ECKES v. BYRD et al

Filing 56

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT - Because Mr. Eckes fails to show he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary reli ef, Mr. Eckes' request for medical records is denied. Mr. Eckes' motion for preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 33 , is denied. Mr. Eckes' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 43 , is denied. M r. Eckes filed an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 53 , on August 17, 2018, twenty-three days after the filing of the defendants' answer. The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that Dkt. No. 53 is a "motion for leave to file an amended complaint." Mr. Eckes' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 53 , is denied as presented because it fails to comply with Local Rule 15-1. Mr. Eckes has submitted a letter requesting a "change of name& quot; document. Dkt. No. 55 . The Court construes his request to be for a blank form "change of name" document. Mr. Eckes should seek such a document, if available, from his local state court. (See Order.) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 8/22/2018. (DMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
AUSTIN ECKES,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMUEL BYRD,
Defendant.

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No. 2:18-cv-00246-WTL-DLP

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
I.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 33)
Presently pending before the Court is plaintiff Austin Eckes’ motion for preliminary

injunction. Dkt. No. 33. In his motion, Mr. Eckes asserts that he has been denied access to his
medical records and requests that the Court order the defendant to provide him records from
September 8, 2017 to the present. Id. In his memorandum in support of his motion for preliminary
injunction, Mr. Eckes instead asserts that he has been denied regular out-of-cell exercise or any
other recreational opportunities, and asks that the Court order the defendant to provide him with
at least one full hour of out-of-cell exercise per day and other recreational opportunities. Dkt. No.
34.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each
case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each
party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must establish [1] that it
is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and [4] that issuing an injunction
is in the public interest.” Grace Schools v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 2015); see Winter,
555 U.S. at 20. “The court weighs the balance of potential harms on a ‘sliding scale’ against the
movant’s likelihood of success: the more likely he is to win, the less the balance of harms must
weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more it must weigh in his favor.” Turnell v.
CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).

“The sliding scale approach is not

mathematical in nature, rather it is more properly characterized as subjective and intuitive, one
which permits district courts to weigh the competing considerations and mold appropriate relief.”
Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Stated another way, the district court ‘sit[s] as would a
chancellor in equity’ and weighs all the factors, ‘seeking at all times to minimize the costs of being
mistaken.’” Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992)).
To the extent Mr. Eckes’ motion for preliminary injunction is directed to his request for
medical records, the defendant has indicted that:
he is in the process of obtaining copies of relevant medical records. It is expected that
the records will be produced to the Plaintiff as part of the Defendant’s initial disclosures
and service of relevant documents pursuant to the Court’s standard scheduling order.
As such, the Defendant expects these medical records will be provided to the Plaintiff
as part of normal discovery.
Dkt. No. 42 at 3. Mr. Eckes has not filed a reply to the defendant’s response or asserted that he failed
to receive the necessary documents. Accordingly, because Mr. Eckes fails to show he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, Mr. Eckes’ request for medical records is denied.
To the extent Mr. Eckes’ motion for preliminary injunction is directed to his request for outof-cell recreation time, injunctions may only be entered against litigants. See Maddox v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 528 Fed. Appx. 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 511 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007)). The defendant asserts that

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he “is a physician at the facility and provides medical care” and “does not have the authority to order
that a patient be provided additional time outside of his cell. These decisions are made by IDOC
administration and security staff.” Dkt. No. 42 at 3. Because Dr. Talbot is the only defendant in this
action, and because additional recreation time is unrelated to Mr. Eckes’ claims and beyond Dr.
Talbot’s authority to order, Mr. Eckes cannot obtain the preliminary relief he seeks in this action. See
Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (A court may grant a motion for injunctive relief
only if there is a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion and the conduct alleged in the
complaint.); Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (same).
Accordingly, Mr. Eckes’ motion for preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 33, is denied.

II.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 43)
Mr. Eckes filed a second motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction

requesting a special medical diet that does not include “spicy, fatty, acidic food.” Dkt. No. 43;
Dkt. No. 44 at 1. He alleges he is in danger of needing a liver transplant without this diet. Dkt.
No. 44 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 45.
“[T]here must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the
conduct asserted in the complaint.” Ball, 396 Fed. at 837. Thus, “a court may not grant an
injunction when the issues raised in the motion are entirely different from those raised in the
complaint.” Jones v. Taylor, No. 3:12cv487, 2013 WL 1899852, at *2 (M.D.Pa. May 7, 2013)
(citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220–23 (1945)); see also Kaimowitz
v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir.1997) (“A district court should not issue an injunction
when the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit.”) (citing De Beers, 325 U.S. at 220).
Mr. Eckes’ complaint here relates to his Eighth Amendment claim that Dr. Byrd’s
prescribing of pain medications for Mr. Eckes’ fractured finger caused stomach ulcers. See Dkt.

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No. 5 at 4. Because the complaint does not seek relief for Mr. Eckes in the form of a special
medical diet or a liver transplant, there is no scenario whereby the Court, in entering judgment
following a resolution of the merits of Mr. Eckes’ complaint, would include in that judgment a
provision requiring the defendant, and most certainly not some person or entity that is not a party
to this action, to provide the relief requested in his motion. Consequently, this Court may not grant
Mr. Eckes the injunctive relief he seeks here.
Therefore, Mr. Eckes’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
Dkt. No. 43, is denied.
III.

Motion for Leave to File An Amended Complaint

Mr. Eckes filed an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 53, on August 17, 2018, twenty-three
days after the filing of the defendants’ answer. Accordingly, Mr. Eckes’ amended complaint is
not timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Rather, the Court will construe Mr. Eckes’ amended
complaint to be a motion for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that Dkt. No. 53 is a “motion for
leave to file an amended complaint.”
Mr. Eckes’ proposed amended complaint alleges that Dr. Byrd continues to be deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Eckes’ medical care when, on August 14, 2018, Dr. Byrd failed to provide
treatment for Mr. Eckes’ abnormal heart beat. Mr. Eckes appears to be attempting to amend his
complaint to add a claim that Dr. Byrd is deliberately indifferent to Mr. Eckes’ heart condition.
Mr. Eckes’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 53, is denied as presented
because it fails to comply with Local Rule 15-1. This rule requires a motion to amend to include
all claims in a single proposed amended pleading, but Mr. Eckes’ proposed amended complaint

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fails to include his original claims against Dr. Byrd. “Amendments to a pleading must reproduce
the entire pleading as amended.” Local Rule 15-1.
For Mr. Eckes’ information, to the extent he wishes to bring an unrelated claim related to
events occurring after the filing of an action, he should first exhaust his available administrative
remedies before filing a new complaint related to his unrelated and new claims.
IV.

Letter Regarding Case

Mr. Eckes has submitted a letter requesting a “change of name” document. Dkt. No. 55.
The Court construes his request to be for a blank form “change of name” document. Mr. Eckes
should seek such a document, if available, from his local state court.
V.

Summary of Actions Taken

Mr. Eckes’ motion for preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 33, is denied. Mr. Eckes’ motion
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 43, is denied.
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that Dkt. No. 53 is a “motion for leave
to file an amended complaint.” Mr. Eckes’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Dkt.
No. 53, is denied as presented because it fails to comply with Local Rule 15-1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:

8/22/18

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

AUSTIN ECKES
228699
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Douglass R. Bitner
KATZ KORIN CUNNINGHAM, P.C.
[e-mail]

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