500 INMATES OF PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al v. RUSSELL et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR EMERGENCY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DISMISSING ACTION AS DUPLICATIVE - Plaintiff Michael Scuteri originally filed this action in state court, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Putnamville Correctional F acility. Defendants removed the action to this Court on August 13, 2024. Dkt. 2 . On October 28, 2024, Mr. Scuteri filed an "emergency motion for preliminary injunction," stating that the Putnamville administration was preparing to impleme nt a variety of new rules governing the institution. Dkt. 44 . In accordance with the Court's previous order and Mr. Scuteri's response thereto, the Court now directs that this action be dismissed without prejudice as duplicative of 2:24-c v-00316-JPH-MKK. Final judgment will issue by separate order. Defendants' motion to supplement is GRANTED. Dkt. 75 . Mr. Scuteri's motions to strike are DENIED. Dkts. 70 and 71 . Mr. Scuteri's motions for emergency injunctive relie f, dkts. 44 and 58 , are DENIED for the reasons above. This case is now also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as duplicative for the reasons above. The pending motions at dkts. 13 , 14 , 15 , 47 , 51 , and 55 , are terminated. Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 1/29/2025. (See Order.) (BAA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
MICHAEL SCUTERI,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
HEATHER RUSSELL, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 2:24-cv-00424-JPH-MG
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR EMERGENCY PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND DISMISSING ACTION AS DUPLICATIVE
Plaintiff Michael Scuteri originally filed this action in state court, alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Putnamville Correctional Facility
("Putnamville"). Defendants removed the action to this Court on August 13,
2024. Dkt. 2. On October 28, 2024, Mr. Scuteri filed an "emergency motion for
preliminary injunction," stating that the Putnamville administration was
preparing to implement a variety of new rules governing the institution. Dkt. 44.
In Mr. Scuteri's words, an injunction was necessary "to prevent imminent rioting
and violence" that the new rules allegedly would cause. Id. Mr. Scuteri filed a
substantially identical motion on October 31, 2024. Dkt. 58.
Given the gravity of Mr. Scuteri's allegations, the Court directed Magistrate
Judge Garcia to hold a telephonic status conference in this case as soon as
practicable to discuss the allegations. Dkt. 48. Magistrate Judge Garcia held two
such conferences, on November 6 and November 26. Dkts. 63, 66. Defendants
filed a brief and submission of evidence in opposition to Mr. Scuteri's motions,
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dkt. 60, and Mr. Scuteri filed a reply, dkt. 69. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court DENIES the motions for emergency injunctive relief.
I. Background
Mr. Scuteri's complaint, as amended on September 3 and which has not
yet been screened by the Court, alleges that the conditions of confinement at
Putnamville are unconstitutional because of inadequate lighting, inadequate
fans heating and ventilation, overcrowding, excessive noise, unsanitary
conditions, lack of structural integrity; equal protection violations; denial of
adequate healthcare; retaliation; denial of access to the courts; improper
handling of disciplinary proceedings; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and inadequate food service. Dkt. 12. 1
Mr. Scuteri's "emergency" injunction motions allege that effective
November 1, Putnamville administration was going to implement new rules
regarding the following:
•
Required waking time of 6:45 a.m.
•
Unnecessarily excessive lighting use
•
No use of bathroom facilities between 11:30 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
•
Beds to be made by 7:15 a.m. and no sleeping allowed during the day
with a bedtime of 9 p.m.
•
No visiting or crossing over between the Putnamville A-Side and B-Side
dorms
1 As previously noted by the Court, these allegations are virtually identical to allegations
made in a different lawsuit Mr. Scuteri filed directly in this Court, Scuteri v. Indiana
Department of Corrections et al., No. 2:24-cv-00316-JPH-MKK. See dkt. 41.
2
•
No loitering (despite Putnamville already being locked down 23 hours a
day)
•
Windows may only be opened and closed by officers, despite inadequate
ventilation in the building
•
Hair cutting and shaving not allowed in the dorms, despite the lack of
a usable barbershop at Putnamville
•
Exercising prohibited in the dorms
•
No washing clothes in dorms
•
No plastic bags
•
Nothing allowed on top of boxes in cells
•
Limits on the amount of ice inmates can receive
•
No talking in the dayroom
•
Dayroom to be closed for cleaning between 8 and 10 a.m.
Dkt. 44 at 1-2; dkt. 58 at 1-2. In addition, Mr. Scuteri alleged that Putnamville
administration planned to remove chairs from inmates' bunk areas, which are
used by some inmates for medical reasons, to climb onto bunk beds, and/or for
socialization. Dkt. 44 at 5; dkt. 58 at 5. Mr. Scuteri submitted as evidence in
support of these motions several "requests for accommodation" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act from various inmates.
These requests are pre-printed with information citing the Rehabilitation Act,
state "I request a chair for medical purposes," and are dated October 31 or
November 1, 2024, or bear no date at all. See dkt. 59.
3
Defendants' brief and evidence in response to Mr. Scuteri's motions assert
that, in fact, only two new rules or procedures were to be implemented at
Putnamville on November 1. Dkt. 60 at 5; dkt. 60-1 at ¶ 8 (declaration of Warden
Tricia Pretorius). First, about half of the chairs currently in the bed areas of the
dormitories would be moved to the dayroom. Dkt. 60-1 at ¶ 8. As Warden
Pretorius explains: "The high volume of chairs in the bed area was not conducive
to ensuring required space between beds, made it unduly difficult for staff to
conduct necessary property searches, and obscured staff members' view of
incarcerated individuals' beds and bed areas." Id. at ¶ 9.
Second, Warden Pretorius stated that Putnamville originally planned to
modify the late-night schedule for inmates, to require them to either be in bed or
watching a movie by 9:30 p.m. Id. at ¶ 10. After receiving input from inmates
about the proposed rule change, however, it was modified to allow additional
late-night viewing of movies and sporting and other special events. Id. at ¶ 11.
Warden Pretorius also explained that Putnamville allows inmates to use
the restroom facilities between 11:30 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. for using toilets or
urinals, but not for other purposes such as personal hygiene. Id. at ¶ 13. Warden
Pretorius also denies that any of the alleged "new" rules mentioned by Mr. Scuteri
are in fact new, as opposed to being in place for several years. Id. at ¶ 14. She
admits that Putnamville is in the process of constructing a new barbershop, but
staff is being paid overtime to cut hair in the meantime. Id. at ¶ 17. She denies
that Putnamville is in a permanent lock-down state and that inmates generally
4
have access to the dayroom and other facilities for more than one hour per day.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Additionally, to the extent there were slight rule changes that took effect
on November 1, they came after meetings between staff and "shelter
representatives"—two inmates from each Putnamville housing unit who meet
with staff monthly to discuss rules, policies, and procedures. Id. at ¶ 7.
Defendants' response did not directly address the issue of lighting at
Putnamville. However, the Court notes that with respect to the facility rules
regarding lighting, previously they had stated:
All main lights will come on in the dormitories at 6:45
a.m. weekdays and 9:30 a.m. on weekends and
holidays. The lights will remain on until 9:30 p.m. on
weekdays and 11:30 on weekends and holidays. Main
lights are considered to be the cubicle, latrine, hallway
and game table lighting. The only exception would be
the TV area lights, they may be dimmed slightly to
decrease glare, allowing enhanced television viewing. All
security lights will remain on at all times. Dorm lights
can and will be turned on during any emergency or
threats to safety and security.
Dkt. 60-3 at 4. The newly-revised rules state:
All main lights will come on in the dormitories at 6:45
a.m. weekdays and 9:30 a.m. on weekends and
holidays. The lights will remain on until 9:30 p.m.
Sunday through Thursday. Dorm lights can and will be
turned on during any emergency or for safety and
security reasons.
Dkt. 60-2 at 2.
In Mr. Scuteri's reply, he continues to advance his injunctive relief claims
related only to the moving of chairs and the allegedly excessive lighting. He does
5
not dispute the Defendants' arguments regarding the other issues, apparently
abandoning those claims for preliminary injunctive relief. Additionally, the Court
notes that no evidence or argument has been presented that Putnamville
experienced rioting or increased violence in response to the allegedly "new" rules
the administration imposed.
Regarding the chairs, Mr. Scuteri denies that the previous placement of
chairs created a security risk. He also asserts that "guidelines established by the
Federal Government" entitle every inmate to a chair, among other things. Dkt.
69-1 at 2. Mr. Scuteri does not provide a citation for such guidelines. He also
states that there are only 80 chairs in the dayroom for 120 inmates to use, and
although there are also 6 tables in the dayroom "[t]hey are used by people of
more melanin toned skin than mine." Id. Further, Mr. Scuteri states he "has a
spinal injury that remains untreated and requires a place to sit with back
support." Id.
As for the lighting, Mr. Scuteri asserts "there is no reason to have enough
light fixtures, pumping warehouse lighting into the sleeping areas of people 24
hours a day." Id. at 3. Also, "[w]hen it is DAYLIGHT OUTSIDE there is no need
to have interior lights blazing at 2,016,000 . . . lumens in light energy," which
Mr. Scuteri states is equivalent to staring at an arc welder. Id. Mr. Scuteri asserts
that the excessive lighting causes him and other inmates headaches, sleep
disruption, and other psychological issues.
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II. Discussion
A. Preliminary Injunction Standard
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is
available only when the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp.,
796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff first must show that "(1) without
this relief, [he] will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would
be inadequate; and (3) [he] has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its
claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element by a preponderance of the
evidence. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S.A., Inc., 549
F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff meets these threshold
requirements, "the court then must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary
injunction would cause the plaintiff against the harm to the defendant if the
court were to grant it." Id.
"A movant's showing of likelihood of success on the merits must be strong."
Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). A
"better than negligible" likelihood of success is not enough. Ill. Republican Party
v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762?63 (7th Cir. 2020). The precise likelihood of
success required depends in part on the balance of harms: "the more likely the
plaintiff is to win on the merits, the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in
his favor, and vice versa." Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020).
"Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an Eighth
Amendment claim." Sasso v. Galipeau, No. 3:23-CV-510-CCB-JEM, 2024 WL
7
1483980, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2024). To state such a claim, an objective and
subjective element must be satisfied. First, "the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official's act or omission must result in
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Eighth Amendment protects prisoners only from conditions that "exceed
contemporary bounds of decency of a mature, civilized society," Jackson v.
Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). On the subjective prong, the plaintiff
must allege that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference—they were
subjectively aware of an excessive risk to an inmate's health or safety and
consciously disregarded it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839.
The Court also observes that "[p]rison administration is a task that has
been committed to the responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches,
and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where
a state penal system is involved, federal courts have additional reason to accord
deference to the appropriate prison authorities." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
84–85 (1987) (cleaned up). And particularly where preliminary injunctive relief
is concerned, "[p]rison officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage." Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679,
683 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The Prison Litigation Reform Act reinforces this
point when it states, "[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires
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preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
B. Analysis
The Court required expedited briefing and consideration of Mr. Scuteri's
"emergency" preliminary injunction motions because of his representation that
there were many new rules going into effect on November 1 that were likely to
cause widespread discord and potential violence within Putnamville. 2 As it turns
out, it's undisputed that there were only two substantive changes to longexisting rules at Putnamville, not fifteen as he alleged in his motions. And there
is no evidence that widespread discord and violence has occurred or is likely to
occur in response to these rule changes. Also, contrary to Mr. Scuteri's
allegations, the rule changes were implemented after consultation between staff
and inmates.
Of these two changes, only one is related to any of the claims set forth in
Mr. Scuteri's his emergency injunction motions—the removal of chairs from
2 In response to Mr. Scuteri's motions seeking preliminary injunctive relief, Magistrate
Judge Garcia held two telephonic status conferences, dkts. 63, 66. Defendants filed
their response on November 6, 2024, dkt. 60, and the Court gave Mr. Scuteri until
December 3, 2024, to file a reply. See dkt. 63 (granting Mr. Scuteri seven days from
November 26 to file a reply). That deadline was later extended to December 13. Dkt. 68.
Mr. Scuteri filed his reply on December 11, dkt. 69, and approximately a month later
filed two motions to strike materials contained in Defendants' response, dkts. 70
(January 7, 2025), 71 (January 13, 2025). Defendants filed a motion for leave to
supplement their response or in the alterative to strike Plaintiff's motions to strike
because they "potentially serve only to delay" the proceedings. Dkt. 75 at 3 ¶ 4. Mr.
Scuteri's filings at dockets 70 and 71 are essentially supplemental reply briefs to
Defendants' response. He gives no explanation why he filed these separate motions
raising issues that could and should have been presented in his reply, or why the Court
should modify the briefing schedule and further delay resolution of his motions for
preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court does not consider Mr. Scuteri's motions to
strike, dkts. [70] and [71], in resolving his motions for preliminary injunction.
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dorm spaces and into dayrooms. Although the Court has not yet screened Mr.
Scuteri's complaint, it does not contain any allegations regarding inadequate
seating. That alone supports denial of preliminary injunctive relief on that issue
because it not tied to potential claims that might proceed in this action as
currently pled. See Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) ("[T]he purpose
of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held." (cleaned up)); see also DeBeers
Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) ("A preliminary
injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same
character as that which may be granted finally."); Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC
v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that absent
a nexus between underlying claims and request for injunctive relief, district court
has no authority to grant injunctive relief) (citing DeBeers Consol. Mines, 325
U.S. at 220).
Moreover, there is a lack of evidence that the allegedly inadequate seating
violates the Eighth Amendment. Even if the Court were to accept that there is a
federal regulation that would require more chairs in prisons than Putnamville
currently has, the existence of a rule or regulation regarding a condition of
confinement does not create an enforceable Eighth Amendment standard.
"Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations, not violations of
departmental regulation and practices." Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d
740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). To the extent Mr. Scuteri claims to need a
chair for medical reasons, he has not supported this claim or shown any
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irreparable harm. See dkt. 59. Finally, although Mr. Scuteri contends that there
is no actual security concern posed by the chairs, Defendants have adequately
explained why they did present such concerns as previously configured. Mr.
Scuteri's denial of those explanations is insufficient to warrant the Court
interfering with Defendants' "broad administrative and discretionary authority"
over Putnamville. See Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683.
Regarding Mr. Scuteri's claims about the lighting, the Court acknowledges
that excessive illumination within a prison may in some cases support an Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. See Vasquez v. Frank, 209 F.
App'x 538 (7th Cir. 2006). There are, however, legitimate penological purposes
for having adequate lighting within prisons for security purposes. See, e.g.,
Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013). And again, this
preliminary injunction motion was based on an alleged change of policy
regarding lighting. Mr. Scuteri does not point to anything in the changed policy
that has had or will have a negative impact on the lighting situation within
Putnamville.
Furthermore, it is possible there could be disputed issues of fact with
respect to the lighting situation. But a dispute of fact is not enough to warrant
the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Rather, Mr. Scuteri bears
the burden of showing entitlement to a preliminary injunction. There is no
evidence, for instance, of what an adequate level of lighting would be and still be
consistent with a prison's security needs. Mr. Scuteri suggests, in part, that
interior lighting could be turned off during the daytime. But it is unclear that
11
daytime exterior light alone would be sufficient for safety and security purposes
within the confines of prison walls.
In sum, Mr. Scuteri's evidence and allegations do not show a likelihood of
success on the merits.
Nor has he shown irreparable harm.
Not only were
there virtually no "new" rules, there is no evidence of actual or imminent rioting
because of them. Even accepting as true that a reduction in or moving of chairs
and alleged overuse of indoor lighting may cause some discomfort to Mr. Scuteri,
there also is no indication that such harms would be likely to cause severe injury
or death. Some level of discomfort is a fact of prison life that does not necessarily
give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, particularly one that must be addressed
through a preliminary injunction. On balance, and giving necessary due
deference to prison officials with respect to matters of safety and security, Mr.
Scuteri has not met his burden of showing he is entitled to emergency injunctive
relief.
III. Dismissal of Case
On October 24, 2024, the Court issued an order to show cause directing
Mr. Scuteri to respond by November 15, 2024, and either explain why this case
should not be dismissed as duplicative of Scuteri v. Indiana Department of
Corrections et al., 2:24-cv-00316-JPH-MKK, or to voluntarily dismiss this case.
Dkt. 41. On October 30, Mr. Scuteri responded by stating in part, "I agree with
the Court, having 2 of the EXACT same cases is nonsensical. . . . So please
consolidate these 2 cases or remove the one." Dkt. 51. In accordance with the
Court's previous order and Mr. Scuteri's response thereto, the Court now directs
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that this action be dismissed without prejudice as duplicative of 2:24-cv00316-JPH-MKK. Final judgment will issue by separate order.
IV. Conclusion
Defendants' motion to supplement is GRANTED. Dkt. [75]. Mr. Scuteri's
motions to strike are DENIED. Dkts. [70] and [71]. Mr. Scuteri's motions for
emergency injunctive relief, dkts. [44] and [58], are DENIED for the reasons
above. This case is now also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as duplicative
for the reasons above. The pending motions at dkts. [13], [14], [15], [47], [51],
and [55], are terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/29/2025
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
MICHAEL SCUTERI
286882
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
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