
Department of Correction (“IDOC”) expects Mr. Bedwell to report any safety and security
concerns he may have with regards to inmate work assignments to the Custody Department. Id. ¶
6.
Amy Strader is the lead supervisor for Aramark at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 35-2 ¶ 2. Ms.
Strader’s job duties include placing, evaluating, and training offenders at Wabash Valley. Ms.
Strader has the authority to place inmates for positions in the kitchen at Wabash Valley. Id. ¶ 3.
Teresa Booker held a position as a Sergeant in the Custody Department for the IDOC. Dkt.
35-1 ¶ 5.
To obtain a position in the kitchen at Wabash Valley, an inmate must fill out a request for
interview form. Dkt. 35-1 ¶ 4. This form is then passed on to the Custody Department. Id. The
Custody Department investigates the inmate requesting the job assignment. Custody investigates

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any gang activity, behavioral issues, and security concerns regarding the inmate. Id. Once their
investigation is complete the Custody Department then determines if the inmate should be sent for
an interview. Id. Aramark is then sent a list of inmates available for interview. Id.
On August 24, 2017, Ms. Booker from the Custody Department contacted Mr. Bedwell as
part of her investigation of Mr. Purvis. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Bedwell informed Ms. Booker that he believed
Mr. Purvis presented a security risk to Mr. Bedwell and his employees because of a pending lawsuit
that Mr. Purvis had against Bedwell and Aramark. 1 Id. ¶ 7. In his lawsuit Mr. Purvis claimed that
he was allergic to mustard, and that Mr. Bedwell was denying him a diet free of mustard, which
was causing him harm. Id. As a result of the allegations that Mr. Bedwell was causing harm to Mr.
Purvis by denying him his requested diet, Mr. Bedwell states that he was concerned regarding his
personal safety and the safety of his staff. Id.
Mr. Purvis has never threatened Mr. Bedwell, any food service employee, or other prisoner
working in the kitchen. Dkt. 47, at 9, ¶ 14, 15.
After the August 24, 2017 email, Ms. Booker called Ms. Strader to discuss Mr. Purvis.
During this conversation Ms. Booker told Ms. Strader that Mr. Purvis had a lawsuit pending
against Aramark. This was first time Strader heard about any lawsuit between Aramark and Mr.
Purvis. Dkt. 35-2. ¶ 5.
Ms. Booker told Mr. Purvis that “she was informed that [Mr. Purvis] would not be hire[d]
in the kitchen by numerous ARAMARK employees, including Mr. Bedwell, Mrs. Strader, Mr.
Hollingsworth, Mrs. Adams.” Dkt. 47, at 9, ¶ 13.

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Mr. Purvis points out that the lawsuit to which Mr. Bedwell refers was closed in 2016 and concludes that
Bedwell has therefore testified falsely when he stated that he thought Purvis presented a safety risk “because
of a pending lawsuit.” But Mr. Bedwell’s affidavit accurately reflects the contents of his email message,
which states, “I don’t know that would be a good idea he has had a law suit out on Lisa and I from years
ago and I don’t even know if its settled yet.” Dkt. 38-1, p. 12. Mr. Purvis has therefore failed to show that
Bedwell has testified falsely.

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Aramark does not have a policy of denying inmates placement in the kitchen who have
filed lawsuits or grievances against the company or its employees. Dkt. 35-1 ¶ 8 Aramark leaves
these decisions to the IDOC. Id. Aramark currently has inmates placed in the Wabash Valley
kitchen who have previously filed lawsuits/grievances. Once the inmates clear the IDOC
evaluation, they are free for placement. Id.
III. Discussion
Mr. Purvis alleges that the defendants retaliated against him by denying him a job in the
kitchen and that Aramark maintains a practice of retaliating against inmates. The defendants move
for summary judgment on these claims. The claims against the individual defendants and Aramark
will be discussed separately.
A. The Individual Defendants
The individual defendants move for summary judgment arguing that they did not retaliate
against Mr. Purvis. To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that
“(1) []he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) []he suffered a deprivation
that would likely deter First Amendment activity; and (3) the protected activity []he engaged in
was at least a motivating factor for the retaliatory action.” Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 618
(7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
1. Protected Activity
Here, the defendants do not dispute that Mr. Purvis has satisfied the first element of his
retaliation claim. His previous lawsuit was activity protected by the First Amendment.
2. Deprivation Likely to Deter First Amendment Activity
The defendants do argue that Mr. Purvis has failed to satisfy the second element – that Mr.
Purvis suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity. The defendants

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argue that this is because IDOC staff, not the defendants, made the decision not to place Mr. Purvis
in a kitchen position. But the defendants do not argue that the deprivation Mr. Purvis suffered –
the denial of the requested job in the kitchen – would be likely to deter First Amendment activity.
And the Seventh Circuit has held that “prison officials cannot deny an inmate a job in retaliation
for exercising his constitutional right to file grievances or lawsuits.” Stewart v. Smith, 124 F.3d
205 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991); Frazier v,
Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1990)). Mr. Purvis has therefore satisfied this element for
purposes of summary judgment.
While the defendants phrase this argument as related to the second element of a retaliation
claim, it is better understood as an argument that the defendants were not personally responsible
for the deprivation. “Individual liability under § 1983… requires personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983)). “A
causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the official
sued is necessary.” Wolf-Lillie, 699 F.2d at 869. Here, there is no evidence that Mr. Adams, Mr.
Hollingsworth, or Ms. Strader played any role in the decision not to hire Mr. Purvis in the kitchen.
Mr. Purvis contends that he was told that these defendants had informed others that he would not
be hired in the kitchen, but this testimony supports only a conclusion that these defendants relayed
information. It does not support a conclusion that any of these defendants had any authority over
this decision. In addition, while there is evidence that Ms. Strader knew about the decision, there
is no evidence that she played a part in it. Because these defendants were not involved in the
decision not to hire Mr. Purvis in the kitchen, they are entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

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But the same reasoning does not apply to the claim against Mr. Bedwell. The undisputed
evidence is that Ms. Booker contacted Mr. Bedwell as part of her investigation of Mr. Purvis’s
request to work in the kitchen. Mr. Bedwell responded that he did not believe it would be a good
idea to hire Mr. Purvis in the kitchen because of his lawsuit. Mr. Bedwell argues that he was
required to participate in the investigation and the ultimate decision regarding job placement is
up to custody staff. But whether or not Mr. Bedwell had the ultimate authority to determine who
to hire in the kitchen, a jury could reasonably infer from these facts that his advice was taken and
that he therefore participated in the decision not to hire Mr. Purvis.
3. Motivating Factor
Mr. Bedwell next argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the third element of
retaliation because his reporting on Mr. Purvis’s lawsuit was based on IDOC policy and safety
concerns, not because of Mr. Purvis’s lawsuit.
To satisfy the third element of a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must present evidence that
would raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there is a “causal link between the
protected act and the alleged retaliation.” See McKinely v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. Appx. 511, 514
(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Roger Whitmore’s Automotive Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cty. Ill., 424 F.3d 659,
669 (7th Cir. 2005)). Mr. Purvis has identified a statement by Mr. Bedwell linking his lawsuit to
the denial of a job in the kitchen. That is Mr. Bedwell’s statement that he did not believe it would
be a good idea to hire Mr. Purvis in the kitchen because he had a lawsuit. Based on this statement,
a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Purvis’s lawsuit was a motivating factor for his denial of the
job.
Mr. Bedwell contends that he did not recommend hiring Mr. Purvis because he was
concerned about his safety and that of his staff. He concludes therefore, that the lawsuit itself was

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not the motivating factor in his decision not to recommend Mr. Purvis for the job. But Mr. Purvis
points out that the lawsuit at issue was settled before he applied for the job in the kitchen and that
he has never threatened Mr. Bedwell, any other food service employee, or other prisoner working
in the kitchen. This evidence is enough to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Bedwell’s
proffered reason for failing to recommend Mr. Purvis is pretext and that the real reason was
retaliation. Id. at 515 (citing Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Mr. Purvis has presented a genuine issue of material fact on the second and third elements
of his retaliation claim against Mr. Bedwell and Mr. Bedwell therefore is not entitled summary
judgment.
B. Aramark
Aramark moves for summary judgment arguing that it did not have a policy or practice that
caused the deprivation of Mr. Purvis’s rights. Because Aramark acts under color of state law by
contracting to perform a government function – providing food service to correctional facilities, it
is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims. See Jackson v. Illinois MediCar, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 fn.6 (7th Cir. 2002). This means that, to show that Aramark violated
his rights, Mr. Purvis must show that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as the result of an
express policy or custom of Aramark. See Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (7th Cir.
2010)). “An official policy or custom may be established by means of an express policy, a
widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so entrenched and well-known as to carry the
force of policy, or through the actions of an individual who possesses the authority to make final
policy decisions on behalf of the municipality or corporation.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med.

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Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Milestone v. City of Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774,
780 (7th Cir. 2011)).
It is undisputed that Aramark does not have a policy of refusing to place prisoners in
kitchen jobs because they have filed lawsuits or grievances. Further, there are currently inmates in
the Wabash Valley kitchen who have previously filed lawsuits and/or grievances. In response, Mr.
Purvis argues that he has repeatedly sought and been denied a job in the kitchen. But, even if this
is true, it is not enough to allow a jury to conclude that Aramark had a widespread practice or
policy of retaliation. Cf. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 531
(7th Cir. 2000) (requiring a series of constitutional violations to raise an inference of a policy on
the part of a municipal defendant). Aramark is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Mr.
Purvis’s claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. [33], is
granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to all claims against defendants
Adams, Hollingsworth, Strader, and Aramark. The claims against these defendants are dismissed
and the clerk shall terminate these defendants on the docket. The motion is denied as to defendant
Bedwell. No partial final judgment shall issue as to the claims resolved in this Order.
The Court will direct further proceedings on the claims against Mr. Bedwell, including
setting a settlement conference, in a separate order. If Mr. Purvis wants to request that the Court
assist him in recruiting counsel to represent him, he should file a motion on the Court’s form. The
clerk shall include a form motion for assistance with recruiting counsel with Mr. Purvis’s copy
of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Date: 8/13/2019

Distribution:
WILLARD PURVIS
985367
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Christopher Douglas Cody
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]

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