BAUGH v. ZATECKY et al

Filing 84

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. 76 , is GRANTED. Consistent with this ruling, Mr. Baugh's motion for a monetary award in his favor, dkt. 83 , is DENIED. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry. (See Order.) Copy to Plaintiff via US mail. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 09/26/2024. (AJG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
WILLIAM EUGENE BAUGH,

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Plaintiff,
v.
FAGOROYE, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00482-JPH-MG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff William Eugene Baugh alleges that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious harm he faced when being
transported back to Putnamville Correctional Facility ("PCF") after knee
surgery. Defendants Sergeant McCullough and Sergeant Fagoroye have moved
for summary judgment on Mr. Baugh's claims. For the reasons below,
Defendants' motion, dkt. [76], is GRANTED.
I.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is
unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,
instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
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determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has
to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it
need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the
basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,
the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the
record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's
factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,
and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
II.
Factual Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to
Mr. Baugh and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985
F.3d at 572–73.
On July 1, 2022, Mr. Baugh was discharged from Terre Haute Regional
Hospital following recovery from his right knee replacement surgery. Dkt. 77-1

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at 24–25, 29 (Baugh Deposition). Mr. Baugh had an immobilizer on his right
knee that prevented the joint from bending. Id. at 39. His left knee was in
good condition, and Mr. Baugh was able to stand on his left leg to move from
his hospital bed to his wheelchair. Id. at 25, 49.
Sgt. Fagoroye and another officer provided Mr. Baugh's transport from
Terre Haute Regional Hospital to PCF. Id. at 41. Sgt. McCullough stated in his
affidavit that he was not present or involved in any way in Mr. Baugh's
transport. Dkt. 77-4 at 1.
Mr. Baugh exited the hospital by wheelchair, dkt. 77-1 at 33, but the van
used to transport him was not wheelchair accessible, id. at 31. The van had
side doors with two steps to get up into the van. Id. at 40. Sgt. Fagoroye and
the other officer instructed Mr. Baugh to get in the van. Id. at 41. Mr. Baugh
did not ask for help getting into the van. Id. at 49. After Mr. Baugh got out of
his wheelchair and was standing on his left leg, Sgt. Fagoroye asked Mr. Baugh
what he was doing, and Mr. Baugh said, "I'm falling, man." Id. at 51. Sgt.
Fagoroye did not attempt to reach for Baugh or grab him. Id. Mr. Baugh fell
on the steps of the van, hitting his right outside thigh. Id.
After Mr. Baugh fell, Sgt. Fagoroye further instructed Mr. Baugh to get
into the van, and he lifted himself onto the van seat. Id. at 51–52. Sgt.
Fagoroye fastened Mr. Baugh's seatbelt. Id. at 52. That day, the temperature
was 90 degrees or higher. Id. at 18. The van was not air-conditioned, and the
windows were not open. Id. at 54. Mr. Baugh complained to the officers that
there was no ventilation in the back of the van. Id. One of the officers
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responded that Mr. Baugh would be okay. Id. at 56. Sgt. Fagoroye indicated to
the other officer that he thought Mr. Baugh may have hurt himself when he
fell. Id.
During the ride to PCF, Mr. Baugh passed out twice, although he does
not know how long he passed out. Id. at 58–59. Both times, Mr. Baugh
informed the officers of his passing out, and the officers told him that they
thought he would be okay. Id. at 58–60. After arriving at PCF, Mr. Baugh
exited the van by sliding down the steps. Id. at 62. Mr. Baugh was provided a
wheelchair and was seen and evaluated by PCF medical staff. Id. at 63; dkt.
77-3 at 1–4.
III.
Discussion
"Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when
they display deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical
need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to
prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an
objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was
deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th
818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839
F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)).

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A. Sgt. McCullough
Sgt. McCullough first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
because he lacked personal involvement in Mr. Baugh's transport from the
hospital. See dkt. 78 at 8–9.
"To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a
defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional
right." Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). Here, the undisputed facts
establish that Sgt. McCullough was not personally involved in the events
underlying Mr. Baugh's claims. In his affidavit, Sgt. McCullough attests that
he worked a different shift, specifically the 6:00 P.M. – 6:00 A.M. shift, during
all times relevant to Mr. Baugh's complaint and that he was neither present
nor involved in any other way in Mr. Baugh's transport. See dkt. 77-4 at 1, ¶¶
4–5. In response, Mr. Baugh concedes that he believes another officer—not
Sgt. McCullough—was involved in transporting him from the hospital back to
the prison. See dkt. 81 at 1–2. Because Mr. Baugh did not designate evidence
showing that Sgt. McCullough was personally involved in the alleged
deprivation, Sgt. McCullough is entitled to summary judgment. Whitfield, 76
F.4th at 706.
B. Sgt. Fagoroye
Sgt. Fagoroye argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because (1)
there was no constitutional violation and (2) at the time Mr. Baugh was
transported from the hospital back to the prison, there was no clearly
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established right for a prisoner be transported in an air-conditioned,
wheelchair-accessible van after knee replacement surgery. Dkt. 78 at 7.
"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). This
"clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . .
anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 639 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two important interests—
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
In considering a qualified immunity defense, courts evaluate "(1) whether
the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ], show that the
defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Gonzalez v.
City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The "difficult part" of the
qualified-immunity test is "identifying the level of generality at which the
constitutional right must be clearly established." Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d
1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A "high level of generality" is not appropriate;
instead, the question is "whether the law was clear in relation to the specific
facts confronting the public official when he acted." Id.
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Qualified immunity applies unless the specific contours of the right "were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would
have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
778–79 (2014). "A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's
conduct 'does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was
firmly established.'" District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)
(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). While "a case directly on point" is not
required, "existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question
beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (cleaned
up). Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (per curiam).
When the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised, "the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.
2019). To meet his burden, Mr. Baugh must "show either a reasonably
analogous case that has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a
factual circumstance similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so
obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as a
violation of the law." Id. (quoting Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir.
2017)). The failure to do so means a plaintiff "cannot defeat" a "qualified
immunity defense." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2013)
(reversing summary judgment grant because plaintiff did not identify a
sufficiently analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly
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excessive); Soriano v. Town of Cicero, 521 F. App'x 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Court may evaluate the "clearly established" prong without reaching the
first prong as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. Kemp v. Liebel,
877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017).
Here, Mr. Baugh has not identified an analogous case dealing with facts
similar to this lawsuit, nor has he explained why Defendants' actions were so
obviously violative of the Eighth Amendment that any reasonable person would
have recognized them as such. See Findlay, 722 F.3d at 900. As the Seventh
Circuit has explained, that's fatal to overcoming a qualified immunity defense.
Id.; Soriano, 521 F. App'x at 567.
Moreover, the Court's review of Eighth Amendment case law does not
indicate that Mr. Baugh had a clearly established right to be transported from
the hospital back to the prison in an air-conditioned, wheelchair-accessible van
after knee replacement surgery. See Smith v. Price, No. 1:21-cv-00373-JMSCSW, 2024 WL 278143, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2024) (granting summary
judgment for defendants when plaintiff "was exposed to uncomfortable
temperatures in the summer heat for around two-hours" during van ride
between prison and hospital); Wheeler v. Godinez, No. 13-CV-964-NJR-RJD,
2016 WL 5394385, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2016) ("The Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit have not yet held, however, that prisoners are entitled to air
conditioned cells."); Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 475–76 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendants on pretrial detainee's
due process claim because he could not "satisfy the deliberate indifference
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standard" when he was placed in a wheelchair-accessible cell but "had limited
access to the toilet and sink and no access to the shower" for two days);
Strominger v. Brock, 2:10–cv–00158–LJM–DKL, 2014 WL 268444, at *8 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 23, 2014) (granting summary judgment for defendants when
wheelchair-bound plaintiff was placed in non-handicap accessible cell for eight
days).
Sgt. Fagoroye is entitled to qualified immunity as to Mr. Baugh's claims.
C. Mr. Baugh's Motion for Settlement
Finally, Mr. Baugh has filed a "Motion for Settlement," in which he seeks
a monetary award in his favor. See dkt. 83. As stated above, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Baugh's claims. Accordingly, Mr.
Baugh's motion, dkt. [83], is DENIED.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [76], is GRANTED.
Consistent with this ruling, Mr. Baugh's motion for a monetary award in his
favor, dkt. [83], is DENIED. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/26/2024

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Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
WILLIAM EUGENE BAUGH
9 Schuyler Ave
Muncy, PA 17756

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