BRADFIELD v. MEETINGS & EVENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC
Filing
75
ORDER GRANTING 28 MEI's Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Bradfield's original Complaint of Age Discrimination, filed on June 23, 2014; DENYING 54 MEI's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's Amended C omplaint, filed on November 07, 2014; and DENYING 57 Ms. Bradfield's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed on December 15, 2014. The case shall proceed accordingly. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 3/31/2015. (NRN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SUEZANNE BRADFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEETINGS & EVENTS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
3:13-cv-00121-SEB-WGH
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF AGE DISCRIMATION AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO RETALIATION
Plaintiff, Suezanne Bradfield, (“Ms. Bradfield”) has brought this action against her
former employer, Defendant, Meetings & Events International, Inc. (“MEI”), alleging that
MEI discriminated against her and later retaliated against her, in violation of the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act (AADEA@), 29 U.S.C. '' 621 et seq.
This cause is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment:
[Dkt. No. 1.]
MEI’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on Ms. Bradfield’s original Complaint of Age Discrimination, filed
on June 23, 2014 [Dkt. nos. 28, 29]; MEI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count
II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed on November 07, 2014 [Dkt. nos. 54, 55]; and
Ms. Bradfield’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of her Amended
Complaint, filed on December 15, 2014 [Dkt. no. 57].
BACKGROUND
Ms. Bradfield, was employed by MEI as a clerk and coordinator in 1995 to assist
MEI in its event planning business.
MEI, which primarily serves the pharmaceutical
industry and medical field, has offices employing approximately 90 individuals in
Evansville, Indiana as well as approximately 30 employees based in Chicago, Illinois.
Within three months of being hired, Ms. Bradfield was transferred to the accounting
department where she stayed throughout the duration of her employment. Thirteen years
later, in December 2008, MEI’s owner and CEO, Teresa Hall-Lima (“Ms. Hall-Lima”),
transferred Ms. Bradfield to the position of Assistant Vice President of Financial Services
(Hall-Lima Dep. at 80-81).
Ms. Bradfield was sixty-one (61) years of age at the time of her termination of
employment (Bradfield Dep. at 4) and she had worked continuously for MEI for more than
seventeen years when she was discharged in 2012. MEI claims that the discharge was
pursuant to a reduction in force (RIF) in which several employees of varying ages were
terminated as part of a plan to decrease expenses and thereby increase net income for the
company.
MEI references various measures it undertook in early 2012 to decrease
expenses, including the deferral of facility lease payments and the elimination of base
salary payments for three of its highest-earning employees. However, MEI asserts, these
measures were insufficient to accomplish the necessary cutbacks, requiring the company
2
to further reduce the staff salaries in order to remain profitable in fiscal year 2012, (the
fiscal year mirrors the calendar year.)
Ms. Bradfield claims that MEI’s decision to terminate her employment was based
on her age and as such, that decision to let her go was discriminatory.
Her responsibilities
leading up to and following her termination were transferred to substantially younger staff,
which created a mini-RIF.
MEI CEO Ms. Hall-Lima in her May 19, 2014 deposition
explained that Plaintiff was not returned to work though many other employees had also
been terminated in July 2012 were, which Ms. Bradfield cites as evidence of retaliation
after not being rehired following the filing of this lawsuit.
The facts that follow are recounted in the light most favorable to the respective
non-movant. Additional relevant facts round out the Analysis below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 27, 2012, Ms. Bradfield filed her first Charge of Discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for age discrimination, for which
she received a notice of right to sue MEI, allowing her to timely file a Complaint [Dkt. No.
1] on May 22, 2013, against MEI for age discrimination.
On May 19, 2014, MEI owner
and CEO, Ms. Hall-Lima, was deposed regarding the pending lawsuit.
Ms. Bradfield then
filed an Amended Complaint on August 12, 2014.
Presently before the Court are several motions:
3
MEI’s original Motion for
Summary Judgment directed towards Ms. Bradfield’s original Complaint of Age
Discrimination, [Dkt. nos. 28, 29]; MEI’s subsequent Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which was filed after Ms.
Bradfield amended her Complaint to include a retaliation charge.
[Dkt. Nos. 54, 55].
Ms. Bradfield’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint pertains solely to her retaliation claim.
[Dkt. No. 57].
LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
I.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record establishes that there is Ano
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.@
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). Disputes concerning material facts are deemed genuine where the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of
material fact exist, the Court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Id. at 255.
However, neither the Amere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties,@
id. at 247, nor the existence of Asome metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,@
4
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), will defeat a
motion for summary judgment.
Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d
687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
The moving party Abears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of (the record) which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.@ Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the non-moving party bears the
burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party's case.
Id. at 325.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for
resolving factual disputes.
1994).
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.
Thus, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the
non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party
opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate.
(See Shields Enter., Inc. v.
First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870
F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989)). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy
the legal requirements necessary to establish his case, summary judgment is not only
appropriate, but mandated.
(See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324
F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Further, a failure to prove one essential element
Anecessarily renders all other facts immaterial.@
5
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
As is the case with regard to the retaliation claim addressed below, courts often
confront cross-motions for summary judgment because Rules 56 (a) and (b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow both plaintiffs and defendants to move for such relief. (See
also Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 671 (7th
Cir.2011)).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not automatically mean that all
questions of material fact have been resolved.” Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. v. Huskey, 666
F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 842 (7th
Cir.2004)). The Court must evaluate each motion independently, making all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party with respect to each motion.
Williamson v.
Ind. Univ., 345 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.2003).
Thus, in determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist in this
case, we have considered the parties= respective memoranda and the exhibits attached
thereto, and have construed all facts and drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the respective non-movant.
A.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574.
Age Discrimination Claim:
Ms. Bradfield claims that she was discharged from her employment with MEI due
to her advanced age (61 years).
The ADEA prohibits employers from, among other
things, “discharg(ing) any individual ... because of such individual's age.”
Van Antwerp
v. City of Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
6
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff in a discrimination case
need not “produce the equivalent of an admission of guilt by the defendant.”
May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.1994).
Troupe v.
Instead, to establish a violation
of the ADEA, an employee must show that age “played a role in the employer's decisionmaking process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”
Id. (citing Schuster
v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir.2003)). An employee may make this
showing using either the direct or indirect method of proof.
Id.
Ms. Bradfield does not claim to have direct evidence of discrimination by MEI.
Instead, she has elected to proceed under the familiar indirect method set forth in
McDonnell Douglas.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
This method requires Ms. Bradfield to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that: (1) she is a member of the protected class; (2) she was performing well
enough to meet her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated, substantially younger employees were
treated more favorably.
Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 627 F.3d
596, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d
1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Ms. Bradfield supports her prima facie showing of age-related discrimination by
noting that, at the age of 61 years at the time of the reduction in force (RIF), she was a
member of a protected class.
[Dkt. No. 1].
There is no disagreement between the parties
7
regarding her performance at that time: Ms. Bradfield was meeting MEI’s legitimate
employment expectations. Nor does MEI dispute that Ms. Bradfield suffered an adverse
action—her job loss—as a result of the July 2012 RIF.
However, the parties are in
decided disagreement over the fourth prong of the prima facie elements.
MEI relies upon the traditional RIF analysis to show that Ms. Bradfield was not the
victim of age discrimination, noting that Ms. Bradfield has been unable to “demonstrate
that the remaining employees in her department were similarly situated to her” and that
Ms. Bradfield was unable to “remember a single condition or requirement placed upon her
that was less favorable than those placed upon Ms. Murphy, Ms. Zimmer, or Ms. Rivera
… [nor] remember a single way in which Ms. Murphy, Ms. Zimmer, or Ms. Rivera were
treated more favorably” than she.
Def.’s Brief at 15-16.
MEI further argues “that
simply because a younger employee was retained in a reduction in force while an older
employee was discharged is not enough to create an inference of age discrimination.” Id.
at 14.
MEI suggests that since Ms. Bradfield lacks any evidence that her treatment was
“less favorable than … Ms. Murphy, Ms. Zimmer, or Ms. Rivera,” her claim necessarily
fails. Id.
These facts as cited by MEI are for the most part not relevant, however, since
they do not apply in circumstances where a terminated employee’s responsibilities are
reallocated among remaining staff following a RIF.
As discussed in greater detail below,
Ms. Bradfield has proffered sufficient facts to illustrate that her circumstances were more
akin to a mini-RIF than to a regular RIF.
8
In this case, Ms. Bradfield’s check processing and report writing responsibilities
were transferred to other MEI employees, thereby creating “a ‘mini-RIF,’ where a
discharged employee's duties are absorbed by other existing staff.”
See Bellaver v.
Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493-95 (7th Cir.2000); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221
F.3d 1003, 1011-12 & n. 5 (7th Cir.2000).
In such circumstances, the fourth prong of Ms.
Bradfield's prima facie case is satisfied only if she is able to demonstrate “that her duties
were absorbed by persons not in the protected class.” Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc.,
470 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2006). Ms. Bradfield asks us to view the situation as if her
job were not actually eliminated, but instead her duties were dispersed among retained
employees.
Ms. Bradfield contends that MEI systematically shifted her responsibilities to
younger members of her team. In support of this contention, she describes that in the
months leading up to her termination, she was asked to train younger members of the team,
such as Ms. Murphy, Ms. Zimmer, and Ms. Rivera in processing checks and running fiscal
reports, all functions she had performed during her employment with MEI.
Bradfield
Dep. at 54. Ms. Zimmer, she recalls, did not “know how to make a deposit ticket,” for
example, and had to be shown all of the accounting procedures due to her background in
auditing rather than accounting.
Id. at 66.
By the time of the mini-RIF, Ms. Bradfield
asserts that all of her responsibilities had been transferred to the younger members of the
finance team.
9
In response, MEI notes that “at the time of her termination, Bradfield’s duties were
primarily to print checks using QuickBooks and to perform some operational accounting,”
Def.’s Brief at 10, ¶ 44.
MEI also describes the various qualifications of each of the team
members in order to shed light on why each member was retained over Ms. Bradfield.
Ms. Murphy was forty-five (45) years of age1 at the time of Ms. Bradfield’s termination.
Hall-Lima Dep. at Ex. 1.
MEI maintains that she “was not selected for termination in the
reduction in force because she had the ability to handle Access queries and work in other
databases utilized by MEI.”
Id. at ¶ 51. Ms. Zimmer was in her twenties at the time of
the mini-RIF, and MEI explains that she was not selected for termination “because she was
a licensed CPA who had different responsibilities that Bradfield would not have been able
to assume.” Id. at ¶ 52.
At the time Ms. Bradfield was terminated, Ms. Rivera was twenty-
three (23) years of age; according to MEI, she was not selected for termination in 2012
because she was hired for the Chicago office. Id. at ¶ 53. Ms. Hall-Lima lives in Chicago,
1 While Ms. Murphy was forty-five (45) years of age at the time of the mini-RIF, she is considered
“substantially younger” than Ms. Bradfield under the ADEA and therefore, for the purposes of this
analysis, treated exactly as the other younger members of the fiscal team. Balderston v.
Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Industries, 328 F.3d 309, 321-22 (7th Cir. 2003), as
amended (May 22, 2003) (“In the age discrimination context, the fact that a plaintiff is replaced
by someone ‘substantially younger’ is a reliable indicator of age discrimination.”). “The Seventh
Circuit has defined ‘substantially younger’ as generally ten years younger.” Id.; see also Tubergen
v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 517 F.3d 470, 475 n. 4 (7th Cir.2008). “Under the
ADEA, in the case of younger employees that fall above the age of forty, the age difference must
be ten years or greater in order to be presumptively substantial.”
Martino v. MCI
Communications Services., Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Wells v. EMF Corp.,
757 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
10
and MEI reports that the financial operations were being moved to the Chicago office so
Mr. McDowell could oversee those staff members in person. Id.
MEI contends that “Ms.
Rivera was able to perform the same operational accounting that Bradfield performed, but
because she was located in Chicago, it was more appropriate that she perform the
operational accounting than Bradfield.” Id.
All of these facts may be persuasive in the context of a RIF; however, a mini-RIF
analysis places less importance on the comparability of similarly-situated employees, their
performance or supervisors, and more importance on whether portions of their work were
in fact absorbed instead of eliminated.
Thus, MEI’s reasoning tends to support, rather
than to discredit, Ms. Bradfield’s assertions that she trained the staff who ultimately
assumed her check processing and operational accounting functions.
These facts considered in a light most favorable to Ms. Bradfield satisfy the
elements of her prima facie case for age discrimination. The burden thus shifts to MEI to
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Bradfield’s termination. Everroad v.
Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2010).
MEI contends that the staff changes were attributable entirely to significant financial
challenges that MEI began to experience in 2012 in part due to the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010, which caused waves of uncertainty
and turmoil within the medical provider and pharmaceutical industries that MEI serves.
Def.’s Br. at 17.
The uncertainties regarding the scheduling of future meetings and
11
training programs and the financial support from pharmaceutical companies for medical
provider education and entertainment, which comprised MEI’s main source of revenue,
created sufficient concerns that MEI was motivated to undertake cost-saving measures
beginning around late February and early March 2012.
Among the cost-saving measures was the discontinued salary draws by the three
family members employed by the corporation: Ms. Hall-Lima, CEO, her sister, and her
husband, Mr. Michael Lima. Hall-Lima Dep. at 46.
The company’s only maintenance
worker, Mr. Josef Senger, was discharged also as a way to reduce costs.
Id. at 53-54.
And the rent owed to the holding company, which leased the office facility to MEI, was
deferred to a later date by mutual agreement.
Id. at 46.
MEI submits that Ms. Hall-
Lima’s review of the March 2012 fiscal report convinced her that additional cost saving
measures might be needed.
Id. at 48-51. When in June 2012 the company’s financial
situation showed a $240,000 cumulative loss, MEI’s corporate leadership decided it needed
to further reduce salary costs by eliminating staff.
Def.’s Br. at 17.
This cumulative loss
was higher than that experienced in 2011 ($77,000 loss); in 2010, the company, by contrast,
had earned a profit by the same point in the fiscal year ($400,000 profit).
Id.
Two other factors are cited by MEI as drivers of the reduction in staff:
First, MEI
had entered into a new relationship with a bank which managed its line of credit, which
was “critical for MEI’s ongoing operations.”
Id.
Second, there was an actual decline in
the “number of purchase orders by the end of April, 2012, and (MEI) had forecast an
12
expected decline of nearly thirty-five percent (35%) of its revenues over the prior calendar
year.” Id.
The drop in purchase orders, MEI argues, was the “canary in the mine” in
signaling the anticipated drop in revenues later in the fiscal year.
Id.
MEI argues that it faced a serious crisis in needing to reduce its expenses and the
resultant personnel decisions were a legitimate way of accomplishing that goal. We agree
that these stated financial reasons provide a legitimate reason for the reductions in staff.
Therefore, MEI has succeeded in proffering a nondiscriminatory basis for its personnel
actions, including Ms. Bradfield’s termination.
To prevail on her age discrimination
claim, Ms. Bradford must now attempt to demonstrate that the reasons offered by the MEI
were in fact pretextual.
Everroad, 604 F.3d 471; (see also Egonmwan v. Cook County
Sheriff's Dep't, 602 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir.2010)).
In order to demonstrate pretext, Ms. Bradfield must show that MEI’s reasons were
false and that it did not actually believe its own stated reasons for terminating her.
Everroad, 604 F.3d at 477 (citing Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.
2008)). That is to say, Ms. Bradfield must be able to establish that even MEI did not
believe its own stated reasons, or, alternately, that a reasonable jury could conclude that
the reasons cited by the Defendant were dishonest and the true underlying reasons were
“based on prohibited discriminatory animus.” Benuzzi v. Board of Education of the City
of Chicago, et. al., 647 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McJowan v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d
575 (7th Cir. 2000)). To this end, Ms. Bradfield’s evidence must establish that either: (1)
13
the proffered reasons are not founded in fact; (2) the reasons provided by the defendant did
not actually motivate the Defendant’s personnel actions; or (3) the reasons provided are
insufficient to motivate the actions. Id.
Ms. Bradfield’s claim of pretext is based on her contention that the mini-RIF was
simply a ruse to eliminate older staff, and that MEI’s reasons for the mini-RIF were not
founded in fact or were insufficient, taken as a whole, to merit the termination of multiple
staff members. Ms. Bradfield outlines seven areas where MEI has shown that its fiscal
reasons for the reduction in employees are unworthy of credence.
Pl.’s Resp. at 11.
To illustrate the disingenuousness of Defendant’s fiscal argument, Ms. Bradfield
first notes that there were employees who were discharged prior to the time when MEI
claims to have started its discussions about the need to reduce staffing levels, beginning in
June 2012.
Id.
She identifies the following employees whom MEI terminated in 2012:
“(1) Josef Senger, age 572, terminated on February 20, 2012; (2) Kathy Sutton, age 59,
terminated on February 20, 2012; (3) Erik Hanson, age 48, terminated on May 30, 2012;
(4) Jacob Harris, age 28, terminated on June 14, 2012; (5) Sarah Goines, age 37, terminated
on July 26, 2012; (6) Michele Hobbs, age 41, terminated on July 26, 2012; (7) Amber
Reuter, age 27, terminated on July 26, 2012; (8) Linda Cross, age 60, terminated on July
26, 2012; (9) James Rustman, age unknown, terminated on July 26, 2012; (10) herself—
2 The ages listed for each terminated individual are based on the age at the date of his or her
termination.
14
Suezanne Bradfield, age 61, terminated on July 26, 2012; and (11) Marybelle Chandler,
age 71, terminated on July 27, 2012.
Id.
Ms. Bradfield’s theory in providing this list of
the 2012 terminations is to cast doubt on MEI’s claim of impending financial crisis at or
about the time it let her go.
Nevertheless, Ms. Bradfield maintains that the only
employees who should be considered part of the mini-RIF are those who were terminated
after June 2012, the date when the company claims to have begun a series of meetings with
its leadership to decide which employees should be terminated from employment.
Hall-Lima Dep. at 50-51.
Id.;
Only those employees who were eliminated from employment
after these discussions commenced were part of the mini-RIF, to wit:
(1) Sarah Goines,
age 37; (2) Michele Hobbs, age 41; (3) Amber Reuter, age 27; (4) Linda Cross, age 60; (5)
herself—Suezanne Bradfield, age 61; and (6) Marybelle Chandler, age 71.
12.
We disagree with this analysis.
Pl.’s Resp. at
To consider only the terminations that occurred
after formal meetings were conducted by MEI in June 2012 both obscures and discounts
the fluid nature of such business decisions.
As previously discussed, Ms. Hall-Lima
recognized that problems were looming during the first quarter of the 2012 fiscal year.
The fact that MEI included those employees who were terminated prior to June 2012 in its
analysis is not, in and of itself, disingenuous or deceitful.
Ms. Bradfield’s second argument posits that individuals outside the protected class
were returned to work after July 2012.
Of those discharged in 2012, Ms. Bradfield
identifies three individuals who were brought back by MEI:
15
(1) Sarah Goines, age 37;
(2) Michele Hobbs, age 41; (3) Amber Reuter, age 27; all of whom are outside ADEA’s
protections.
Id.
MEI responds that several others also returned to work based on their
stated desire to resume working for MEI.
As clients of MEI scheduled meetings and
conferences, MEI asserts, more of the RIF’ed employees returned to their previous
positions.
That the majority of returning employees were younger does raise some
concerns in analyzing MEI’s proffered reasons, but not to a degree where that factor carries
the day for Plaintiff, given her burden of persuasion3.
Ms. Bradfield also notes that the company never did move its operations to Chicago,
which was one of the reasons cited by MEI as not retaining Ms. Bradfield, to wit: “Ms.
Rivera was not selected for termination in the reduction in force because she was hired for
the Chicago office, which is where MEI was moving its operations.
Hall-Lima Dep. at
87. Additionally, [Mr.] Lima is located in Chicago, and as a result, most of the operational
accounting was already being transitioned to the Chicago office so he could oversee it as
CFO.” Def.’s Brief at 11.
It is unclear from the record whether MEI’s entire operation
was to move to Chicago, as implied by Ms. Bradfield, or only the fiscal operations, since
the CFO is based from Chicago.
However, the fact that 90 of 120 employees remained
in MEI’s Evansville location does not erode the sincerity of MEI’s plan to move some to
3 “‘(T)he plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination.’” Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir.
2000) citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
16
Chicago as a reason for the mini-RIF.
Moreover, the fact that one employee was retained
at the time of the RIF to work from the Chicago office—Ms. Rivera—who was
professionally comparable to Ms. Bradfield, provides some support for MEI’s position that
they were interested in moving staff to the Chicago office. Even viewed in a light most
favorable to Ms. Bradfield, we fail to see how the fact that most MEI employees remained
in Evansville and were not transferred to Chicago could be reasonably construed as
evidence of MEI’s disingenuousness in stating fiscal reasons for the mini-RIF.
Similarly, Ms. Bradfield’s arguments that: (1) the overall personnel expense did
not change significantly in 2012 and in 2013 the expense line for salaries greatly increased,
(2) the company “knew” that the end of the year would be more profitable than the
beginning of the year, (3) MEI decided to retain employees whose salaries represented a
greater cost to the company than those terminated, and (4) the effect of federal legislation
was greatly exaggerated, all call into question MEI’s business judgments, which is beyond
the scope of our inquiry here.
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how these fiscal
circumstances faced by MEI as the basis for its reduction in personnel are unworthy of
credence.
At summary judgment, Plaintiff is not required to present every minute fact and
detail, depicting all the possible evidence in support of her contentions. However, she is
required to sketch enough of an argument with supportive proof from which a jury could
find in her favor on pretext. Taken cumulatively, Ms. Bradfield has failed to offer
17
sufficient facts and information which would be persuasive to a reasonable jury considering
her claim of pretext, specifically, or her claim of age discrimination, generally. As often
reiterated by the Seventh Circuit, the Court does “not sit as a kind of ‘super-personnel
department’ weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by firms charged with
employment discrimination.”
Wollenburg v. Comtech Mfg. Co., 201 F.3d 973, 976 (7th
Cir.2000) (quoting Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410
(7th Cir.1997)).
“On the issue of pretext, our only concern is the honesty of the
employer's explanation.” O'Connor v. DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th
Cir.1997); O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 984 (7th Cir. 2001). Here,
major gaps exist in Plaintiff’s proof. The fact that some younger employees who were
discharged as part of the RIF were recalled to their previous posts is, by itself, unpersuasive
in Plaintiff’s effort to prove pretext and Ms. Bradfield’s claim of age discrimination cannot
survive. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
B.
Retaliation Claim:
Ms. Bradfield’s second cause of action is for retaliation by MEI for her having filed
a discrimination claim.
She alleges that comments made by CEO Ms. Hall-Lima
constitute direct evidence of retaliation, entitling her to summary judgment on this claim.
MEI counters that the Plaintiff has no evidence of any retaliation or retaliatory motive by
those in hiring authority for MEI and, therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary
18
judgment.
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test applies to Ms. Bradfield's retaliation
claim just as it does with regard to her age discrimination claim.
93 F.3d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir.1996).
Knox v. State of Indiana,
In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation
using the direct method, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to establish that: (1)
she engaged in statutorily-protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. Jones v. Res-Care, Inc.,
613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, if MEI shows a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its refusal to rehire
Ms. Bradfield, the burden shifts back to Ms. Bradfield to show pretext.
As discussed
supra., the evidence presented on cross motions for summary judgment must be considered
in the light most favorable to the respective non-movant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574.
It is well-settled that the filing of an EEOC charge is considered a statutorily
protected activity for purposes of asserting an ADEA retaliation claim.
(See Smith v.
Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 674 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2012); Tomanovich v. City of
Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006); Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., 336 F.3d
520, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding there is “no dispute that (the plaintiff) satisfied the first
element by filing her EEOC charge”)).
In filing her EEOC claim on August 27, 2012
(amended on August 12, 2014), Ms. Bradfield engaged in protected activity under the
ADEA.
MEI does not dispute that Ms. Bradfield has satisfied this first requirement, so
19
we move on to the remaining elements of the direct proof for an ADEA retaliation claim.
When considering whether an employee suffered an adverse action in the ADEA
retaliation context, the standard used is identical to that in the Title VII context, to wit,
whether a reasonable worker would be dissuaded from lodging a charge in the face of such
action.
(See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405
(2006):
Actions constitute retaliation under Title VII if they could well “dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”).
Ms.
Bradfield submits that other MEI employees were recalled to work once the company’s
financial forecast appeared brighter, but that she and another past employee, Ms. Marybelle
Chandler, an individual also protected under ADEA, were not invited to return because
they had filed charges against the company.
Because MEI has not challenged this second
prong of the direct method of proof, we accept Ms. Bradfield’s contentions as true and turn
to the third prong of causation.
During her deposition on May 19, 2014, Ms. Hall-Lima testified that several
individuals had returned to employment with MEI: “I know that we called most of them
back, with the exception of the two that filed suit.
So I believe—I know—Sarah Goines
had come back, Michele Hobbs is back, Amber Reuter is back. I guess that's why you're
jumping over them. But I don't know if Linda Cross is back or not.”
Hall-Lima Dep. at
57. Ms. Hall-Lima also stated, “I would never call someone back to work that said I
was—that filed a suit against me. Would you?”
20
Id. at 86.
MEI explains that, despite her
comments, Ms. Hall-Lima had no direct responsibility for hiring staff.
Instead, according
to MEI, she hired the leaders in each area and each of those managers had complete
autonomy over the personnel in their functional areas.
Def.’s Resp4. at 5.
MEI further
suggests that Ms. Bradfield’s conclusions regarding Ms. Hall-Lima’s involvement in hiring
after July 2012 are purely “speculative.”
Id.
Citing Ripberger, a case in which the
Seventh Circuit made clear that a plaintiff must provide evidence beyond her own
speculation that the person making the alleged direct comments had involvement in the
hiring decisions.
Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23186 (7th Cir.
December, 2014); citing Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evidence that an allegedly biased complex manager played any role in adverse decision
made by regional manager was simply too speculative to establish involvement).
Defendant further argues that to prove a causal connection in the context of ADEA
retaliation, the challenged act “must be a but-for cause of a materially adverse action, not
merely a contributing factor.’” See Barton v. Zimmer, 662 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 2011).
Def.’s Resp. at 5. MEI claims that Ms. Bradfield has no basis for her retaliation claim
because she has not, to date, submitted her application for any positions available at MEI
in contrast to other rehired employees and because her position has not been re-opened.
Thus, MEI suggests the comments and actions of its CEO have not materially affected her
4 This refers to Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Count II of the Amended Complaint.
21
employment prospects.
We are urged to accept the argument that by not putting forth an
application, she has failed to state a viable claim, and cannot be deemed to have suffered
any injury due to Ms. Hall-Lima’s comments.
MEI also maintains that it is unnecessary
for us to examine the question of whether the statement made by Ms. Hall-Lima would be
sufficient to dissuade other similarly-situated individuals from lodging charges against
MEI, given that Ms. Hall-Lima was not the person in charge of hiring.
We disagree that Ms. Bradfield’s assertions are premised solely on her speculation;
her claim reasonably invokes the comments made by a person whom both parties have
characterized as a “hands-on” CEO.
This constitutes proof of Ms. Hall-Lima’s role in the
personnel decisions on behalf of MEI, which fact is further corroborated given that she:
(1) promoted Ms. Bradfield to the position of Assistant Vice President of Financial
Services in 2008 (Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Part. Summ. J. at 5) and (2) said herself that she
was directly involved in personnel meetings in 2012 (Hall-Lima Dep. at 50-51;). These
facts are undisputed by MEI. Defendant’s assertion that Ms. Hall-Lima may have been
closely involved in personnel decisions prior to 2012, but not involved thereafter, creates
a question of fact between the parties that must be resolved by a jury.
Finally, we turn to the issue of whether Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails on the basis
of pretext.
MEI asserts that the deposition provided by Jason McDowell, (“Mr.
McDowell”), who led the finance team and made the hiring decisions for those employees,
clearly shows that he had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for declining to recall Ms.
22
Bradfield. Def.’s Resp. at 6. Mr. McDowell stated that he had no interest in re-hiring
Ms. Bradfield based on his previous negative experience in working with her.
Mr.
McDowell viewed Ms. Bradfield as a difficult employee who was inept in succeeding in a
fast-paced team environment. Moreover, in his view, she declined to add proficiencies,
such as a mastery of Access databases, to her skill set.
Ms. Bradfield counters that the view expressed so succinctly by Ms. Hall-Lima—
that no one was welcome back who had sued her or her company—was MEI’s de facto
policy.
Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Part. Summ. J. at 18.
Whether or not this characterization
is true turns on issues of fact and assessments of credibility the Court is not authorized to
resolve on summary judgment.
We will leave those to the factfinder to sort out at trial.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim must be and is DENIED.
Ms. Bradfield reciprocally argues that summary judgment should be decided on the
retaliation claim in her favor.
However, for the same reasons articulated above, these
issues are not amenable to resolution by the Court on summary judgment.
Thus Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on her retaliation claim must also be DENIED.
23
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, MEI’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms.
Bradfield’s original Complaint of Age Discrimination, filed on June 23, 2014 [Dkt. nos.
28, 29] is GRANTED; MEI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed on November 07, 2014 [Dkt. nos. 54, 55] is DENIED;
and Ms. Bradfield’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, filed on December 15, 2014 [Dkt. No. 57] is also DENIED.
case shall proceed accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
03/31/2015
Date: _________________________
24
The
Distribution:
Benjamin R. Aylsworth
BIESECKER DUTKANYCH & MACER LLC
baylsworth@bdlegal.com
Andrew Dutkanych, III
BIESECKER DUTKANYCH & MACER LLC
ad@bdlegal.com
Patrick A. Shoulders
ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS
pshoulders@zsws.com
Wm. Michael Schiff
ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS
MSchiff@zsws.com
Jean Marie Blanton
ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS LLP
jblanton@zsws.com
25
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