VONDERHEIDE et al v. GREEN et al
Filing
61
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 50 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 2/10/2015 (copy mailed to plaintiffs). (LBT) (Main Document 61 replaced on 2/10/2015) (LBT).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
KARINA VONDERHEIDE,
JOSHUA MCBRIDE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARK GREEN Officer, Individually and
in His Official Capacity,
INDIANA STATE POLICE,
Defendants.
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3:12-cv-00125-RLY-MJD
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, Karina Vonderheide and Joshua McBride, brought the present action
against Defendants, Mark Green, individually and in his official capacity, and the Indiana
State Police, alleging violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983 claims”) and several related state-law claims. Defendants move for summary
judgment; Plaintiffs have not filed a response. For the reasons set forth below, the court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
I.
Background
On August 17, 2010, a search warrant was executed at Plaintiffs’ residence located
at 8042 South Pine Road, Birdseye, Indiana. (Complaint ¶¶ 12-13). The warrant was
obtained by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). (Probable Cause Affidavit, Filing No. 51-2; Search
Warrant, Filing No. 51-4). Special Agent Chad Foreman of ATF obtained the search
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warrant. (Probable Cause Affidavit, Filing No. 51-2; Search Warrant, Filing No. 51-4).
In his probable cause affidavit, Special Agent Foreman stated that he received
information from Indiana State Police Trooper Phil Luebbers that McBride was in
possession of several firearms. (Filing No. 51-2). The ATF officers collected
information from the Indiana Department of Correction web page that indicated McBride
was convicted of two drug related felonies. (Filing No. 51-2). The ATF agents, who
executed the search warrant, seized numerous firearms, ammunition, and ammunition
materials. (Complaint ¶ 13).
Plaintiffs have brought several claims relating to this incident, including: (1)
violation of constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts
1-8); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts 9-12); (3) respondeat
superior liability (Counts 13-14); and (4) trespass liability (Counts 15-16). Officer Green
and the Indiana State Police move for summary judgment on all counts, alleging
primarily that Officer Green played no role in the obtainment or execution of the search
warrant.
II.
Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof
in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of
material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
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in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
III.
Discussion
A.
Section 1983 Claims
1.
Against Officer Green, in his official capacity, and the Indiana
State Police
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that the Indiana State Police and
Officer Green, in his official capacity, are not “persons” for purposes of Section 1983. In
support, Defendants rely on Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989). In that case, the Supreme Court held that neither “a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. at 71. That case clearly
precludes the present claims. As such, the court grants summary judgment in favor of
Officer Green on any and all claims brought against him in his official capacity under
Section 1983 (Counts 1-2, 5-6). Under the same logic, the court grants summary
judgment in favor of the Indiana State Police for any and all claims brought against the
Indiana State Police under Section 1983 (Counts 3-4, 7-8).
2.
Against Officer Green in his individual capacity
Although Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Officer Green “falsely informed
law enforcement agencies such as the [ATF] that [McBride] was a convicted felon in
possession of firearms and ammunition,” they submit no evidence to support this
allegation. Officer Green, on the other hand, submitted an affidavit stating, “I did not
have anything to do with obtaining the warrant for that search and did not provide any
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information used to obtain the warrant.” (Affidavit of Mark Green (“Green Aff.”) ¶ 5,
Filing No. 51-3). Furthermore, Officer Green stated, “I had nothing to do with execution
of the search warrant.” (Id. at ¶ 6). Additionally, the affidavit of probable cause does not
mention Officer Green as a source of information, but rather an Officer Luebbers. (Filing
No. 51-2).
Officer Green moves for summary judgment because there is no evidence that he
had any personal involvement with obtaining the search warrant or searching the house.
As the Seventh Circuit has held, “[a]n individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action
unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zimmerman
v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000) quoting Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87
F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir.1996). Because the only evidence in the record shows that Officer
Green did not participate in the constitutional violations, the court grants summary
judgment for all constitutional claims under Section 1983 in his favor (Counts 1-2, 5-6).
B.
Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Respondeat
Superior
Both Plaintiffs brought claims against Defendants for intentional infliction of
emotional distress caused by the search of their residence. To prove a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, under Indiana law, a plaintiff must establish
that “the defendant: (1) engages in extreme and outrageous conduct (2) which
intentionally or recklessly (3) causes (4) severe emotional distress.” Lindsey v. DeGroot,
898 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) quoting Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27,
31 (Ind. 1991).
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Again, Plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence in support of this claim. Even
looking at their complaint, the Plaintiffs only allege legal conclusions that they suffered
severe emotional distress. Furthermore, Officer Green could not have possessed the
intent to harm the Plaintiffs when he played no role in obtaining or executing the search
warrant. Likewise the claims of respondeat superior against the Indiana State Police must
fail as they are predicated on the alleged acts of Officer Green. As such, the court finds
that Plaintiffs have failed to show an issue of fact precluding summary judgment; the
court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and respondeat superior (Counts 9-14).
C.
Claims for Trespass
Plaintiffs also bring claims of trespass against Officer Green and the Indiana State
Police for interrupting the Plaintiffs’ quiet use and enjoyment of their property. For a
claim of trespass, a plaintiff must establish: (1) “he possessed the land when the alleged
trespass occurred,” and (2) “the trespassing defendant entered the land without a legal
right to do so.” KB Home Indiana Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 308
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds. First,
Defendants did not enter onto Plaintiffs’ property, and second, even if they had, they had
the right to be there to execute a search warrant. Because the only evidence before the
court shows that Officer Green and the Indiana State Police did not enter onto Plaintiff’s
property, there is no claim for trespass. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment in
favor of Defendants for all claims of trespass (Counts 15-16).
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IV.
Conclusion
Having reviewed the evidence, the court finds that there are no questions of
material fact and all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. Therefore, the court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 50).
SO ORDERED this 10th day of February 2015.
_________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record and
mailed to:
Karina Vonderheide
5178 West County Road 150 North
Petersburg, IN 47567
Joshua McBride
8042 South State Road 145
Birdseye, IN 47513
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