SMITH v. PARSLEY et al
Filing
34
ENTRY GRANTING 19 DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A separate judgment shall issue. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 3/19/2013. (JLM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
POLICE CHIEF DENNIS N. PARSLEY, et. al, )
)
)
Defendants.
CLARENCE SMITH,
4:12-cv-34 SEB-DML
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Docket No. 19)
This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Limited
Issue of the Application of Heck v. Humphry. (Dkt. No. 19). For the reasons set forth below, we
GRANT Defendants’ motion.
I. FACTS
The facts designated by the parties are uncontested. On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff was
involved in an incident with several Bedford, Indiana police officers in the lobby of the Bedford
police station.1 Complaint, ¶¶ 9 - 20 (Dkt. No. 1-1). The next day, Plaintiff was charged by the
Lawrence County Prosecutor with the offenses of battery on a police officer and resisting law
enforcement. Id. at ¶ 21. On February 20, 2012, just seventeen days before his criminal case was
to be tried, Plaintiff filed this civil action in the Lawrence Superior Court asserting claims under 42
1
Neither party has specifically designated or otherwise addressed in their summary
judgment briefings exactly what happened during the incident and, thus, we have not been asked
to consider those facts in ruling on Defendants’ motion. The facts are, however, recounted in the
Indiana Court of Appeals’ Memorandum Decision, Smith v. State of Indiana, No. 47A04-1206CR-315 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), which Defendants have attached to their Notice of State
Court Ruling (Dkt. No. 32-1).
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights. Id.
On March 9, 2012, Plaintiff’s criminal case was tried before a Lawrence County jury, which
found him guilty of resisting law enforcement, but acquitted him of battery on a police officer.
Pltf’s Motion to Stay, ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 16). On March 21, 2012, Defendants timely removed this cause
to federal court and, later, filed the summary judgment motion that is now before us. In the
meantime, Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Indiana Court of Appeals. Pltf’s Motion to Stay,
¶ 6. On February 15, 2013, Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.2 Notice of State
Court Ruling (Dkt. No. 32).
II. ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether Plaintiff’s claims in this action are barred as a matter of
law by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reflects that there is “no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled of judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The parties agree that there
are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the issue before us is appropriate for resolution
as a matter of law.
IV. DISCUSSION
“Heck bars any suit for damages premised on a violation of civil rights if the basis for the
suit is inconsistent with or would undermine the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence.”
Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004). Consequently, when a convicted
2
Because the Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Pending
State Court Appeal at Docket No. 16 is denied as moot.
2
person, such as Plaintiff, files a suit for money damages under § 1983, “the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
In Plaintiff’s own words, his claims in this action are for: “(1) unlawful arrest, (2) unlawful
search and seizure, (3) unlawful detention and confinement, . . . (4) conspiracy, [and] (5) refusing
or neglecting to prevent deprivations of [his] rights.”3 Pltf’s Memo, ¶ 9 (Dkt. No. 22). Defendants
argue that these claims are barred by Heck because Plaintiff was convicted of resisting law
enforcement, Plaintiff’s conviction has not been invalidated, and any finding by this Court that
Plaintiff was falsely arrested, detained and confined would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction.
Plaintiff responds that Heck does not bar his claims. He argues that the Indiana Supreme
Court’s ruling in Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2011) and the Indiana Court of Appeals’ prior
ruling in Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) entitle him to pursue his claims,
notwithstanding Heck. We disagree.
3
The Court notes that paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint
could be read to support an excessive force claim and that an excessive force claim might not
necessarily be barred by Heck. See Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (a criminal
conviction for resisting arrest does not necessarily invalidate a § 1983 excessive force claim).
However, Plaintiff has not asserted an excessive force claim in this action insofar as we can
determine. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is styled as a statement of facts section setting forth
the facts that underlie the claims expressly asserted in the “wherefore” clauses of Counts II (false
arrest), III (false detention and confinement), IV (conspiracy), and V (refusing or neglecting to
prevent deprivations). Unlike Counts II, III, IV, and V, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
include a “wherefore” clause which expressly asserts a claim. Significantly, in responding to
Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has made no mention of an excessive force
claim. We, thus, conclude that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not assert an excessive force claim,
but if it does, Plaintiff has waived his right to proceed on that claim by failing to reference it and
address it on summary judgment.
3
In Barnes, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the English common law “right to resist an
unlawful police entry into a home is against public policy and is incompatible with modern Forth
Amendment jurisprudence.”4 Id. at 576. The court explained that resistance to an arrest, even an
unlawful arrest, is unwarranted because it can escalate into violence leading to injuries and that
aggrieved arrestees now have options to address police misconduct that were unavailable at common
law, including civil remedies. Id. In Alspach, a case decided ten years before Barnes, the Indiana
Court of Appeals similarly observed that “[a] citizen today can seek his remedy for a police officer’s
unwarranted and illegal intrusion into the citizen’s private affairs by bringing a civil action.”
Alspach, 755 N.E.2d at 211.
While both Barnes and Alspach reference the modern availability of civil remedies for police
misconduct, neither case establishes that a person who believes he has been the victim of police
misconduct has an absolute right to bring and maintain any particular type of civil action. Neither
case addresses the circumstances under which § 1983 claims can be brought and maintained in
federal court, and neither case casts doubt on the continued viability of Heck, which remains good
law. We, thus, return to Heck, which requires us to determine whether a judgment in favor of
Plaintiff on his claims in this action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for
resisting law enforcement.
Before a defendant can be convicted of resisting law enforcement under Indiana Code § 3544-3-3,5 a judge or jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) knowingly or
4
Of course, Plaintiff here was not arrested in his home, but in the lobby of the Bedford
police station.
5
Indiana Code § 35-44-3-3 is the statute under which Plaintiff was convicted. Pltf’s
Memo, ¶ 13. It has since been repealed and recodified at Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1.
4
intentionally, (2) forcibly (3) resisted, obstructed, or interfered with (4) a law enforcement officer,
(5) while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” K.W. v. State, ___
N.E.2d ___, 2013 WL 653023, *2 (Ind. 2013) (listing the “five essential elements” of Indiana Code
§ 35-44-3-3) (emphasis added). Given the five essential elements of this crime, the jury that
received the evidence during Plaintiff’s criminal trial necessarily found that the Bedford police
officers involved in the February 24, 2010 incident were lawfully engaged in the execution of their
duties. Had they found otherwise, Plaintiff would not have been found guilty.
Because all of Plaintiff’s claims in this action are based on the allegation that the Bedford
police officers acted unlawfully, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his criminal conviction and would be inconsistent with or contradict the fifth essential
element of the crime for which Plaintiff was convicted – i.e., that the officers acted lawfully.
Plaintiff’s claims in this action are, therefore, barred by Heck and are subject to dismissal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
and their motion is GRANTED. A separate judgment shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 03/19/2013
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Copies to:
Liberty L. Roberts
ROBERTS LEGAL GROUP, LLC
liberty@robertslegalgroupllc.com
John D. Boren
BOREN OLIVER & COFFEY
johnboren@boclawyers.com
Glen Emmett Koch II
BOREN OLIVER & COFFEY
glenkoch@boclawyers.com
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?