BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION v. INTERTAPE POLYMER CORPORATION

Filing 206

ORDER denying 183 Sealed Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr., on 3/3/2014. (NRN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION,

)
)
Plaintiff and
)
Counter Defendant, )
)
v.
)
)
INTERTAPE POLYMER CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant and
)
Counter Claimant. )

3:10-cv-76-RLY-WGH

ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
COMPEL TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS
This matter is before the Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff Berry Plastics
Corporation’s Motion to Compel Testimony and Documents (Filing No. 183) and
Chief Judge Young’s Order of Reference of December 19, 2013. The motion is
fully briefed. (Filing No. 184; Filing No. 190; Filing No. 192.) The Magistrate
Judge, having considered the motion, the parties’ filings, and relevant law, and
being duly advised, hereby DENIES Berry’s motion.
I.

Introduction
At the outset, the Magistrate Judge wishes to emphasize the scope of this

Entry. Berry asks the Court to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege to compel Intertape to produce documents and
testimony it has withheld as privileged. This raises a question regarding the
scope of discovery—and nothing more.

Berry offers numerous allegations and offered extensive evidence
suggesting Intertape engaged in inequitable conduct or defrauded the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Intertape responds with
numerous defenses and extensive evidence suggesting its dealings with the
USPTO were lawful and forthright. For the Magistrate Judge to determine
whose account is truthful or whose evidence is most compelling would exceed
his authority in this action and would be improper at this stage in the
litigation. Whether Intertape has perpetrated a fraud upon the USPTO is one of
the ultimate issues in the action and will be decided at trial before Chief Judge
Young. (Filing No. 1 at ¶¶ 38–39, 45, 47.) Here, the Magistrate may consider
only whether the parties’ respective showings merit imposition of the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege during the discovery phase of
the litigation.
II.

Legal Standard
A party to litigation is entitled to discover from his adversary “any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Where federal law decides the case, federal common law
determines the existence and applicability of any evidentiary privilege. Fed. R.
Evid. 501; see also United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 814 (7th
Cir. 2007).
Federal common law protects from discovery communications between
attorneys and their clients, but the privilege is negated where the

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communications are made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. United States v.
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1983). When courts apply the attorney-client
privilege, they compromise their truth-seeking mission in deference to the
principle that justice is better served by ensuring free and frank discussions
between attorneys and clients. Id. at 562. Because neither interest is promoted
where a client seeks (or an attorney offers) advice to facilitate the perpetration
of a crime or fraud, the privilege does not reach such communications. Id. at
562–63.
The parties agree that Federal Circuit precedent controls application of
the crime-fraud exception in patent cases like this one. (See Filing No. 184 at
ECF p. 9 and Filing No. 190 at ECF p. 6 (both applying Unigene Labs., Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).) To pierce the attorney-client
privilege, Berry must present a prima facie showing that Intertape has engaged
in common-law fraud. E.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800,
807 (Fed. Cir. 2000). To prevail, Berry must offer evidence demonstrating that:
1) Intertape made a false representation as to a material fact;
2) Intertape made its false representation with intent to deceive;
3) the USPTO justifiably relied upon Intertape’s false
representation; and
4) the USPTO suffered an injury as a consequence of its reliance
on Intertape’s false representation.
Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 1141 F.3d 1059, 1069–70
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).

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Piercing the attorney-client privilege is an “extreme remedy.” Unigene,
655 F.3d at 1359. Allegations and evidence of mere inequitable conduct are
insufficient. E.g., Spalding, 203 F.3d at 807. Berry must present evidence that
gives color to its allegations of fraud and justifies the Court in demanding an
explanation from Intertape. E.g., Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Crimson AV LLC, No. 11
C 11768, 2013 WL 605006 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing BDO, 492 F.3d
at 818) (patent case). If the Court finds Intertape’s explanation satisfactory, it
must leave the privilege in tact. Id.
III.

Discussion
The Magistrate Judge finds that Berry has not presented the lofty

showing necessary to overcome Intertape’s responses and pierce the attorneyclient privilege. The facts concerning fraud are strongly contested. Simply put,
the Magistrate finds Intertape’s explanations plausible enough to avoid the
harsh remedy imposed by the crime-fraud exception. Specifically, the
Magistrate notes:
Berry alleges broadly that Entex invented the substance of the ’416
patent and that Intertape therefore defrauded the USPTO by claiming to
be its original inventor. (Filing No. 184 at ECF pp. 16–17, 22–23.) In
response, Intertape explains that the ’416 patent covers a process for
compounding adhesives and that Entex has invented only machinery
that could be used to effectuate that process. (Filing No. 190 at ECF pp.
9–10.) The Magistrate Judge finds Intertape’s explanation sufficient to
maintain its claim of privilege at this stage.
Berry alleges that Intertape defrauded the USPTO by failing to disclose
Entex’s contributions—including prior art, literature, and photographs—
to its compounding process. (Filing No. 184 at ECF p. 17–18.) In
response, Intertape raises questions about the extent and materiality of
Entex’s contributions and the sufficiency of its disclosures to the USPTO.
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(Filing No. 190 at ECF pp. 10–16.) The Magistrate Judge finds too many
unresolved questions to allow invocation of the crime-fraud exception.
Similarly, Berry accuses Intertape of defrauding the USPTO by failing to
disclose certain written communications from Entex during and after the
patent application process. (Filing No. 184 at ECF pp. 18–19.) In
response, Intertape raises serious questions as to the nature of those
communications and the existence and scope of any duty to report them.
(Filing No. 190 at ECF pp. 16–18.) Again, the Magistrate Judge finds that
Intertape has raised sufficient questions of law and fact to maintain its
claim of privilege.
Finally, Berry finds fraud in Intertape’s efforts to distinguish its
compounding process from others preceding it. (Filing No. 184 at ECF
pp. 19–21, 23–24, 25–27.) In response, Intertape offers facially
reasonable explanations of their differences and raises serious questions
about whether arguments to distinguish patented processes can
constitute fraud. (Filing No. 190 at ECF pp. 18–23.) At this stage, the
Magistrate Judge can conclude only that Intertape has offered plausible
explanations of good faith efforts to distinguish its process, and those
explanations suffice to maintain its claim of privilege.
Berry has assembled arguments and marshalled evidence that may prove
inequitable conduct—and possibly even fraud—at trial. Coupled with
Intertape’s responses, however, the Magistrate Judge cannot find that Berry
has demonstrated fraud to the extent necessary to justify piercing Intertape’s
attorney-client privilege.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Magistrate Judge DENIES Berry’s

Motion to Compel.
SO ORDERED the 3rd day of March, 2014.
__________________________
William G. Hussmann, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Served electronically on all ECF-registered counsel of record.
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