SOLIS v. WATSON

Filing 33

ENTRY DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL, DISMISSING ACTION, AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - Mr. Solis's motion to compel, dkt. 23 , is denied, and his § 2241 petition is dismissed. The dismissal of the conditions of confinement claims is w ithout prejudice and the dismissal of the claims challenging the ongoing validity of the fine is with prejudice. Accordingly, Mr. Solis's motion for the enforcement of due process, dkt. 31 , is denied as moot. Final judgment shall issue by separate entry. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 9/24/2024 (Copy mailed to Petitioner). (LBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
ARTURO SOLIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
T. J. WATSON,
Respondent.

No. 2:21-cv-00462-JPH-MJD

ENTRY DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL, DISMISSING ACTION,
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
As part of the sentence imposed in a criminal case, Arturo Solis was
ordered to pay a fine. After the offense conduct occurred but before the
sentence was imposed, Congress amended the statute that authorized the fine
to extend the length of time for which a defendant may be liable for the fine. In
his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Mr. Solis argues
that extending the length of time he is liable for paying his criminal fine
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. He also
seeks to compel Respondent to produce a copy of a payment contract that he
allegedly signed. For the reasons stated below, Mr. Solis's § 2241 petition is
dismissed, and his motion to compel is denied.
I.

Background
Petitioner Arturo Solis is a federal inmate formerly incarcerated at the

U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana ("USP Terre Haute") and currently
incarcerated at the Coleman II U.S. Penitentiary.

1

On July 8, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
entered judgment in Mr. Solis's underlying criminal case. Dkt. 1-1. 1 As
relevant here, the court imposed an $1,800 fine, which was to be "paid
immediately." Id. The court also waived the interest requirement for the fine
under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). Id.
Mr. Solis represents that he came into BOP custody in 2017—more than
20 years after judgment was entered in his federal case. Dkt. 1 at 4. Before
that, he had been incarcerated in a Texas state prison for a state conviction.
See United States v. Solis, 124 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1997) (direct appeal, noting
that Mr. Solis was in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice).
Once Mr. Solis was in federal custody, the BOP has attempted to collect the
$1,800 fine. The BOP asked Mr. Solis to sign a contract agreeing to a payment
plan for his fine under the voluntary IFRP program, but Mr. Solis has refused.
Id. at 2. In response, the BOP has imposed various consequences, such as
restricting Mr. Solis's commissary purchases and placing him in what he
describes as a "punishment transition unit," where his out-of-cell time is
limited. Id.
II.

Discussion
Mr. Solis argues that the consequences the BOP has imposed for his

refusal to make payments toward his fine are unlawful because the law
authorizing the criminal fine that existed when he committed his offense of

Neither party has filed a complete copy of the judgment in the underlying criminal
case, but Mr. Solis filed the relevant portions, and the Court cites to that document.
1

2

conviction limited his liability to 20 years after judgment was entered in his
criminal case. Dkt. 1. He argues that application of the amended law to him
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because
extending his liability to pay his fine disadvantages him and increases his
punishment. See, e.g., id. at 6. He also contends that the saving clause in 1
U.S.C. § 109 preserved the 20-year liability period for his fine, that the BOP
has no authority to set schedules for payments of monetary obligations, and
that it's unconstitutional for the BOP to subject him to consequences for failing
to make payments on his fine. 2 See, e.g., id. at 3, 7–8; dkts. 17, 18.
In response, Respondent argues that applying the longer liability period
to Mr. Solis does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the change in
law was procedural and did not increase Mr. Solis's punishment. Dkt. 10.
Respondent also argues that Mr. Solis cannot challenge his conditions of
confinement (such as restricted commissary purchases and his housing
assignment) in a § 2241 petition. Id.
A. Liability Period
Mr. Solis contends that his liability to pay his fine expired several years
ago, so the BOP cannot now try to collect it. This is a challenge to the
execution of his sentence, which is properly raised in a § 2241 petition.
Cf. Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (challenge to

Mr. Solis raises other arguments for the first time in his reply. The Court does not
consider these arguments, as parties waive arguments raised for the first time on
reply. See United States v. Desotell, 929 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 2019) ("In most
instances, litigants waive any arguments they make for the first time in a reply brief.").

2

3

execution of sentence falls under § 2241); Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709,
712 (8th Cir. 2002).
1. Ex Post Facto Clause
a. Applicable Law
When Mr. Solis committed the offense of conviction in 1995, the
applicable law provided that "liability to pay a fine expires . . . twenty years
after the entry of the judgment." 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1) (eff. until April 23,
1996). The same time frame applied to liability for restitution. United States v.
Norwood, 49 F.4th 189, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2022). Before Mr. Solis was convicted
and sentenced, Congress amended the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of
1996 ("MVRA") to provide that "[t]he liability to pay a fine shall terminate the
later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years after the release from
imprisonment of the person fined, or upon the death of the individual fined."
18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (eff. April 24, 1996, to Dec. 15, 2016); see MVRA § 207,
104 Pub. L. 132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996). The amendments also
extended the liability period for restitution obligations. Norwood, 49 F.4th at
197.
Mr. Solis contends that he can lawfully be subject only to the version of
§ 3613(b) that was in effect in 1995 when he committed the offenses of
conviction. Therefore, he argues that the BOP's attempt to apply the revised
version of § 3613(b) that was in effect when he was sentenced violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

4

The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the passing of an "ex post facto Law,"
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, that is, a law "that retroactively alter[s] the
definition of crimes or increase[s] the punishment for criminal acts," Nelson v.
Town of Paris, 78 F.4th 389, 395 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A law violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution "if it is both retroactive and penal
in nature." Id.
Here, it's undisputed that Congress made the change to § 3613(b)
retroactive. See id.; dkt. 10 at 4; dkt. 1 at 6. So the Court's evaluation of
whether its application to Mr. Solis's criminal fine turns on whether the change
to § 3613(b) is "penal in nature." Nelson, 78 F.4th at 395. The parties do not
cite, and the Court has not identified, Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit
precedent resolving whether retroactive application of the 1996 amended
version of § 3613(b) that lengthens the liability period for a criminal fine
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. There are cases from those courts, however,
that have assessed the constitutionality of retroactive application of other
statutes and are therefore useful to the Court's evaluation of the retroactive
application of § 3613(b) here.
The Supreme Court has held that retroactively increasing a defendant's
advisory sentencing guidelines range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because
it "creates a 'significant risk' of a higher sentence." Peugh v. United States, 569
U.S. 530, 550 (2013). And the Seventh Circuit has held that not every
retroactive change that disadvantages a defendant violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See United States v. Gibson, 490 F.3d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)
5

(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3296—which allows the government 60 days to move
to reinstate counts that were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement under
certain circumstances—was not impermissibly ex post facto where it was
passed before the statute of limitation ran on the count); see also United States
v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Even if a law operates
retroactively, it does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause unless it
disadvantages the defendant by altering the definition of criminal conduct or
increasing the punishment for that crime." (cleaned up)).
There are also decisions from other circuits that have examined
retroactive application of § 3613(b) which are similarly helpful to the Court
here. In United States v. Blackwell, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply the amended version of § 3613(b) to
the defendant by extending the liability period during which the government
could collect a fine. 852 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The
court explained:
The . . . amendment to the termination of liability provision did not
affect [the defendant's] substantive rights. After [§ 3613(b)] was
enacted, [he] remained liable for the same amount of fines and
restitution as he was prior to the enactment. The [amended
statute] merely increased the time period over which the
government could collect those fines and restitution.
Id.; see also United States v. Richards, 472 F. App'x 523 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[A]n
expansion of the period in which [defendant] is liable for restitution does not
increase [defendant's] punishment.").
Similarly, in United States v. Rosello, 737 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that applying the
6

amended § 3613(b) to a restitution order did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause:
The continued enforcement of Rosello's judgment of restitution
under amended section 3613(b) does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Amended section 3613(b) does not retroactively increase
Rosello's sentence. The amended statute merely extends the span
of time in which Rosello's victims can collect restitution from him.
And the application of amended section 3613(b) did not
"compromise . . . [Rosello's] right to receive fair notice of the
punishment his offense carries." [Hock v. Singletary, 41 F.3d
1470, 1473 (11th Cir. 1995).] The extension of the collection
period has no effect on the amount of restitution that [the
defendant] owes. "His punishment remains what it was when he
committed the offense, at which time he had received fair notice of
the crime and the punishment it carries." Id.
The prolongment of the period to collect restitution is like the
extension of the statute of limitation to prosecute a criminal
charge, which we have long held does not infringe the Ex Post
Facto Clause. . . . Even if a "change in law obviously ha[s] a
detrimental impact upon the defendant, . . . the law [is] not ex post
facto . . . [unless the law] ma[kes] criminal a theretofore innocent
act, . . . aggravate[s] a crime previously committed, . . . provide[s]
greater punishment, [] or change[s] the proof necessary to convict."
[Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1997).] None of these
concerns are implicated in an extension of the statute of limitation.
[United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1286 (11th Cir.
2001)]. Extending the period in which a defendant remains
obligated to pay restitution likewise does not alter the definition of
his criminal conduct or increase his punishment.
Id. at 908–09 (alterations in original, except for full citations appearing in
brackets).
In contrast to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the Third Circuit has
rejected the argument that the change to § 3613(b) was merely "procedural,"
because "the rule has the practical effect of increasing a defendant's
punishment." United States v. Norwood, 49 F.4th 189, 218 (3d Cir. 2022)
(decision issued after this matter was fully briefed). The court also rejected any
7

analogy between the liability period and a statute of limitation, noting that the
two concepts have very different legal effects. While a statute of limitation
creates a "procedural bar to seeking a remedy or prosecuting a crime but [not
extinguishing] a plaintiff's underlying rights or the crime itself, as evidenced by
the fact that a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that can be
waived," § 3613(b) "expressly extinguishes a defendant's liability once the
liability period has run." Id. at 217–18. The court further reasoned that
§ 3613(b)'s liability period serves a different purpose—placing a temporal limit
on a defendant's liability—than a statute of limitation, which "ensures cases
are brought while evidence is still ripe." Id. at 218. Moreover, the government
would likely be able to collect more from the defendant under the amended
§ 3613(b). Because the defendant owed more in restitution than he would
likely ever be able to pay while in prison, the amendment allowed the
government to collect future funds obtained once he is released, thereby
increasing the ultimate restitution payment, and thus his punishment. Id. at
217.
Finally, the court stated that "being subject to restitutionary liability is
its own form of criminal punishment, independent of the amount a defendant
owes, such that extending the duration of a defendant's liability period may
itself violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 218–19. It explained that being
subject to restitutionary liability is punitive because "an unpaid restitution
obligation instantly becomes an added condition of parole or supervised
release." Id. at 219 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663(g) (1994)); 18 U.S.C. § 3664
8

(1994)). It also observed that, in many states, having an outstanding criminal
restitution liability carries associated collateral consequences, such as being
denied the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold a driver's license, run for office, or
own a firearm. Id. (citing various state statutes). The court concluded,
[R]etroactive application of [the amended § 3613(b)] to Norwood
would increase his punishment by subjecting him to additional
decades of liability, supervision, and collateral consequences, even
if he ultimately never paid a cent more than he would have under
the [pre-amendment version of § 3613(b)]. This extension, like his
increased financial obligations, is a retroactive increase in
punishment that is forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause."
Id. at 220.
It's worth noting that Norwood was a 2-1 decision. The dissenting judge
criticized the majority's analysis because it looked to cases concerning the
duration of incarceration, not monetary obligations. Id. at 222 (Phipps, J.,
dissenting). Judge Phipps further emphasized that the Ex Post Facto Clause is
violated only if there is a "significant risk" of increasing the defendant's
punishment. Id. at 221. He concluded that any potential collateral
consequences did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they rested on
speculation and produced nothing more than "some ambiguous sort of
disadvantage." Id. (cleaned up).
b. Analysis
Here, the amendment to § 3613(b) did not increase the amount of Mr.
Solis's fine—it remained $1,800. And unlike the restitution at issue in
Norwood, Mr. Solis's fine is not subject to interest, so the increased liability
period cannot potentially increase that amount. Although giving the
9

government more time to collect Mr. Solis's fine effectively increased the portion
of the fine Mr. Solis will pay because he didn't pay the full amount within 20
years after judgment was entered in his case, not every retroactive change in
law that is potentially detrimental to a defendant violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See, e.g., Gibson, 490 F.3d at 609; Newman, 144 F.3d at 538. A
change to a statute of limitation does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it
is made before the original limitation period expires. Although there are
differences between § 3613(b) and a statute of limitation, § 3613(b)'s effects are
sufficiently similar to a statute of limitation to support the analogy. See
Blackwell, 852 F.3d at 1166; Rosello, 737 F. App'x at 909.
Finally, Mr. Solis contends that "[s]everal U.S. Appellate Court Circuits
have held that the similar Statutory law in the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act of April 24, 1996 violates the Ex-Post Facto Clause." Dkt. 1 at 7. But the
cases he references there address a different provision of the MVRA—the
portion that made restitution mandatory for certain crimes when it had
previously been discretionary. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87
(3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998).
In sum, lengthening the amount of time Mr. Solis is on the hook for
paying his fine, which does not include accrued interest, does not increase his
punishment. And Mr. Solis has not presented any evidence or argument that
his continued failure to pay his fine will subject him to significant collateral
consequences. Therefore, retroactively applying the extended liability period

10

from the amended version of § 3613(b) to Mr. Solis's fine does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
2. Saving Clause
Mr. Solis also argues that the so-called "saving clause" in 1 U.S.C. § 109
preserves the 20-year liability period for his fine. 3 Under that provision, "[t]he
repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as
still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability."
Mr. Solis focuses on the second half of the provision—"such statute shall
be treated as still remaining in force"—but ignores the first half, which plainly
states that § 109 applies only when a repeal of a statute has the "effect to
release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under" the
repealed statute. That's not the case here because the repeal of the prior
version of § 3613(b) did not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing Mr.
Solis's liability for his fine. Instead, he was subject to a longer liability period
after § 3613(b) was amended. See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 661

Mr. Solis argues that Respondent waived this issue by failing to respond to his
arguments about it. Dkt. 17 at 16. The saving clause analysis is very similar to the
Ex Post Facto Clause analysis, so the Court is not convinced that Respondent
intentionally failed to respond to Mr. Solis's argument on this issue. And, even if did,
the Court exercises its discretion to excuse the failure and reach the merits of the
argument because the argument is plainly wrong. See Bourgeois v. Warden, 977 F.3d
620, 632 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that government did not waive or forfeit 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) bar to petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241, and even if it did, "we
would excuse that forfeiture on these facts").
3

11

(1974) ("In consequence, the saving clause has been held to bar application of
ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at the
time of the commission of an offense.") (emphasis added). Mr. Solis does not
cite any cases applying § 109 to law changes that disadvantaged a defendant,
as opposed to those that would have provided an advantage but for the saving
clause.
Regardless, even if § 109 can be read to establish that repealed statutes
always remain in force "for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability," a
procedural change such as a change to a statute of limitation does not
implicate § 109. See Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 751 F.2d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir.
1985) (§ 109 "generally does not 'save' discarded remedies and procedures,"
and "[s]tatutes of limitation are usually considered remedial," so "the savings
clause will not ordinarily preserve a repealed statute of limitations"); United
States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1950); cf. United States v. Bell,
624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting attempt to fit a statutory change
"into one of the narrow exceptions to the savings statute, this time statutes
that primarily affect 'procedures' or 'remedies'"). As explained above, the Court
finds that the amendment to § 3613(b) is analogous to a change in a statute of
limitation. Accordingly, the amendment was a procedural change that did not
"save" the prior liability period under § 109.
Mr. Solis is not entitled to relief under § 109.

12

B. BOP's Authority to Collect Fine
Mr. Solis argues that the BOP has no authority to order him to make
payments on his fine. Dkt. 1 at 8. This is also an argument about the
execution of his sentence that is properly raised in a § 2241 petition.
While the BOP cannot compel him to make payments under the IFRP,
see, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2010)
(participation in the IFRP is voluntary), the BOP has not ordered him to make
any payments. Instead, the BOP has imposed consequences for his failure to
pay or participate in the IFRP, which the BOP has the authority to do. McGhee
v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1999) (BOP may use the IFRP to ensure
that inmates make "good-faith progress" toward satisfying their court-ordered
obligations); Boyd, 608 F.3d at 334 ("[A]n inmate in the Bureau of Prisons'
custody may lose certain privileges by not participating in the IFRP."). None of
the cases Mr. Solis cites hold to the contrary.
Mr. Solis cites Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2012), and
United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2002), which held that, where
a defendant lacked sufficient resources to make immediate payment of
restitution, a sentencing court may not order "immediate" payment of
restitution because doing so implicitly delegates the court's obligation to
schedule payments to the BOP or the probation office. To the extent that Mr.
Solis contends that these cases mean that the BOP cannot attempt to collect
his fine through the IFRP because his sentencing court was responsible for
setting a payment schedule for him while he is in prison, he is incorrect. The
13

cases are distinguishable because they deal with statutory provisions relating
to restitution payments, and those provisions do not apply to fines. See United
States v. Ellis, 522 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that criminal fines
are immediately payable absent a contrary court order because "[i]n contrast
[to restitution], criminal fines are discretionary, and sentencing courts must
consider ability to pay when determining whether to impose any fine at all").
Mr. Solis is not entitled to relief on this basis.
C. Ability to Pay and Improper Consequences
Mr. Solis mentioned in passing in his petition that he had not been and
was not financially able to pay his fine. Dkt. 1 at 2, 5. He did not, however,
provide any further argument or evidence on this point. In his reply, however,
he argues that it's unconstitutional for the BOP to subject him to consequences
for failing to make payments on his fine because—under the IFRP's
implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 545.10–545.11, and the BOP's IFRP
Program Statement, P5380.08, see dkt. 10-4—he should be exempt based on
his inability to pay. Dkts. 17, 18. He also contends that he is being subjected
to consequences not allowed under the IFRP regulations or Program Statement,
such as being housed in a disciplinary unit, where he is subjected to restricted
out-of-cell time. Id. Respondent argues that Mr. Solis cannot challenge his
conditions of confinement in a § 2241 petition. Dkt. 10.
As relevant here, a § 2241 petition is appropriate when a petitioner is
challenging the fact or duration of his confinement and also when a petitioner
is challenging the execution of his sentence. Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644,
14

645 (7th Cir. 2012) (fact or duration of confinement); Valona, 138 F.3d at 694
(execution of sentence). In complaining about the BOP's failure to exempt him
from the IFRP and imposition of consequences not allowed by the IFRP,
Mr. Solis is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. As the
Court has already told Mr. Solis, he cannot bring claims challenging his
conditions of confinement in a § 2241 petition. Dkts. 9, 16. 4
The Court has already determined that the BOP is properly executing
Mr. Solis's sentence in that it is properly working from the position that he still
owes the $1,800 fine. The Court further concludes that Mr. Solis's claims
relating to the consequences he is facing because of his ongoing refusal to
make payments toward his fine under the IFRP are challenges to his conditions
of confinement that are not cognizable in a § 2241 petition. See, e.g., Robinson
v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the "longstanding view that habeas corpus is not a permissible route for challenging
prison conditions" that do not bear on the duration of confinement).
At least as to his complaints about the BOP's failure to label him as
exempt (for the time being) from IFRP refusal status and its imposition of

The Court has told Mr. Solis that if he wants to litigate his conditions of confinement,
he must do so in a separate civil action. Dkts. 9, 16. As of the writing of his Order,
Mr. Solis has not initiated such an action. The Court notes, however, that Mr. Solis
has apparently accrued at least six "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Solis v.
Johnson, 199 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1999) (TABLE) (stating that Mr. Solis had six "strikes"
in 1999). Thus, it appears that he cannot proceed in forma pauperis as to any civil
rights action unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, which
does not appear to be the case as to any of the conditions at issue in his habeas
petition. Mr. Solis cannot evade the requirements of § 1915(g) by bringing conditions
of confinement claims in a § 2241 petition.
4

15

consequences he believes are not authorized by the IFRP regulations or
Program Statement, Mr. Solis is not challenging the execution of his sentence.
If he succeeded in his arguments, the result would not be a change to the
amount of the fine he owes, nor would it change the fact or duration of his
confinement. It would not even result in the BOP permanently ceasing its
collection efforts. Instead, at best, it might result in some improvement to his
conditions of confinement, a temporary reprieve from the BOP's imposition of
consequences for failing to participate in the IFRP (so long as he remains
exempt under its terms), or both. That is, he is really challenging his
conditions of confinement, not the execution of his sentence, and he cannot
pursue such claims in a § 2241 petition, as the Court has previously informed
him.
The Court recognizes that the Seventh Circuit has stated in an
unpublished decision that "[t]he IFRP is a means of executing an inmate's
sentence, and thus complaints about the BOP's administration of the program
are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241." Ihmoud v. Jett, 272 F. App'x 525, 526
(7th Cir. 2008). Similarly, in another unpublished case, the Seventh Circuit
held that a challenge to the BOP's implementation of the IFRP was cognizable
in a § 2241 petition. United States v. Neal, 207 F. App'x 700, 702 (7th Cir.
2006). But Ihmoud, Neal, and all the IFRP-related cases cited in them involved
claims that the BOP's attempts to collect funds through the IFRP conflicted
with judgments issued in the petitioner's underlying criminal actions. See
Ihmoud v. Warden, No. 1:06-cv-01823-SEB-JMS, dkt. 1 at 7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22,
16

2006); United States v. Neal, No. 4:00-cr-40101-JPG, dkt. 415 (S.D. Ill. July 21,
2005); McGhee, 166 F.3d at 886; see also Matheny, 307 F.3d at 711.
Thus, not every challenge to the way the BOP is administering the IFRP
is cognizable in a § 2241 petition as a challenge to the way the sentence is
being executed. Instead, the common feature of these cases is that the inmates
were claiming that the BOP's attempts to set payment schedules for them
conflicted with their judgments and were seeking rulings that the BOP should
not be able to try to collect their monetary obligations at all. At least as to his
complaints about misapplication of the IFRP regulations and policy, Mr. Solis
does not make such an argument.
Because Mr. Solis cannot challenge his conditions of confinement in a
§ 2241 petition, the Court does not reach his arguments as to these points.
III.

Motion to Compel

Long after briefing was closed in this case, Mr. Solis filed a motion to
compel asking the Court to require production of:
The signed by me Inmate Financial Responsibility Program
"Contract and/or Agreement" upon which the Respondent and/or
it's Agents or Employees are relying upon so as to cause them to
enter into my Bureau of Prisons Program Review Records to show
that I "AGREED" to make $25.00 Payments Quarterly.
Dkt. 23. Mr. Solis explains that he has never agreed to make IFRP payments
and that prison staff have refused to give him a copy of the contract he
allegedly signed. Id.
"A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not
entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Bracy v. Gramley, 520
17

U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings for the United States District Courts (made applicable to § 2241
proceedings by Rule 1(b)), states that "[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize
a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
may limit the extent of discovery." In addition, the "party requesting discovery
must provide reasons for the request. The request must also include any
proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any
requested documents." Rule 6(b).
Mr. Solis has not shown good cause for the requested discovery. The
question of whether he has ever signed an IFRP contract is not at issue in his
§ 2241 petition. To the contrary, everyone agrees—at least for purposes of this
petition—that he did not. If the BOP is actually deducting money from
Mr. Solis's trust fund account on the basis of the alleged contract and Mr. Solis
contends that they have no authority to do so, such a complaint is entirely
separate from the issues before the Court in his current petition.
The motion to compel, dkt. [23], is denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Solis's motion to compel, dkt. [23], is

denied, and his § 2241 petition is dismissed. The dismissal of the conditions
of confinement claims is without prejudice and the dismissal of the claims
challenging the ongoing validity of the fine is with prejudice. Accordingly, Mr.
Solis's motion for the enforcement of due process, dkt. [31], is denied as moot.

18

Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/24/2024

Distribution:
ARTURO SOLIS
61520080
COLEMAN - II USP
COLEMAN II U.S. PENITENTIARY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 1034
COLEMAN, FL 33521
All electronically registered counsel

19