OUTLAW v. REGIS HAIR SALON
Filing
79
ORDER granting Defendant Regis's 62 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment shall now issue. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 2/08/2013. (copy mailed) (TMD) Modified on 2/11/2013 (TMD).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
BRIDGETT OUTLAW,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
REGIS CORPORATION,
Defendant.
3:11-cv-138-RLY-WGH
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Bridgett Outlaw, filed a Complaint against her former employer, Regis
Corporation, alleging that Regis’s termination of her employment constituted
discrimination on the bases of race and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Regis now
moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability. For the reasons set forth below,
the Motion is GRANTED.
I.
Factual Background and Procedural History1
Outlaw, an African-American, was first hired by Regis during the 1990’s as
a hair stylist. (Deposition of Bridgett Outlaw (“Outlaw Dep.”) at 24-25). The
salon where Outlaw worked was located in Washington Square Mall in Evansville.
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Outlaw submitted documents and letters in opposition to the Motion, however, notwithstanding
the notice given by Defendant (Docket # 65), none of the tendered items are in the form of an
affidavit or declaration in compliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). As a result, the court has
only considered Outlaw’s statements in her deposition testimony provided to the court in
determining the material facts.
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(Id. at 24). Outlaw worked at the Washington Square Regis for approximately three
years, but was terminated after a salon manager had to re-do a haircut Outlaw had
performed on a customer. (Outlaw Dep. at 27-30).
On or about October 16, 2007, Outlaw began working for the Regis Hair Salon
located in the Eastland Mall in Evansville (“Eastland Regis”) as a full-time stylist.
(Affidavit of Jane Schenk (“Schenk Aff.”) ¶ 7). The Eastland Regis is a retail
establishment and full-service salon that is owned and operated by Regis Corporation.
(Schenk Aff. ¶ 2). At the time Schenk hired Outlaw, she was unaware that Outlaw had
been fired from the Washington Square Regis. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 5-6).
Throughout the time Outlaw, a self-identified Christian, was employed at the
Eastland Regis, she kept a Bible at her workstation. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 8; Outlaw Dep. at
165-166). Schenk never expressed disapproval of this, nor did she tell Outlaw that
Outlaw could not keep a Bible there. (Id.).
On December 30, 2010, Outlaw received a written warning from Schenk for poor
technical skills after a customer called the salon and complained that Plaintiff had not
layered her hair as requested. (Schenk Aff. ¶¶ 9-10; Outlaw Dep. at 100). Schenk stated
in the written warning that if Eastland Regis received any more customer complaints,
Outlaw would be terminated. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 10; Defendant’s Ex. 2). Outlaw signed and
dated the written warning. (Id.). One month later, on February 5, 2011, Eastland Regis
received another complaint from a customer that her hair was “fried” and her scalp was
sore from Outlaw coloring her hair. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 11). Instead of terminating Outlaw,
Schenk issued a final written warning. (Defendant’s Ex. 3). The final written warning
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stated that Outlaw was receiving the warning due to her unsatisfactory technical skills
and because she stole a customer from another stylist. (Id.). Like the previous warning,
this stated that “if this happens again, you (Outlaw) will be terminated.” (Id.). Outlaw
signed and dated the warning. (Defendant’s Ex. 3).
On February 19, 2011, Outlaw performed another unsatisfactory haircut on a
customer, and cut two of her family members’ hair for free, contravening company
policy. (Schenk Aff. ¶¶ 13-15).2 Schenk prepared a termination form, delivered it to
Outlaw on February 20, 2011, and terminated her that day. (Schenk Aff. ¶¶ 18-19;
Defendant’s Ex. 4).
Outlaw filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC.”) on July 23, 2011, alleging that Regis discriminated against her on the bases of
race and religion. She received her Dismissal and Notice of Rights from the EEOC on
October 27, 2011, and filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana on November 1, 2011.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d
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Outlaw disputes that the company policy was violated [Outlaw Dep. at 129], but does not offer
any supporting documents to contradict Schenk’s affidavit on that point.
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202 (1986). Some alleged factual dispute of material fact will not alone defeat a
summary judgment motion. (Id. at 247-48).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (“Rule 56(c)”) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s case,
and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp v. Cattrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the evidence and draws all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d
1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1996). However, when a summary judgment motion is made and
supported by evidence as provided in Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party may not rest on
mere allegations or denials in its pleadings but “must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
III.
Discussion
A.
Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Claim
Outlaw claims that she was terminated from her job at Eastland Regis
because of her race (African-American). Outlaw pursues this discrimination claim under
the indirect method of proof. To sustain her claim, she must show:(1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) she was meeting Eastland Regis’s legitimate performance
expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated
employees not in the protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). If Outlaw
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establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, Regis must offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Id. The burden then shifts back
to Outlaw to prove that the reason articulated by Regis is pretextual. Lucas v. PyraMax
Bank, FSB, 539 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
Outlaw identifies her adverse employment action as Eastland Regis terminating
her because she is African-American. Outlaw cannot establish that she was meeting
Eastland Regis’s legitimate performance expectations at the time of her termination. As
noted above, in the six weeks leading up to her termination, Outlaw was cited for poor
technical skills on three different occasions. (Defendant’s Ex. 2-4). Outlaw received two
written warnings, warning her that her work did not meet Eastland Regis’s performance
expectations. (Id.).
In addition, Outlaw presents no evidence that similarly situated employees not in
her protected class were treated more favorably. In her Amended Complaint, she claims
that white stylists and African-American stylists were not held to the same technical
standards because white stylists were not required to take ethnic classes to keep their
jobs. She also claims that some white employees with less seniority were given more
lucrative jobs even though they were right out of beauty school. However, Outlaw has
not identified another stylist outside her protected class who demonstrated poor technical
skills several times and was not terminated. She also does not identify any company
rules or protocol that required her to take classes white stylists were not required to take.
The evidence presented by Regis leads the court to conclude that Outlaw was terminated
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because of her poor technical skills, not because she is African-American. (Schenk Aff. ¶
18).
The court need not reach the issue of pretext, as Outlaw has failed to state a prima
facie case of discriminatory discharge under McDonnell Douglas. Cowan v. Glenbrook
Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 348, 445 (7th Cir. 1997). Regis’s motion for summary
judgment on Outlaw’s race discrimination claim is therefore GRANTED.
B.
Plaintiff’s Religion Discrimination Claim
Outlaw contends that she was terminated from the Eastland Regis because
of her religion (Christianity) and because she kept a Bible on top of her workstation.
(Outlaw Dep. at 165-166). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fire an
employee solely on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The statute defines
“religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). To defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff
can proceed under either the “direct” or “indirect” method of proof. Porter v. City of
Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the direct method of proof, the
method under which Outlaw proceeds, a plaintiff must show, by way of direct or
circumstantial evidence, that her employer’s decision to take the adverse employment
action against her was motivated by an impermissible purpose, such as religion. Rhodes
v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff can also prevail
under the direct method of proof by constructing a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial
evidence that “allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker”.
Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994). The circumstantial
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evidence, however, “must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s
action.” Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003).
The undisputed facts of this case indicate that Outlaw was subjected to an adverse
employment action when she was terminated from the Eastland Regis on February 20,
2011. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 19; Outlaw Dep. at 133-134). Outlaw presents no evidence that
Schenk’s decision to terminate Outlaw was motivated by her keeping a Bible on her
workstation. Outlaw admitted that no one ever told her that they did not want her to have
a Bible on her workstation. (Outlaw Dep. at 166). Outlaw has provided no additional
evidence that any of her co-workers or Schenk ever made any type of comments that
would indicate her Bible was the reason for her termination.
Outlaw also claims that she was terminated because of her Christian beliefs, and
contends that on the day she was terminated, the District Manager Katie Joyner told her,
“I know you are a Christian. I know you want to do the right thing. It would be good for
you if you just left….” (Outlaw Dep. at 135). Outlaw alleges that Joyner was later
terminated by Regis for her statements to Outlaw. (Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 67). Regis states Joyner retired from the company, and Outlaw has provided no evidence
that Joyner was actually terminated.
Evidence of discriminatory motives must have some relationship with the
employment decision in question. Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d
563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989). However, inappropriate but isolated comments that amount to
no more than “stray remarks” in the workplace will not do. Id. Schenk was the manager
who determined Outlaw should be terminated, and there is no evidence that Schenk spoke
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to Joyner about terminating Outlaw. (Schenk Aff. ¶ 18-19). Furthermore, Outlaw only
requested to speak to Joyner after she had been terminated. Id.
For the reasons set forth above, Outlaw fails to establish a prima facie case, and
her religious discrimination claim fails as a matter of law. Regis’s motion for summary
judgment on Outlaw’s religious discrimination claim is therefore GRANTED.
IV.
Materials Supplied After Defendant’s Reply in Support of Summary
Judgment (Docket # 67)
Pursuant to Southern District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1(d) (“Local Rule56-
1(d)”), a party opposing a summary judgment motion may file a surreply brief only if the
movant cites new evidence in the reply or objects to the admissibility of the evidence
cited in the response. S.D. IND. L. R. 56-1(d). The surreply must be filed within seven
(7) days after movant serves the reply and must be limited to the new evidence and
objections. Id. Regis did not cite new evidence in its reply, and did not object to the
admissibility of the evidence in the response. Therefore, the materials submitted by
Outlaw after Regis’s Reply Brief were not considered in ruling on this motion.
However, one document filed by Outlaw needs some comment. That
document, a second EEOC charge of discrimination filed by Outlaw on October 9, 2012,
does not allege that the termination by Regis, which is the subject of this lawsuit, was
retaliatory. (Docket # 70). Rather, that charge alleges that after this termination, Regis
retaliated against Outlaw by failing to rehire her on other occasions. The facts in the
newly filed charge implicate other time periods and other decision makers, not from the
same core of operative facts in this case. To the extent a rehire claim does arise from this
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charge, Outlaw may file a new complaint. The court advises Outlaw to seek counsel so
that any future filing of a new complaint is done in a timely manner.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Regis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #
62) is GRANTED. A separate final judgment in favor of Defendant shall issue
forthwith.
SO ORDERED this 8th day of February 2013.
______________________________________
__________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
Distributed by U.S. Mail:
Bridgett Outlaw
1922 West Indiana
Apt. B
Evansville, IN 47712
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