SHEPARD v. KIJAKAZI

Filing 15

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Complaint filed by JOSEPH W. SHEPARD - The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Any objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation shall be filed with the Clerk and failure to timely file objections within fourteen days after service shall constitute a waiver of subsequent review absent a showing of good cause for such failure. (SEE ORDER) Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 11/18/2022.(KAA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
JOSEPH S., 1
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:21-cv-00470-JPH-MJD

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Claimant Joseph S. requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability
Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); 42
U.S.C. § 1382. District Judge Hanlon has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to issue a
report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). [Dkt. 14.] For the reasons set
forth below, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court REVERSE and REMAND
the decision of the Commissioner.

1

In an attempt to protect the privacy interest of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.

I. Background
Claimant applied for DIB and SSI in October 2018, alleging an onset of disability as of
August 14, 2018. [Dkt. 8-8 at 2-5.] Claimant's applications were denied initially and again upon
reconsideration, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Belinda Brown
("ALJ") on May 19, 2021. [Dkt. 8-2 at 35-58.] On June 3, 2021, ALJ Brown issued her
determination that Claimant was not disabled. Id. at 29. The Appeals Council then denied
Claimant's request for review on October 26, 2021. Id. at 2-5. Claimant timely filed his
Complaint on December 29, 2021, seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision. [Dkt. 1.]
II. Legal Standards
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
423. 2 Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner, as represented by the
ALJ, employs a sequential, five-step analysis: (1) if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, he is not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not have a "severe" impairment, one that
significantly limits his ability to perform basic work activities, he is not disabled; (3) if the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment
appearing in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, App. 1, the claimant is

2

DIB and SSI claims are governed by separate statutes and regulations that are identical in all
respects relevant to this case. For the sake of simplicity, this Entry contains citations to those that
apply to DIB.
2

disabled; (4) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step three, and is able to perform his
past relevant work, he is not disabled; and (5) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step
three, cannot perform his past relevant work, but can perform certain other available work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Before continuing to step four, the ALJ must assess the
claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by "incorporat[ing] all of the claimant's
limitations supported by the medical record." Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015)). If, at any step, the ALJ can make a
conclusive finding that the claimant either is or is not disabled, then she need not progress to the
next step of the analysis. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 20
CFR § 404.1520(a)(4)).
In reviewing a claimant's appeal, the Court will reverse only "if the ALJ based the denial
of benefits on incorrect legal standards or less than substantial evidence." Martin v. Saul, 950
F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). While an ALJ need not address every piece of evidence, she
"must provide a 'logical bridge' between the evidence and [her] conclusions." Varga, 794 F.3d at
813 (quoting O'Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010)). Thus, an ALJ's
decision "will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence," which is "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Jozefyk v. Berryhill,
923 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). This Court may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts,
decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v.
Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
disability determination, the Court must affirm the decision even if "reasonable minds could
differ" on whether the claimant is disabled. Id.

3

III. ALJ Decision
ALJ Brown first determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date of August 14, 2018. [Dkt. 8-2 at 18.] At step two, the ALJ found that
Claimant had the following severe impairments: "learning disability, social anxiety disorder, and
bipolar disorder." Id. at 19. At step three, the ALJ found that Claimant's impairments did not
meet or equal a listed impairment during the relevant time period. Id. at 21-22. ALJ Brown then
found that, during the relevant time period, Claimant had the residual functional capacity
("RFC")
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and only
occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.
Id. at 24.
At step four, relying on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Claimant
was able to perform his past relevant work as a machine feeder (DOT 699.686-010) during the
relevant time period. Id. at 28. Accordingly, ALJ Brown concluded Claimant was not disabled.
Id. at 29.
IV. Discussion
Claimant asserts a host of errors, arguing that the ALJ: (1) based her decision on
cherrypicked evidence, (2) did not provide a logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions,
(3) erred in assessing Claimant's and third-party statements, (4) erred in her Step 3
determination, (5) assessed an RFC that is inconsistent with Claimant's capabilities, (5) did not
support the limitations she assessed, (6) failed to present all of Claimant's limitations to the
vocational expert, and (7) found Claimant capable of past occupations that are inconsistent with
his current capabilities. [Dkt. 10.] In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ based her
4

decision on substantial evidence and that Claimant's arguments boil down to a request that the
Court reweigh the evidence. [Dkt. 12.] The Court addresses each of Claimant's arguments, as
necessary, below.
A. The ALJ Failed to Consider Claimant's Medication Side Effects.
An ALJ is required to consider medications that a physician prescribes to treat a
claimant's symptoms as well as any side effects those medications produce. SSR 16-3p. As
Claimant recognizes, the ALJ acknowledged his subjective allegations and noted that Claimant's
medications helped him manage his symptoms of his bipolar disorder and social anxiety
disorder. [Dkt. 8-2 at 24-27.] However, Claimant testified that the medication he takes in the
morning, Buspar, "knocks [him] back out and when [he] wake[s] up, half the day is gone." Id. at
52. When the ALJ asked the Claimant if he had talked to a doctor about adjusting the
medication, Claimant testified that the doctor "told [him] to cut it in half" but that he "get[s] the
same result but it's not as bad as it was when [he] took the whole pill. Because when I took the
whole pill . . . the room would be spinning so bad that [he] would have to lay down in bed on
[his] couch and crash out." Id. at 53.
The ALJ did not acknowledge or address this testimony about the side effects caused by
Claimant's medication or how these side effects, if credited, affect Claimant's ability to work.
Although the ALJ might have decided that no RFC limitations were warranted based on
Claimant's medication side effects, she was required to say so and explain why. "We cannot
uphold an administrative decision that fails to mention highly pertinent evidence." Parker v.
Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Because the ALJ failed to address
Claimant's statements regarding his medication side effects, the Court is unable to determine
from the decision why the ALJ determined that a specific work-related functional limitation to
5

address the medication side effects was not necessary in the RFC, or even whether she
considered the issue at all. See SSR 96-8p. Without any such analysis in the opinion, the Court is
prevented from engaging in a meaningful review. The undersigned therefore recommends that
this case be remanded to correct this error.
B. The ALJ's Step Three Analysis
Claimant next argues that the ALJ's Step Three determination is "flawed because the ALJ
failed to properly assess Plaintiff's conditions under Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.11." [Dkt. 10
at 17.] At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment, or
combination of impairments, which meets or equals an impairment found in the Listing of
Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, and
416.926). The claimant bears the burden of proving his condition meets or equals a listed
impairment. Steward v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1295, 1297 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1988). If the claimant's
impairment or combination of impairments is severe enough to meet or medically equal the
criteria of a Listing and meets the duration requirement set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.909, then the
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(c)(3). If no Listing is met, the ALJ proceeds to step
four and determines the claimant's RFC.
Here, the ALJ found that Claimant has the following severe impairments: learning
disability, social anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. [Dkt. 8-2 at 19.] She then proceeded to
assess whether Claimant's impairments meet or medically equal the severity of the applicable
Listings. Claimant argues that the ALJ ignored and/or inadequately analyzed evidence of marked
limitations in three domains: interacting with others; adapting and managing oneself; and
concentration, persistence, or pace. [Dkt. 10 at 18-20.]

6

To start, Claimant cites a host of allegedly ignored evidence, id. at 19-22, but the Court
finds that the ALJ confronts the majority of that allegedly ignored evidence elsewhere in the
opinion. For example, Claimant alleges the ALJ never mentioned
(1) exams noting "somewhat" blunted and bland demeanor, "somewhat
subservient" nature, poor to fair impulse control, persecutory and paranoid
thought content, limited judgment, and poor, "somewhat marginal," or "fair"
grooming and hygiene; (2) diagnoses of PTSD, social phobia, social anxiety
disorder with panic, bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and
persistent depressive disorder; (3) prescriptions for, among others, mood
regulators and anxiolytics; (4) testimony that Plaintiff suffers paranoia in addition
to social anxiety and difficulty being around crowds; and, (5) reports of difficulty
being around others—including family, friends, and neighbors—due to paranoia
and high anxiety, bad mood swings, hypervigilance, depression, irritability,
episodes of intense anger, hallucinations, becoming "triggered" and "going off"
on others, wanting to fight others when angry, a lack of significant social activities
aside from going to the grocery store, and that Plaintiff has lost jobs due to issues
with coworkers and walked off a job due to anger.
***
In addition, Claimant asserts that the ALJ
ignored other critical evidence undermining the ALJ’s assessment. For example,
Dr. Al-Khattab noted that Plaintiff was easily distracted during her exam. Plaintiff
reported insomnia due to bipolar disorder, racing thoughts, nightmares,
hallucinations, anxiety, and mood issues; he needs reminders to take medications
and attend appointments, cannot handle finances on his own, can pay attention for
10 minutes to 1 hours, and has difficulty focusing and reading. Plaintiff’s wife
stated that Plaintiff has night terrors, is forgetful, loses focus easily, and becomes
stressed and overwhelmed when asked to pay bills or plan family events.
Id. at 19-21. Claimant is patently incorrect. Much of this evidence is addressed by the ALJ
throughout her more in-depth RFC analysis, [Dkt. 8-2 at 24-28], and the ALJ was not required to
discuss every single line of the record in order to meet her burden. Burnett v. Bowen, 830 F.2d
731, 735 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A written evaluation of every piece of testimony and submitted
evidence is not required" so long as the ALJ "articulate at some minimum level [her] analysis of

7

the evidence in cases in which considerable evidence is presented to counter the agency's
position.")
Claimant also argues that the ALJ did not adequately analyze and explain her assessment
of certain evidence. First, the Claimant argues the ALJ "did not explain how being 'cooperative'
and 'pleasant' during time-limited exams supports only a moderate limitation in social interaction
given the evidence above showing that Plaintiff struggles with sustained interaction 3 and
interaction with groups of people," and "did not discuss how an ability to live only with his wife,
shop in stores only when there are not many people 4. . . spend time with friends depending on his
mood, and sometimes deal with authority 'ok' 5 suggests appropriate functioning in the
workplace." [Dkt. 10 at 20] (citations omitted) (footnotes added). The Court notes, however, that
the ALJ's assessment of a moderate limitation in interacting with others rests on much more:
[A]ccording to his statements, the claimant is also able to shop, spend time with
friends and family, attend church, deal appropriately with authority, and live with
others. Finally, the medical evidence shows that the claimant had a good rapport
with providers, was described as pleasant and cooperative, and appeared
comfortable during appointments. . . . Mental status examinations of the claimant
since re-establishing treatment documented . . . calm and cooperative behavior . .
. good eye contact, good mood, appropriate affect . . . . [C]laimant has endorsed
the ability to . . . get along well with authority figures, socialize with friends and
family often, play video and card games with friends, go camping, go to church,
go to restaurants . . . . [I]n addition, the claimant has worked for extended,

3

Claimant cites to no evidence of issues with sustained interaction. The Court notes that the
record contains evidence that Claimant both "spend[s] time together with [wife] & his friends . . .
as much as possible" and yet is "edgy and nervous around friends." [Dkt. 8-12 at 16, 32]; see
also id. at 28, [Dkt. 8-14 at 27-28].
4
Claimant testified that he can be around people and go shopping now that he has restarted his
medications, but he still gets anxious in crowds of twelve or more people. [Dkt. 8-2 at 52-53.]
5
Claimant cites to a Function Report answer of "sometimes ok" with authority figures. [Dkt. 812 at 49.] The Court notes that, at other times, the Claimant and his wife answered, respectively,
"pretty good I am very respectful" and "he is very respectful and usually gets along well." Id. at
18, 29.
8

continuous periods following his alleged onset date 6. . . [and] for the majority of
the time . . . was not receiving any mental health treatment for his allegedly
disabling mental impairments. 7 This evidence is also inconsistent with the
claimant's alleged severity of the symptoms and limitations. . . . [Claimant]
explained that he was better able to tolerate social interaction once he was taking
his medications.
[Dkt. 8-2 at 23-27] (citations omitted) (footnote added). The ALJ clearly credits Claimant's and
his wife's testimony, finding Claimant's social anxiety to be severe and assessing a corresponding
RFC limitation, but she also clearly explains why evidence in the record—Claimant's and his
wife's own conflicting statements, Claimant's hearing testimony, Claimant's treating providers,
and Claimant's work history during periods of non-treatment—does not support a finding of a
marked limitation in interacting with others. Based on this record, and the deferential standard,

6

Claimant takes issue with the ALJ's finding that Claimant's "ability to work for 'extended,
continuous periods' following his alleged onset date undermined his reported limitations"
because he was laid off from Texas Roadhouse for problems getting along with others, making it
an unsuccessful work attempt. [Dkt. 10 at 14-15.] While this may be true—although the Court
notes that Claimant reported to one of his physicians that he was fired from Texas Roadhouse for
coming to work with the flu, [Dkt. 8-14 at 27-28]—the ALJ also found that Claimant worked as
a dishwasher for approximately a year at Longview Management Group, Inc. [Dkt. 8-2 at 26.]
Claimant clearly was able to maintain continuous employment for months at both jobs before
any of his mental impairments allegedly affected his employment, so the ALJ's finding that his
employment history undermines his subjective symptoms is supported by substantial evidence.
7
Claimant takes issue with this, arguing "the ALJ erred in relying on the absence of additional
mental health treatment without first considering the reasons Plaintiff may not have pursued or
obtained additional treatment." [Dkt. 10 at 10.] However, the ALJ did consider and acknowledge
the reasons Claimant did not pursue additional treatment. See [Dkt. 8-2 at 25] ("[O]wing to a
lapse of medical insurance, the claimant did not receive any mental health treatment, neither
outpatient nor inpatient, or have access to his psychotropic medications for an extended period
starting from, at the latest, approximately January 2019 and continuing to November 2020 when
he re-established treatment with the Hamilton Center.") Second, in reading the opinion as a
whole, the Court reads the ALJ's reliance on the lack of health treatment not as evidence that
Claimant did not need treatment, but rather as evidence that provides important context to other
evidence. Specifically, the ALJ notes that Claimant worked for extended, continuous periods
following the alleged onset date, and whether the Claimant was medicated during this period of
work provides relevant context to determining the severity of Claimant's symptoms and
limitations. [Dkt. 8-2 at 26.]
9

the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ committed error in finding that Claimant's social anxiety
disorder supported no more than a moderate limitation on Claimant's ability to interact with
others.
Next, Claimant takes issue with the ALJ's explanation of her assessment that Claimant
only has a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, arguing "the ALJ did not
explain how the ability to watch tv and play video games depending on his mood and prepare
meals with his wife’s help support only a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace." [Dkt. 10 at 21] (citations omitted). Here, again, Claimant ignores the rest of the ALJ's
opinion, wherein the ALJ explains:
[Claimant] reported that he was able to . . . take care of cats, help with wife with
household chores and finances, wash dishes, do laundry, vacuum, mop the floor,
dust furniture, do yard work such as cutting the grass, prepare meals . . . play video
and card games with friends, . . . and watch television. . . . [T]his evidence is
inconsistent with the claimant's alleged severity of the symptoms and limitations.
. . . [A] field office representative noted that the claimant did not appear to have
any difficulties understanding, concentrating, and answering during questions
during the interview. . . . Mental status examinations of the claimant since reestablishing treatment documented concentration that ranged from easily
distracted to good. . . . [T]he record reflects that the claimant has worked for
extended, continuous periods following his alleged onset date. . . . Although this
work activity did not constitute disqualifying substantial gainful activity, it does
it does indicate that the claimant's daily activities have, at least at times, been
somewhat greater than the claimant has generally reported. . . . [F]or the majority
of the time following his alleged onset date and until recently, the claimant was
not receiving any mental health treatment. . . . [T]he claimant’s allegations of
disabling learning or intellectual difficulties are inconsistent with the claimant's
history of semi-skilled work as a trailer assembler, his ability to graduate from
high school albeit with the assistance of special education services, and the
claimant's fairly intact daily activities.
[Dkt. 8-2 at 23-26.] Beyond a November 2020 notation from Dr. Al-Khattab that
Claimant was easily distracted, [Dkt. 8-15 at 12], there is no medical evidence supporting
Claimant's contention that he has limitations in "concentrating generally" or "completing
10

tasks." Nevertheless, and despite conflicts in his own subjective reports, see [Dkt. 8-12 at
28, 48, 57], the ALJ "[gave] greatest weight to the claimant's subjective statements,"
[Dkt. 8-2 at 28], and assessed a greater limit in concentration, persistence, or pace than
both State agency psychologists. Compare [Dkt. 8-2 at 23] with [Dkt. 8-4 at 19, 33]. She
then clearly explains throughout her opinion how Claimant's work history, treatment
history, and daily activities since the alleged onset date all are inconsistent with
Claimant's subjective statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his symptoms. [Dkt. 8-2 at 26-27.] Ultimately, after reviewing the record, the
ALJ determined that only a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace was
appropriate, and the Court finds no reason to disturb that conclusion given the deferential
standard of review.
Lastly, Claimant takes issue with the ALJ's explanation of her assessment that
Claimant only has a mild limitation in adapting and managing oneself. [Dkt. 10 at 22.]
Claimant argues that the ALJ "failed to sufficiently explain how the evidence supports
only a mild limitation in adapting and managing oneself" and lists cherry-picked
evidence from the record supporting a greater limitation that the ALJ assessed. Id. In
finding that Claimant has a mild limitation in adapting and managing oneself, the ALJ
explained,
[t]he claimant asserted that he has difficulties handling stress. . . . [T]hat said, the
claimant has also stated that he is able to handle self-care and personal hygiene
and care for pets. Meanwhile, the objective evidence in the record showed the
claimant to have no problem getting along well with providers and staff, normal
mood and affect, and no problems with temper control 8. . . . Mental status

8

Claimant takes issue with this, arguing that Claimant "suffers from" intermittent explosive
disorder. [Dkt. 10 at 22.] However, Dr. Wooden never diagnosed Claimant with intermittent
11

examinations of the claimant since re-establishing treatment documented
appropriate dress, calm and cooperative behavior, normal speech, full orientation,
good eye contact, good mood, appropriate affect, concentration that ranged from
easily distracted to good, thought process that ranged from circumstantial to
organized, fair insight, impulse control that ranged from poor to good, and
judgment that ranged from limited to good. . . . [T]he claimant has worked for
extended, continuous periods following his alleged onset date. . . . [T]he claimant
testified that psychotropic medication again helped to manage his symptoms. . . .
Dr. Wooden[,a psychologist who conducted three consultative psychological
evaluations of Claimant,] repeatedly indicated that there were no signs of
psychosis.
[Dkt. 8-2 at 23-27] (citations omitted) (footnote added). Again, the ALJ clearly explains
throughout her opinion how Claimant's work history, treatment history, and daily activities since
the alleged onset date all cut against other evidence (notably only found in one medical record
from one therapy session, see [Dkt. 8-15 at 13-15], a far cry from a full and substantial record)
noting poor to fair impulse control, persecutory and paranoid thought content, and limited
judgment. [Dkt. 8-2 at 26-27.] Claimant is correct that some of his medical records note
"[g]rooming and hygiene marginal, and dressed simply in ragged jumpsuit" and "poorlygroomed." [Dkt. 8-14 at 23, 28.] However, the ALJ confronts this by noting that records reflect
appropriate dress and affect since Claimant re-started treatment. [Dkt. 8-2 at 25.] Because the

explosive disorder; on August 6, 2018, he stated: "Based upon all descriptors this claimant gives
relative to his alleged psychological issues, . . . the claimant may show some evidence of an
intermittent explosive disorder. . . diagnostic impressions: … intermittent explosive disorder
features." [Dkt. 8-14 at 13-16.] Dr. Wooden examined Claimant twice more, on February 11,
2019, and June 4, 2019, and did not mention nor diagnose intermittent explosive disorder, nor
anger or temper issues. [Dkt. 8-14 at 27-33.] Furthermore, Claimant himself stated on September
11, 2020, regarding anger: "I don't have much of a problem anymore because I know to take
some time to cool down. I just walk away. Sometimes I say some things I don't mean, but that's
it." [Dkt. 8-15 at 4.] The objective medical evidence indicates that, while Claimant had features
of intermittent explosive disorder in August 2018, he no longer had anger or temper control
problems in February 2019, June 2019, and September 2020. Thus, it was not error for the ALJ
to note and rely on the fact that the objective evidence shows no current problems with temper
control.
12

ALJ adequately explained how she weighed the evidence, this conclusion is also supported by
substantial evidence.
In sum, Claimant disagrees with how the ALJ considered the evidence, but the ALJ gave
a sufficient explanation to build the requisite "logical bridge between the evidence and the result"
when making her Step 3 findings. Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014); see
Shaun R. v. Saul, 2019 WL 6834664, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2019) ("So, as she is required to
do, the ALJ acknowledged evidence on both sides of the issue and reached a conclusion. As long
as she didn't ignore evidence that points to a disability, she has fulfilled her duty to minimally
articulate the path to her conclusion."). In accordance with the standard of review, the Court
declines to reweigh the evidence of record and independently determine the precise severitylevel of limitations with the contested domains. The Seventh Circuit has "repeatedly held that
although an ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ may not
analyze only the evidence supporting her ultimate conclusion while ignoring the evidence that
undermines it." Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Terry v. Astrue,
580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); Arnett v.
Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012)). "The ALJ must confront the evidence that does not
support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was rejected." Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123
(citing Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004)). Here, the Court, reading the
ALJ opinion as a whole, finds the ALJ adequately confronted the conflicting evidence pointed to
by Claimant and discussed above. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n. 5 (7th Cir.2004)
("[I]t is proper to read the ALJ's decision as a whole, and ... it would be a needless formality to
have the ALJ repeat substantially similar factual analyses at both steps three and five"); see
also Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.1985) ("[W]e examine the [ALJ]'s opinion
13

as a whole to ascertain whether he considered all of the relevant evidence, made the required
determinations, and gave supporting reasons for his decisions.").
That said, as noted above, the ALJ did not confront Claimant's reported medication side
effects, and this Court cannot say without a doubt that proper consideration of Claimant's
reported medication side effects would not change the ALJ's Paragraph B criteria analysis,
particularly with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. Thus, on remand, the Undersigned
recommends that the ALJ be instructed to, at a minimum, explain whether and how Claimant's
medication side effects affect her analysis at Step Three.
C. The ALJ's RFC Assessment
Claimant next contends that the ALJ improperly considered Claimant's social
functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace limitations; and ability to adapt and manage
himself.
1. The ALJ's Consideration of Claimant's social functioning and ability to adapt and
manage himself were proper.
Both state-agency psychologists Drs. Kennedy and Unversaw found Plaintiff capable of
semi-skilled tasks in a less social setting that did not require constant and intense interaction with
the general public and coworkers due to his social anxiety. [Dkt. 8-4 at 21, 37.] The ALJ found
their conclusions that Claimant could perform semi-skilled work undermined by Claimant's
subjective statements, consultative examiner Dr. Wooden's learning disability diagnosis, and
Claimant's history of special education services. [Dkt. 8-2, at 27-28.] She thus limited Claimant
to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with occasional interaction with the public, coworkers,
and supervisors. Id. Claimant takes issue with the assessment, arguing that the ALJ's RFC failed
to account for the limited depth or length of interactions with others that Claimant could handle
14

and Claimant's difficulty in handling stress. [Dkt. 10 at 28-29.] However, it is unclear what kinds
of work restrictions might address Claimant's limitations in depth or length of social interaction,
nor his difficulty in handling stress, because he hypothesizes none. Claimant cites no evidence
that his stress-related deficits keep him from performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. In
fact, the ALJ notes that those types of tasks, such as household chores, are exactly what Claimant
reports he can perform on a daily basis. [Dkt. 8-2 at 23-24.] Further, Claimant points to no
evidence in the record, from Claimant or his medical providers, that supports length or depth of
interaction restrictions. Therefore, Claimant has not identified any evidence-based restrictions
that the ALJ could include in a revised RFC finding on remand.
The ALJ tied the record evidence to the limitations included in the RFC, tailoring
Claimant's workplace setting to accommodate his social anxiety, difficulty handling changes in
routine, and learning disability. Id. at 28. Thus, regarding Claimant's social functioning and
ability to adapt and manage himself, the Court sees no error in the ALJ’s assessment; she
considered all limitations supported by record evidence. See Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492,
497 (7th Cir. 2019).
2. The ALJ's RFC Determination Did Not Adequately Account for His Moderate
Limitation In Concentration, Persistence or Pace.
Claimant argues that the ALJ's RFC restriction to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks is
insufficient to address Claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence or pace. Because the
ALJ found Claimant has a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence or pace and credited
Claimant's assertions that he "has limitations in concentrating generally, following instructions,
and completing tasks," [Dkt. 8-2 at 23], she needed to explain how her corresponding RFC
limitation sufficiently deals with Claimant's concentration, persistence or pace limitations. To be
15

sure, a restriction to "simple" tasks may address issues with concentration, but it does not address
issues with persistence and pace. Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373-74 (7th Cir. 2020).
Claimant's problems with following instructions can be addressed by "simple" tasks as well,
especially in light of the record evidence showing his difficulty in following instructions stems
from his learning disability. See [Dkt. 8-12 at 17, 28, 48, 57.] However, an RFC limitation to
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks does not address Claimant's limitation in his capability to
complete those tasks. Thus, the Undersigned recommends remand to assess a persistence
limitation or to explain why one is not needed. In addition, on remand the ALJ should address
the evidence of record regarding Claimant's medication side effects and the effect, if any, they
have on Claimant's concentration, persistence, or pace limitations.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Undersigned recommends the Commissioner's decision
be REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Any
objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation shall be filed with the Clerk in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), and failure to timely file
objections within fourteen days after service shall constitute a waiver of subsequent review
absent a showing of good cause for such failure.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: 18 NOV 2022

16

Distribution:
Service will be made electronically on
all ECF-registered counsel of record via
email generated by the Court's ECF system.

17