RLI CORP. v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.
Filing
44
OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 4/26/2012. (gxh) [Transferred from New Jersey on 4/26/2012.]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RLI CORP.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM,
INC.,
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-2161 (MLC)
O P I N I O N
THE PLAINTIFF, RLI Corp. (“RLI”), brings this action as
subrogee for its insured, AmerisourceBergen Corporation (“ABC”), and
against the defendant, FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. (“FedEx”).
(See generally dkt. entry no. 20, Second Am. Compl.)
RLI’s claims
are governed by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, et seq.
See 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1).
THE COURT earlier ordered the parties to show cause why the
action should not be transferred to either the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana or the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
entry no. 41, Order & Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”).)
each filed timely responses to the OTSC.
(Dkt.
The parties
(Dkt. entry no. 42, FedEx
Response to OTSC; dkt. entry no. 43, RLI Response to OTSC.)
The
Court now resolves the OTSC without oral argument, pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 78.1(b).
RLI alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that FedEx, acting
on instruction from Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (“BMSC”) employees in
Plainsboro, New Jersey, accepted two pharmaceutical shipments from
BMSC’s facility in Mount Vernon, Indiana, each destined for ABC’s
facility in Paducah, Kentucky.
(Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 3, 9, 21.)
Although FedEx accepted each shipment in “good order, quantity, and
condition”, both shipments appeared upon arrival at ABC’s Paducah,
Kentucky facility “to be damaged and/or in an unsound condition due
to broken and torn boxes as a result of rough handling”.
¶¶ 10-11, 22-23.)
(Id. at
ABC thus rejected both shipments, and FedEx
returned them to the BMSC facility in Mount Vernon, where they were
deemed unfit for human consumption and destroyed.
(Id. at ¶¶ 11-13,
23-25.)
THE COURT notes that an action filed pursuant to the Carmack
Amendment may be brought in a United States District Court in a
judicial district: (1) through which the defendant motor carrier
operates, if the defendant motor carrier is the “delivering
carrier”; or (2) where the loss or damage at issue occurred, if the
defendant motor carrier is the “carrier responsible for loss”.
U.S.C. § 14706(d)(1)-(2).
49
RLI here alleges that FedEx is both the
delivering carrier and the carrier responsible for loss.
generally Second Am. Compl.)
(See
Venue in this case is thus appropriate
in both of the judicial districts where damage to the pharmaceutical
shipments at issue may have occurred, i.e., the Southern District of
2
Indiana, which serves Mount Vernon, Indiana, and the Western
District of Kentucky, which serves Paducah, Kentucky.
See 49 U.S.C.
§ 14706(d)(2); Donaldson Tech. Grp. LLC v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.,
347 F.Supp.2d 525, 527 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (venue appropriate in
Carmack Amendment case in judicial district along carrier’s route,
where damage to shipment may have occurred).
Venue is also
technically appropriate in any judicial district where FedEx
operates, such as the District of New Jersey.
14706(d)(1).
See 49 U.S.C. §
(See also Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 2; dkt. entry no. 43-
1, Barrow Cert. at ¶¶ 3-9 (detailing extent of FedEx’s New Jersey
operations).)
THE COURT further notes, however, that district courts have
“broad discretion to determine, on an individualized, case-by-case
basis, whether convenience and fairness considerations weigh in
favor of transfer” of venue.
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d
873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing district court powers under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“Section 1404(a)”)).
District courts may, “[f]or
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interests
of justice . . . transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.”
see Jumara, 55 F.3d at 875, 877 n.3, 883.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a);
When determining whether
to transfer venue, the Court should consider, inter alia, the
plaintiff’s original choice of venue, the defendant’s preference (if
any), whether the claim arose elsewhere, the convenience of the
3
parties, the extent to which witnesses may be unavailable for trial,
the location of books and records, and “the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home”.
Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
THE COURT, upon consideration of the Jumara factors, concludes
that the action would have been more properly brought in the
Southern District of Indiana.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Court gives little weight to RLI’s choice of forum because RLI is
not a citizen of the forum state.
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981); Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc.,
529 F.3d 183, 190 (2008); see also Hoffer v. InfoSpace.com, Inc.,
102 F.Supp.2d 556, 573 (D.N.J. 2000) (“The choice of forum by a
plaintiff is simply a preference; it is not a right.”).
The Court
also gives little weight to RLI’s choice of forum because it appears
that RLI’s claims arose elsewhere, i.e., in either Indiana or
Kentucky, along FedEx’s route.
See Nat’l Prop. Investors VIII v.
Shell Oil Co., 917 F.Supp. 324, 327 (D.N.J. 1995) (stating that
plaintiff’s venue choice is entitled to less deference “when the
central facts of a lawsuit occur outside of the chosen forum”). (See
also id. at ¶¶ 10-13, 22-25.)1
1
RLI has not produced any evidence to support its contention
that the issues remaining for trial center on a contract negotiated
and signed in New Jersey. (Compare RLI Response to OTSC at 4-5
(citing Second Am. Compl.) with FedEx Response to OTSC at 3 (noting
that it is “not clear . . . if New Jersey is where those policies
were created”).) The Court thus notes but, as detailed above,
gives little weight to RLI’s preference.
4
THE COURT believes that the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana will have a greater interest in
deciding the controversy between these parties.
That court serves
Mount Vernon, Indiana; that judicial district encompasses the area
where the shipments at issue originated and, ultimately, were
deemed unfit for human consumption and destroyed.
9-13, 21-25.)
(Id. at ¶¶ 3,
BMSC’s Indiana employees who may testify at trial
likely reside in or near that judicial district, and evidence
located in BMSC’s Indiana facility is located in that judicial
district.
(See FedEx Response to OTSC at 4.)
RLI argues that other witnesses would be inconvenienced by a
transfer of venue to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana.
(RLI Response to OTSC at 4-5.)
RLI
has, however, only generally referenced witnesses who work either at
BMSC’s New York headquarters or FedEx’s Pennsylvania headquarters.
Because RLI has failed to demonstrate how or why such witnesses
would be unavailable for trial, the Court need not consider such
inconvenience.
See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (noting that courts have
considered “the convenience of the witnesses-but only to the extent
that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of
the fora”).
FedEx has identified one witness who resides in New
Jersey, Todd May, but notes that May has been deposed.
Response to OTSC at 2, 4.)
5
(FedEx
FEDEX prefers that the Court transfer this action to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
Response to OTSC at 5.)
(FedEx
It notes that a plaintiff’s unfettered
choice of forum under 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d)(1), in any forum where a
defendant carrier operates, “could lead to an absurd result,” such
as a carrier being sued in a state that otherwise bears no
connection to the parties or the shipments at issue.
(Id. at 3.)
The Court agrees, and notes that this example demonstrates why the
Court must examine and weigh the Jumara factors.
THE COURT will issue an appropriate order.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date:
April 26, 2012
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?