THORNTON v. PRATT et al

Filing 19

ENTRY - The Court concludes that there is no legitimate basis for the plaintiff to sue the assigned Article III judge. The plaintiff's suggestion otherwise is both frivolous and contrived. As the Court concluded previously, there is no need fo r disqualification of the undersigned. Because of this, the motion to recuse 5 and the Motion to Set Aside 10 are DENIED. Copy mailed to pltf. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 4/15/2013. **Entry emailed to USCA. **(JLM) Modified on 4/15/2013 (JLM).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
RICHARD B. THORNTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN G. HEYBURN, II, JUDGES OF WESTERN
DISTRICT and JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
6TH CIRCUIT,
Defendants.

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ENTRY
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Richard B. Thornton’s Motion for Recusal
(Dkt. 5) and a Motion to Vacate and Strike this Court’s Entry entered January 31, 2013 (Dkt.
10). In both of these motions, Mr. Thornton asks for recusal of the undersigned.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), a judge shall disqualify herself if she is a party to the
proceeding. In limited circumstances, however, judges have refused to disqualify themselves
when a party seeks to add them as a party to a pending proceeding. See United States v. Walls,
2006 WL 1284556, at *2 n.2 (E.D.Mich. May 9, 2006). A case which arrives with the judgedefendant in place should be treated no differently. “A judge who is named as a defendant in a
plaintiff’s amended complaint is not required to disqualify himself or herself under 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(5)(i) unless there is a legitimate basis for suing the judge.” 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts
§ 95; Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (judge refused to
disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5)(i) where he was named as a party in second amended
complaint after he dismissed original complaint). “For a judge to be disqualified simply because

the plaintiff has sued that judge would be to allow the plaintiff to manipulate the identity of the
decision-maker and thus to engage in judge-shopping.” 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 95.
The Mr. Thornton complains of the manner in which this Court and others have dealt
with his litigation.

Judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary

admonishments are not grounds for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). In
order to justify recusal under § 455(a), the impartiality of which a judge is accused will almost
always be extrajudicial. Id. at 554. Thus, “[w]hen a motion for recusal fails to set forth an
extrajudicial source for the alleged bias and no such source is apparent, the motion should be
denied.” Sprinpangler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (S.D.Ind. 1991) (citing
Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988)).
The Court concludes that there is no legitimate basis for the plaintiff to sue the assigned
Article III judge. The plaintiff=s suggestion otherwise is both frivolous and contrived. As the
Court concluded previously, there is no need for disqualification of the undersigned. Because of
this, the motion to recuse (Dkt. 5) and the Motion to Set Aside (Dkt. 10) are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
04/15/2013
Date: __________________

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:
Richard B. Thornton
P. O. Box 144
Mauchport, Indiana 47142

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