ECKES v. HIATT et al

Filing 6

ORDER Screening and Dismissing Complaint and Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause - Accordingly, Mr. Eckes's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The p laintiff shall have through July 25, 2018, in which to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that (1) "C/O S. D uggar" is a named defendant, and (2) "C/O Brewer" is the correct defendant in place of defendant "C/O Brown." (SEE ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/26/2018.(DWH) Modified on 6/26/2018 (DWH).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
AUSTIN ECKES,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. HIATT,
BROWN c/o,
Defendants.

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No. 2:18-cv-00279-WTL-DLP

Order Screening and Dismissing Complaint and Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause
I.

Screening and Dismissing Complaint

Plaintiff Austin Eckes is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility. Because the plaintiff is a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), this Court has an
obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to screen his complaint before service on the defendants.
The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining
whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston,
463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to [him] that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
403 (7th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Eckes, an inmate confined at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, names as
defendants: (1) Lt. Hiatt; (2) C/O S. Duggar; and (3) C/O Brewer. He alleges that he has an
irregular heart beat that slow down his breathing and that on June 19, 2018, he was improperly left
in a smoke-filled room unattended for around thirty minutes, and that the prison officers were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need because he “could have fallen unconscious or
died or committed suicide.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Specifically, Mr. Eckes was brought into an interview
room where Lt. Hiatt spoke to him for about five minutes before leaving. He was then left
unattended for around thirty minutes. After thirty minutes, he beat on the cell doors to get the
attention of the officer, and he was subsequently released from the room. Upon his release, he
asked to see a mental health therapist, but C/O S. Duggar allegedly told him he was fine and refused
to go get Mr. Eckes’s mental health therapist. Mr. Eckes then alleges he was going through a
“mental & physical break down.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Mr. Eckes alleges that C/O Brewer was in
charge of the control booth, and if Mr. Eckes had not beat on the cell door, he would most likely
have died “not by suicide but by breathing in those chemicals that was [sic] physically hurting me
internally.” Id. For relief, he requests an “equitable sum of money.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5.
Any claims against Lt. Hiatt must be dismissed because there are no allegations of
constitutional wrongdoing on his part. Mr. Eckes alleges only that he talked to Lt. Hiatt for about
five minutes. “Individual liability under § 1983… requires personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Section
1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual

cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional
deprivation.... A causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of
and the official sued is necessary.”)).
Any Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against C/O S. Duggar and C/O
Brewer are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To prevail
on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference medical claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate two
elements: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the defendant
knew about the plaintiff’s condition and the substantial risk of harm it posed, but disregarded that
risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison,
Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014). A successful § 1983 plaintiff must also establish not only
that a state actor violated his constitutional rights, but that the violation caused the plaintiff injury
or damages. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Eckes
does not allege that these defendants were aware of a serious medical need or any actual physical
harm.
Mr. Eckes also asserts he has a Fourteenth amendment due process claim for the officers’
failure to comply with IDOC policy, rules and procedures, but has failed to explain what due
process rights were violated or which IDOC policy, rules, or procedures were not complied with.
Accordingly, any Fourteenth amendment due process claim is dismissed.
Accordingly, Mr. Eckes’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
II.

Further Proceedings

The plaintiff shall have through July 25, 2018, in which to show cause why this action
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Luevano v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (Plaintiffs should be given at least an
opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show cause before a case is “tossed out of court
without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or
simply request leave to amend.”). If the plaintiff wishes to amend his complaint, he shall place
the proper case number, 2:18-cv-00279-WTL-DLP, and the words “Amended Complaint” on the
first page of the amended complaint.
If the plaintiff fails to show cause, the action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth in
this Entry without further notice. If the plaintiff files an amended Complaint, it will be screened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that (1) “C/O S. Duggar” is a named
defendant, and (2) “C/O Brewer” is the correct defendant in place of defendant “C/O Brown.”
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
Date: 6/26/18
Distribution:

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

AUSTIN ECKES
228699
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only